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THE EFFEC~S OF POLICY-MAKING WITHIN THE PLANNING FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY &~D 
PRACTICE 
TOM RATHWELL 
ABSTRACT 
The re-0rganisation of the National Health Service (NHS) in 1974 was 
im:ended to have a profound and fundamental effect upon the decision-
making underpinning the development and delivery of health care 
services. Re-organisation was considered necessary on two grounds: 
first to unite the tripartite structure of health care which had 
existed since 1948; and second to instil the discipline of a 
corporate management and planning system into the health service. 
By the late 1970s it had become clear that the corporate management 
planning system was not working; certainly not as its procreators had 
envisaged. The system was judged a failure on four counts: 
1) health planning became largely prescriptive; 
2) it remained essentially incrementalist; 
3) very few plans and policies produced were evaluated; and 
4) an inability to achieve the change envisaged. 
Given the perceived failure of the corporate management planning 
system to effect change in the NHS, the study sought to investigate 
two pertinent issues: firstly, the extent to which the philosophy and 
rationale of health planning is a guiding force leading to better 
policies; and secondly, to understand those factors which influence 
and impinge on the planning process and the resulting policy 
decisions. 
It is clear from the investigation that health planning in the NHS has 
failed to live up to expectations. The study has demonstrated that 
the introduction of a formal planning system into an organisation, 
however well-intended, is of itself not enough without additional and 
continuing support. In the local case study, mechanisms and 
procedures were established and adhered to, and yet very little in the 
way of acceptable and implementable plans were produced. Nevertheless 
policy changes did occur and a number of factors can be cited as 
explanation for this phenomenon. 
Leadership emerged from the study as being a crucial ingredient in any 
recipe for planning and policy-making. Power was another dominant 
factor which was generally applied in a negative sense but when used 
in a positive way, dramatic results were possible. The third 
ingredient necessary for effective planning and policy-making was 
involvement not only of others in the organisation but also of the 
public. However having these attributes is not enough and the study 
has demonstrated the need for a more integrated style of planning, 
policy-making and management, and a concept of strategic management is 
proffered as an appropriate vehicle for creating within the NHS the 
desired future change consistent with the needs of the public. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TNTFODDCTION 
The re-organisation of the British National Health Service (NHS) in 
1974 was intended to have a profound and fundamental effect upon the 
decision-making underpinning the development and delivery of health 
care services. The key feature of the 1974 re-organisation was the 
introduction, for the first time in a British public agency, of a 
formal corporate management structure, whose principal characteristic 
was decision-making through consensus (DHSS, 1972). Re-organisation 
was considered necessary on two grounds. The first factor was the 
growing dissatisfaction with the tripartite structure of health care 
comprising general practitioner services, hospital and specialist 
care, and a mixture of community and personal support services, which 
had existed since 1948. The administrative distinctiveness of the 
three sectors was a recipe for fragmentation in that each sector was 
managed seperately, thus making "co-ordination of services and 
'rational' planning very difficult" (Barnard, 1977, p.15). 
The second thrust for change was partly a reflection of the growth of 
planning in general and health planning in particular, and partly the 
realization that in "modern technologically-based organisations too 
much is at stake to be left to chance" (Barnard, 1977, p.17). The 
very size and complexity of the NHS meant that it was virtually 
impossible for the centre, the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS) - head office, to control in any meaningful way the 
overall development and directional growth of the NHS. Thus re-
organisation had two principal objectives; to integrate under one 
management structure the existinq tripartite system; and to provide a 
mechanism whereby the DHSS could control the general direction and 
development of the NHS while allowing the local administrative units 
the necessary autonomy for operational decision-making. A formal 
corporate planninq and management system was seen as essential if 
these two objectives were to be achieved (Barnard, 1977). 
Corporate management planning systems are a means whereby 
organisations attempt to minimize uncertainty - to control the future 
- by developing a sophisticated information and communication network, 
incorporating key managers and interest groups, whose involvement was 
seen as instrumental in shaping the future direction of the 
organisation. Thus corporate planning was the vehicle through which 
decisions on policy were determined. The NHS was seen to be no 
different from other corporate entities and consequently a 
comprehensive and rational system of planning was introduced, on a 
national basis, shortly after the 1974 re-organisation (DHSS 1976a). 
The system was 'comprehensive' in that all levels in the 
administrative network, were involved in the process, all issues or 
topics were to be thoroughly assessed, a variety of courses of action 
could be identified and evaluated, so that the 'best' or most 
appropriate choice would emerge. In this context, 'rational' was 
taken to mean that all planning issues could be objectively evaluated, 
such that any decision made was done solely on the merits of the 
case. 
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Just as the corporate management structure was designed to =·rino some 
order to a fraomented NHS, sn too the introduction of a formal 
planning system was intended to in~rn~uoe same direction to the 
fragmented and chaotic planning of the 1950s and 1960s, to integrate 
and improve the delivery of services to patients and to ensure that 
those responsible for service provision were sensitized to the 'needs' 
of patients and the public. In summary, the NHS planning system had 
a dual purpose: firstly, as a vehicle through which changes could 
occur and secondly, as a mechanism for ensuring that the proposed 
changes were compatible with the perceived needs of the community 
(DHSS, 1972). 
Unfulfilled Promises - a Rationale for Investigation 
By the end of the 1970s it was abundantly clear that the NHS planning 
system was not working: certainly not as its procreators had 
envisaged (Royal Commission, 1979; DHSS, 1980a). Plans had been 
produced by health authorities in fulfillment of the formal 
requirements of the system as attested to by the mountain of planning 
documents to be seen in most health authorities. However, very few 
of these plans reflect the spirit of the planning system - to bring 
about change which is compatible to the needs of the community. 
Clearly the NHS planning system, and by implication corporate 
management, had not proved to be the appropriate instrument through 
which broad policy objectives were fashioned into workable and 
acceptable policies. Why should this be so? 
The corporate planning and management model, according to Barnard 
(1977), was inappropriate for the NHS and therefore bound to fail. He 
- ·~ 
cites four reasons in support of his stance: no single product or 
ranaP of products which would allow catlonaliza~ion ln the interest of 
effi~iPn~y; consumer nenavlaur which is JifElcult to understand; 
conflicting local interests which makes consultation and collaboration 
laborious; and, the dominant feature of health care delivery which 
concentrates on relieving present problems and not on the provision 
or attainment of a desirable state of affairs sometime in the future. 
Barnard offers no evidence in support of his claim that "these are 
potentially powerful factors against the substantial application of 
the corporate planning approach" (emphasis added] (1977, p. 18). It 
is the potentiality of these militating factors, among others, with 
which this research is concerned. 
Attention is also directed to three additional major factors said to 
act as inhibitors which prevent the health planning process from 
reaching its full potential. These debilitating agents, so critics 
argue, are: 
a) The prescriptive nature of the health services planning system 
itself which with its emphasis on an annual time scale precluded 
any detailed analysis and assessment of problems to such an 
extent that most plans tended to adopt DHSS guidelines as de 
facto appropriate levels of service (Barnard, et al, 1980a; 
198Gb). 
b) Policy decision-making rooted very much in incrementalist 
philosophy had not given those involved in the planning of health 
services clear and succinct objectives within which to plan 
(Irving, et al, 1981; McNaught, 1981). 
c) Satlsfaction from most planners rested with the difficult 
enc,ugh task of produc J_ng the completed plan. 
usually made to evaluate the policies arislna out of thP planning 
system in order to ascertain their impact upon the public nor 
indeed to see if the original policy objectives have been 
achieved (Barnard, et al, 1980a; 1980b). 
d) The philosophy of planning has been allocated a relatively low 
profile while its practical elements have been emphasised to such 
an extent that planning had become a means unto itself rather than 
a pursuit of chosen policy objectives (Barnard, et al, 1979; 
Weller and Williams, 1982). 
Purpose of the Study 
The various critical assertions cited would seem to represent the 
current wisdom of self-critical NHS planners (Beveridge, 1983; 
Hunter, 1983:; Kearns, et al, 1983; Stevens and Whitt, 1983; Irving 
et al, 1981; McNaught, 1981). The purpose of the research was 
twofold: a) to determine how the philosophy and rational which 
underpins the NHS planning system is manifested in the plans produced, 
and b) to investigate the extent to which the assertions cited above 
influenced the planning process and the resulting policy decisions. 
~n over-arching objective was to assess what impact the decisions 
emanating out of the central-local corporate framework of the NHS 
planning system had on the public for whom the service is designed. 
Critical to the assessment of the impact of decisions on the public 
and their responses to these decisions would be an analysis of the 
role played by certain pressure aroups (far instance, the Community 
Health Counr.il portray the public's interest 
in influencina pnli~y ~P~isi0n~-
The Study Area 
The application of health planning to the formulation of policy is 
considered through an empirical investigation of the processes 
involved in the consideration and development of services for two 
particular population groups, i) the elderly and ii) the mentally 
handicapped, in a single health authority. The choice of one health 
authority was deliberate, as was the choice of study groups. A 
single health authority was selected largely for logistical reasons. 
It was considered that to include more than one health authority would 
unduly complicate the investigation, especially in the light of the 
impending structural changes in the NHS. 
At the time that the feasibility of the investigation was being 
discussed it became apparent that the Government was committed to the 
abolition of the Area tier in the management structure of the NHS 
(DHSS, 1980a). The Government's rationale for the removal of the 
Area tier was to strengthen local decision-making through the creation 
of local health authorities. Such an arrangement they believed would 
be more sensitive to the needs of the patient (DHSS, 1980a). 
Concomitant with this policy of strengthening and promoting local 
decision-making was the desire of the Government to devolve central 
functions, where appropriate, to the local level thereby fostering 
greater local accountability. 
This change in 1982 in the management structure of the NHS was of 
prnfnun~ s10nificance for the because it ~as the ~rea 
ti2r whi~h hB~ h~~ ~hP m~jnr rFspnnsihili~y for planning and policy-
making under the 1974 reorganisation. The abolition of the Area tier 
meant that planning and policy-making were devolved to the local level 
or District Health Authorities(DHA). This created difficulties for 
the research on two fronts: firstly, under the 1974 reorganisation 
responsibility for planning and policy-making was vested in the Area 
tier with the District tier responsible for the day to day operation 
of the health service. This meant that the Districts were only 
marginally involved in planning and policy-making so that when the 
Area tier was abolished there was no defined or developed planning 
capability within the Districts to enable them to carry on (Rathwell, 
1982). Furthermore, the interregnum between the time it was known 
that the Area tier would go and the new DHAs were to come into power 
generally meant that any policy initiatives under discussion were 
suspended or put into abeyance because the one body did not 
necessarily wish to commit the other to a policy which they might not 
wish to support. 
The second factor concerns policies already developed by the Area 
tier. There was no guarantee that policies and plans approved by the 
Area tier would be enthusiastically endorsed by the new DHAs. In fact 
there was some evidence to suggest that DHAs were most unlikely to 
accept the policy decision of their Area predecessors because one of 
the reasons for the demise of the Area was the continuing war of 
attrition between Areas and their Districts over policy issues (Royal 
Commission, 1979). The difference between them was largely one of 
perspecti 'i.le: the Area level was concerned about the impact of policy 
issues ac~oss their territorv - the area-wide view, whereas Districts 
were rightly troubled by the local implications. Thus it can be 
argued that even where DHAs shared the concern of the former Area 
level on a specific issue, they would probably prescribe a different 
recipe for consideration. 
Fortunately not all former Area Health Authorities (AHA) had a number 
of health districts within their geographical boundaries. Some AHAs 
had none and were known as single district AHAs. It was decided that 
one of the single district AHAs would be the most appropriate focus 
for the study, since it was most likely that the constraints 
identified above would be either non-existent or greatly minimized. 
This decision would ensure that the then forthcoming structural 
changes in the NHS would not be very disruptive to the research 
protocol, since its outcome to a large extent depended upon the 
continuity of the decision-making and planning processes. 
One such single district AHA was the Newcastle Health Authority (NHA) 
who agreed to participate in the research initiative. NHA very 
generously granted access to all its records including minutes of 
committee meetings and planning team meetings, general correspondence 
and published and unpublished reports. 
The two study groups, the elderly and the mentally handicapped, were 
selected in consultation with officers from NHA. The intention was 
to select two population sub-groups about which considerable national 
policy existed, but in which there was clear local differentiation 
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with regard to the acceptance and implementation of the natlonal 
guidance. Analysis has suggested that there is differentiation by 
health authorities between certain population sub-groups (Barnard, et 
al, 1979; Glennerster, et al, 1982; DHSS, 1976b; Rathwell, 1981). 
tn particular it woulrl appear that contrary to central policy 
initiatives there is little evidence of a significant shift in 
resources from the hospital sector to the priority care groups 
identified by the DHSS (Glennerster, et al, 1983; Rathwell and 
Barnard, 1985). Where shifts in resources have occurred these 
have largely benefited the elderly, almost to the total exclusion of 
the other priorty groups (Rathwell and Barnard, 1985). In the 
planning and policy making arena the elderly are much more likely to 
be given differential even preferential treatment from which policy 
initiatives emerge than is generally the case for the mentally 
handicapped. Several reasons may be advanced for this view; 
firstly, the elderly have been and most likely will continue to be a 
topical issue, not least because of the latest demographic evidence, 
which indicates that the numbers of elderly are increasing absolutely 
and proportionally compared to the rest of the population (OPCS, 
1985). Secondly, it is well-known that the elderly group are one of 
the major consumers of health services. This fact coupled with the 
forecast demographic changes for the elderly, is a powerful influence 
which most health authorities are unlikely to ignore. Thirdly, as 
the elderly have increased in number over the years so too has their 
influence in that, as a group they have become more adept and more 
astute at making their particular views known, which has had an 
obvious impact upon those agencies responsible for social welfare 
(Issacs and Robertson, 1985). 
By contrast, the mentally handicapped possess little of these 
att.-cibuLt=~ ctnd cons(~quent1y lt LS easier for healt~ policy~make.!:"'s anc 
i~liplewen te1:s Lu i.~uure -cf1e needs or tllls particular group even 'Nhere 
clear-cut national guidance exists (DHSS, 1971; National 
Development Group for the Mentally Handicapped, 1976; 1977; 1980; 
DHSS, 1980a). Compared to the elderly this group is numerically small, 
is perceived to have little or no clout -politically or socially, and 
most importantly is largely removed from public view, thanks mainly to 
the outmoded legacy of that Victorian institution, the asylum. The 
adage 'out of sight, out-of mind' was never more appropriate. Since 
they were numerically small and were currently being provided with 
reasonable services, NHS policy-makers did not share with the DHSS the 
same sense of urgency to institute reforms and/or inject more 
resources especially when viewed against all the other competing 
claims for additional resources facing each DHA. In light of the 
foregoing, it was considered that a examination of those two 
population sub-groups would provide a useful insight into how the 
planning process manages the development and implementation of 
specific policies. 
The research therefore seeks to investigate two issues: 
i) the extent to which the philosophy and rationale of health 
planning is a guiding force leading to better policies, and 
ii) to understand those factors which influences and impinge on the 
planning process and the resulting policy decisions. 
Understanding the planning process and discerning the factors which 
distinguish success from failure are not sufficient requisites for 
i' 
change if auch change onlv occurs on an ad hoc or infreauent basis. 
It is important, therefore, to not only direct, but also to sustain 
planning and policy-making through a mechanism or procedure which 
synthesizes the ingredients for success with sound management 
principles. In other words, the art of managing strategically. 
Plan of Thesis 
The thesis begins with a short but important Chapter (Two) which 
outlines the investigative framework applied in the research. Chapter 
Three goes on to provide the conceptual framework by considering, 
mainly from a review of the relevant literature, the theoretical 
background to decision-making in general and to planning and policy-
making in particular. It does this from three separate but not 
mutually exclusive perspectives: theories of decision-making; 
questions of policy analysis; and social planning systems. This is 
the cornerstone of the thesis and is also its distinguishing feature; 
that is the synthesis of decision-making, policy analysis and planning 
systems within one conceptual framework as a basis for understanding 
the relationship between theory and practice of planning and policy-
making in the NHS. The chapter also provides the background to the 
contextual discussion of the research findings because it places 
planning firmly within the decision-making sphere in the sense that 
plans are meaningless unless implemented. It is on this foundation 
which the remainder of the thesis is constructed. 
Chapter Four traces the development of health planning in the NHS as 
background to Chapter Five which is an exposition of events as they 
unfolded in the study area and from which the observations crucial to 
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an understanding of the policy-making and planning processes have been 
drawn. Chapters Six to Nine embody the main discussion of the 
research with the topics or subjects in turn comprising: power and 
influence in decision-making; the political nature of planning and 
policy-making; professionals and the role of the planner; and public 
involvement in the planning process. Chapter Ten concludes by briefly 
rehearsing the original objectives of the research, how far those 
objectives have been achieved and discusses the concept of strategic 
management which has been put forward as an operative for synthesizing 
management principles with the key features identified with promoting 
and sustaining strategic change. 
CHAPTER TWO 
INVESTIGATIVE FRAMEWORK AND DISCUSSION AGENDA 
The investigative framework employed in this study is that advocated 
by Barnard, et al (1980c) in Training Decisions in the NHS. The 
methodology which they recommend is one which attempts to pick up a 
policy issue in mid-stream and to retrospectively trace its origins 
through the organisation or agency's records while simultaneously 
following the policy issue through to its logical conclusion. The 
rationale for such a procedure is that it allows the researcher to 
analyse the way in which issues are screened or filtered at the 
outset; an important criterion when one is considering the policy-
making process. It will also identify a number of clues which the 
researcher can draw on to help his/her understanding of the events 
that surround the current developments of the policy issue. 
The success of such a methodology is very dependent upon the degree of 
co-operation and access to material granted by the agency or 
organisation under investigation. In the case of the research 
described herein, the researcher enjoyed the full co-operation of NHA. 
Being given unlimited access to material and making certain and 
specific deductions from the study thereof, provides only one aspect 
to the story. The researcher's observations need to be tested 
against the known facts, evidence from similar studies done elsewhere, 
and the views of those working within the study area. It is the 
third aspect, the corroboration of one's findings with those employed 
by the health authority, that is of concern here. 
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The analysis of the documentary evidence made available was 
supplemented through a series of interviews, or to be more precise, 
guided conversations, with a selection of the key actors involved in 
planning and decision-making in NHA. Time constraints did not allow 
all those involved in the planning process to be interviewed, so it 
was decided to focus on twelve persons who, from the analysis of the 
available documents, appeared to be instrumental in dictating the 
course of events. The key actors selected for interview ' . .rere a 
fairly disparate group comprising clinicians, nurses, administrators, 
local government officers and lay persons. They were reasonably 
representative of the different professional and disciplinary groups 
involved in the planning process. Interviews took place with ten of 
the twelve persons chosen. One declined to be interviewed (a 
clinician) as that person has recently retired and therefore did not 
wish to participate on the grounds that they were no longer part of 
the Service. The other person (an administrator) has left the NHA 
for a post in a health authority in the South of England. It was not 
possible, because of time and resource constraints, to arrange to 
interview this person at their new workplace. 
The loss of two persons from the original list of twelve was not 
thought to be damaging in terms of providing informed observations on 
the research findings. A majority of those interviewed had been 
involved in the planning machinery relevant to both groups, the 
elderly and the mentally handicapped, and were well-placed to be able 
to comment on the researcher's interpretation of the activities 
relating to them. 
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In an attempt to ensure that the responses of the interviewees were 
broadly comparable, a form of guided interview was used and a copy 
of the questions employed as an aide memoire during the course of 
the interview is affixed as an appendix. The interviews, which 
averaged between one and one and a half to two hours, were conducted 
at the interviewees place of work and the discussion was candid given 
the circumstances. In all cases the interview topics were discussed 
but not necessarily in the order listed in the appendix. 
The purpose of the interviews was to elicit from these key actors 
their personal perceptions of how and why events appeared to unfold as 
they did. The results of the interviews largely confirmed the 
observations of the researcher but this was not consistently so. For 
instance, while a majority of those interviewed agreed with the 
researcher's interpretation as reflected in the interview questions 
and the ensuing discussion, they sought to add their own gloss on why 
events had proceeded in such a manner. In some cases a small 
minority, while not necessarily reflecting the researcher's 
reconstruction of events, indicated that they felt that possibly too 
much was being read into certain situations and suggested that nothing 
unusual or untoward had taken place. Despite their varying 
explanations, it was clear that a number of crucial factors, crucial 
in the sense that they appeared to be instrumental to the way events 
developed, do go a long way towards an elucidation and understanding 
of planning and policy-making in the NHS. 
- 16 -
An Agenda for Discussion 
Jl ... number of crucial features emerged both from the docu.luentary 
evidence and the interview schedule which 'explain' why events 
progressed as they did. So it seems reasonable to hypothesize that 
they are central to the planning and policy-making arena, especially 
as some supporting evidence is available. The key characteristics of 
'so-called' successful planning are; leadership, power, politics -
particularly that related to existing provision of services, 
professional values and status, and the arrangements for and emphasis 
upon collaboration and consultation. Although each of these 
attributes will be considered in detail in later chapters, some 
justification of their importance as determining factors is necessary 
at this stage , 
The chairperson of any group can be considered, de jure, to be the 
leader of the group and accordingly has the opportunity to play a 
central role vis-a-vis the group (Fiedler, 1967). This question of 
leadership and how it is exercised is closely related to the concept 
of power and how it is wielded. According to Lukes (1974) power can 
be applied in three ways: firstly, the so-called 'pluralists' 
approach (Ham and Hill, 1984) which is the conflict over what should 
be considered as key issues; secondly, non decision-making (Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1970) where specific issues are not included on the agenda 
because of their contentious nature; and thirdly, the shaping of 
events by suppressing known captious issues as well as those merely 
suspected as being so (Lukes, 1974). Clearly what is included on the 
agenda and how the discussion is transacted is crucial to the manner 
in which policies are agreed and implemented. 
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There appears to be in the NHS an unwritten law which says that 
existing services are largely sacrosanct, almost above scrutiny, even 
on grounds of effectiveness and efficiency. This means that existing 
or established services restrict the organisation's capability for 
planning because there is a tendency, as Barnard et al observed, to 
concentrate on issues which "do not immediately threaten to disrupt 
people's established patterns of behaviour" (1979, Vol. 4, p. 30). 
Thus it is argued that existing services and/or facilities act as an 
undue constraint upon the planning and policy-making process. 
A central feature of the NHS is the clinical autonomy enjoyed by the 
medical profession which ensures that the clinical conditions are made 
available to practice medicine. An additional and related constraint 
is the general power and influence enjoyed by other health 
professionals over matters of policy. "They determine what shall be 
done and for whom" ( Illich, 1978, p. 342). These factors can be a 
very formidable barrier to change; especially when the change being 
mooted appears to threaten widely held professional values and 
beliefs. 
One of the major features of the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS was 
the desire to facilitate joint discussions between health authorities 
and local government. Legislation was enacted to ensure a closer 
working (that is, collaborative) relationship between both bodies. 
But requirements to work together does not necessarily guarantee 
success (Booth, 1981a; 1981b). Consultation was seen as being a key 
element of the NHS planning system, the purpose of which was to bring 
a degree of credibility and legitimacy to the planning process. 
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Regretably it failed to do either and has become largly discredited. 
This was because NHS planners and policy-makers saw it merely as a 
mechanism for information sharing •,.;hereas others, notably the CHC and 
certain professional groups saw things differently - an opportunity to 
contribute and potentially to influence the outcome of the planning 
system. Thus, to a certain extent consultation is the bete noire of 
NHS planners and policy-makers because it is something they are 
obliged to do but to which they carry very little commitment. 
The foregoing has served as an appetiser to the contents and the 
issues to be discussed in the body of this research report. However 
before such a discussion can be undertaken, it is necessary to place 
the study within a conceptual framework and this is undertaken in 
Chapter Three. 
CHAPTER THREE 
HEALTH PLANNING AND POLICY-M.J\.KING - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter examines decision-making from two perspectives: its 
theoretical or conceptual roots; and, its practical manifestations. 
Decision-making as a concept and as an activity has been the subject 
of considerable attention by social and behavioural scientists who 
sought to understand the conditions or criteria necessary for 
decision-making. The logic underpinning an analysis of decision-
making was simply this - if one understood the factors governing 
decision-making and how they impacted upon the process, then one could 
enhance the quality of decisions. There is an implicit but unstated 
assumption here; namely that because one does not understand the 
decision-making process any decisions reached, by definition, must be 
poor ones. 
The problem with this relatively simplistic approach to decision-
making is that decisions are very difficult to categorise: the issues 
they seek to remedy are in many cases exceedingly complex, and often 
involve a host or range of different groups or individuals who have 
their own specific and often unarticulated perception of what the 
problem is and how it should be solved. Such difficulties obviously 
complicate attempts to reach an understanding of decision-making and 
the development of a paradigm to 'explain' how it functions. 
Commentators in order it seems to better understand the driving forces 
of decision-making sought to develop theories or models as 
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'explanation' for the way in which they believed decision-making 
functioned. A random selection of some of the literature on 
decision-making has highlighted an apparent paradox in this field of 
study; namely that while there are a variety of typologies or 
paradigms which purport to describe decision-making, there is an 
acknowledgement that in reality none of them do so satisfactorily 
(Klein, 1974a; 1974b; Rein, 1976). A brief forage among the many 
theories propounded on decision-making may be useful, if only to 
demonstrate the seeming lack of consensus on what decision-making is 
really about. As Harrison rightly notes, "the classification of 
theories • will always be problematic since many of the theories 
have several dimensions and it is not self-evident which ones should 
be used to structure the analysis" (1985, p. 106). The discussion of 
decision-making theories is followed by a brief forage into policy 
analysis as a framework within which decisions are located. The 
Chapter concludes with a general exploration of planning methodologies 
and attempts to place planning within a social context. 
Towards Theories of Decision-Making 
Attempts by various students of decision-making to categorise the 
different approaches which they have observed have yielded a variety 
of classifications. Pettigrew (1973) contends that decision-making 
theories can be split into two broad classes: the 'normative 
mathematical-economic' and the 'behavioural'. There appear to be two 
difficulties with Pettigrew's classification; firstly it is over-
simplistic in that he presupposes that it is the behaviour of the 
organisation and those working within the organisation which largely 
determines decision outcomes. This seems to ignore the fact that 
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decisions occur within a political environment a fact which Pettigrew 
later acknowledges. Secondly, Pettigrew does not define nor does he 
discuss 'normative mathematical-economic' models thus depriving the 
reader of some insight into what these sorts of models might be. 
Thus one is left with Pettigrew's word that there are only two classes 
of decision-making theories but with no substantive argument in 
support of such a contention. 
The two dimensional model for classifying theories of decision-making 
is the most common approach in the literature. Advocates of this 
method, Pettigrew apart, are Allen who sees decision theories as being 
either descriptive - details the process by which organisations "make 
decisions about what to do" (1979, p. 109), or normative- outlines a 
process by which organisations should make decisions. To a certain 
extent Allen's diagnosis at first glance appears to be very similar to 
that of Pettigrew but the reality is different. In Allen's terms 
normative models are in essence 'rational' models in that they can be 
used "to derive improvements in how decisions are actually made" 
(1979, p. 109). This classification of Allen's includes behavioural 
theories of decision-making which Pettigrew considered worthy of a 
separate categorisation. Thus definitional differences appear to be 
predominant in any attempt at classifying theories of decision-making. 
Allen does admit that such distinctions are rather artificial because 
the theoretical definitions are hardly if ever reflected in practice. 
Nevertheless such a handicap has not prevented him from analysing 
"decision-making by breaking down the process of decision-making into 
its component parts" (1975, p .109). Though the desire to 
compartmentalise decision-making seems inevitably to lead to confusion 
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as to what is what; the certainty is that the process of decision-
making cannot be ignored. 
The two dimensional model to explain, or at least analyse, why 
decisions are made as they are is also favoured by Ham and Hill (1984) 
and Hunter (1980). These authors share similar views on how one might 
classify theories of decision-making; specifically they argue that 
there are two separate but not mutually exclusive approaches to 
decision-making which can be stated as rational and incremental 
models. Rational models or theories presuppose that clear aims and 
objectives can be identified, that there are a variety of ways of 
achieving these, that their consequences are known, and thus the 
'best' or most acceptable alternative can be readily identified and 
acted upon. 
proactive. 
In short, rational models by definition seek to be 
Incremental theories, by contrast, are politically driven 
in the sense that there is an unknown environment governing the manner 
in which decision-making occurs and which ultimately determines the 
decision outcome. In other words, the philosophy underpinning this 
approach is reactionary - wait for something to happen before deciding 
what to do about it. 
The difficulty with a two-dimensional typology is that there are 
always some decisions that do not quite fit either, and this has led 
some scholars to argue that there are in essence three categories of 
decision-making. A main protagonist for a three category 
classification for decision-making theories was Allison (1969, 1971) 
who identified three divisions: rational policy model, organisational 
process model, and bureaucratic politics models. This three way 
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classification is endorsed by Rhodes who states that "although each of 
the models highlights certain features of the decision-making process, 
none is without its defects'' (1979, p.32). A similar typology is 
used by Pfeffer ( 1982) although he employs different descriptive 
labels and attempts to minimise the models' inherent defects by 
arguing that their application is not universal because each mode] or 
theory operates somewhat differently depending on whether one is at 
the macro or micro level. At the macro level it is the behaviour of 
the organisation which is paramount, whereas at the micro level the 
focus is on groups, professions and/or individuals. The macro-micro 
dichotomization will be explored further later in the chapter when 
consideration is given to some approaches to the study of health 
policy. 
There is a common theme beginning to appear through this assessment of 
various commentators' attempts to develop a classification of theories 
of decision-making: namely that similar labels are being encountered 
even if there is limited or no consensus about the elements to be 
found under each label. Despite this apparent difficulty in 
classifying theories of decision-making and recognising that no one 
system is ideal, the typology offered by Allison (figure 3.1) is a 
reasonable methodolgy because it seems to incorporate those elements 
which nearly all students of decision-making acknowledge as being of 
importance. Each of these three classifications, rational, 
organisational and political (incremental) will now be considered in 
turn. 
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FIGURE 3.1 
Processes of Decision-Making 
RATIONAL 
COMPREHENSIVE 
ORGANISATIONAL 
Source: Allison, 1971; Rhodes, 1979. 
The Rational Model 
POLITICAL/ 
INCP£MENTAL 
Rationality implies that decision-making can be considered as a 
logical and largely sequential process. It assumes that those making 
decisions have perfect (or near perfect) knowledge about what is 
occurring and how the issue arose, that all the options or courses of 
action can be considered, that each option or alternative can be 
evaluated as to its likely impact on the issue or problem under 
consideration, and that out of this procedure the optimal or best 
approach will emerge (Simon, 1957, Carley, 1980, Van de Ven, 1983). 
March offers a slightly different but nonetheless supportive 
definition of rationality to which he ascribed these characteristics. 
1) a knowledge of alternatives- a set of options which are 
known and defined by the situation. 
2) a knowledge of consequences - the impact of each alternative can 
be readily assessed. 
3) a consistent preference ordering- the objective and values on 
which each option is evaluated are clearly specified. 
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4) a decision rule - all possibilities can be ranked in priority 
order according to a known and clearly defined set of criteria 
(1981, p. 210) 
Carley suggests that rationality can be expressed in five sequential 
steps: 
1) "A problem which requires action is identified and goals 
values and objectives related to the problems are classified and 
organised. 
2) All important possible ways of solving the problem or achieving 
goals and objectives are listed - these are alternative 
strategies, courses of action, or policies. 
J) The important consequences which would follow from each 
alternative strategy are predicted and the probability of those 
consequences occurring is estimated. 
4) The consequences of each strategy are then compared to the goals 
and objectives identified above. 
5) Finally, a policy or strategy is selected in which consequences 
most closely match goals and objectives, or the problem is most 
nearly solved, or most benefit is got from equal cost or equal 
benefit at least cost" (1980, p. 11). 
In essence the pattern of activities which March and Carley ascribe to 
rational decision-making are very similar if not identical. 
Nonetheless, the process of rationality described above is but an 
ideal or model and as such is "an abstraction from reality that is 
intended to order and simplify our view of that reality while still 
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capturing its essential characteristics" (Forcese and Richer, quoted 
in Carley, 1980, p. 11). 
Critics of the rational model argue that decisions seldom occur in a 
rational manner as organisations are not homogeneous - they are a 
composite of groups (Simon, 1957, Rhodes, 1979: Ham and Hill 1984). 
Another criticism of the rational approach is that, by definition, it 
demands comprehensiveness. Lindblom rails against the notion of 
comprehensiveness because "a concept of rationality appropriate for 
judging a complex political system cannot be defined" (1968, p. 10). 
In essence what these and other critics are saying is that the 
rational model is inherently sterile because "the limits of human 
cognition and perception coupled with problems of conflicting ends in 
collective decision-making severely restrict the relevance of the 
rational model" (Van de Ven, 1983, p. 41). 
Carley suggests that the rational model has a third weakness; namely 
that it assumes that "it is possible to develop a social welfare 
function" which he defines as "a preference ranking by society on some 
set of alternative strategies" (1980, p. 16). Although Carley goes 
on to discuss the difficulties inherent in the social welfare function 
they can be largely categorised as: no consistent or agreed views as 
to which policy or programme is 'best for society'; the benefits of a 
set of actions may not be universally distributed amongst society in 
the sense that some may benefit at the expense of others; and, 
society is not homogeneous but composed of a heterogeneous mix who 
possess different values and objectives and have different perceptions 
of what is 'best' for society. In the end, Carley argues that while 
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the development of the social welfare function is not all that 
critical, it is necessary for governments to have "a series of 
'working' social welfare functions upon which to base policy" (1980, 
p. 18). 
Inspite of its limitations, Carley is relatively sympathetic towards 
rational decision-making since he argues that "the rational model is a 
valuable but partial perspective on policy problems" (1980, p. 11). 
This view of 'limited rationality' is one which is shared by a number 
of writers: notably Allison (1969;1971) who argues that the 
assumption of limited rationality is both a common and acceptable one; 
Etzioni (1967) who sees rationality not as an achievable ideal but one 
that is worth approaching; and Rawls who refers instead to 
"deliberate rationality", a concept which suggests that "we should 
deliberate up to the point where the likely benefits from improving 
our plans are just worth the time and effort on reflection . . . It is 
perfectly rational to follow a satisfactory plan when the prospective 
returns from further calculations and additional knowledge outweigh 
the trouble" (1971, p. 418). In short these writers are 
acknowledging both the desirability for and limitations of rationality 
in decision-making and are advocating that the discipline of 
rationality is worth aspiring to even though there are practical 
problems inherent therein. Allison (1971) has referred to this 
procedure as the 'organisational process' model or paradigm. 
The Organisational Process Model 
This paradigm asserts that policy outputs are largely determined by 
the organisation and its structure (Allison, 1969). It has elements 
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of rationality in that it assumes a known or established procedure for 
analysing issues, and that there are specific organisational routines 
available for remedying defined problems. Simon (1957) has called 
such behaviour 'bounded rationality' because of the limitations one 
has in understanding the totality of any problem, the environment in 
which the problem or issue is encapsulated, the demands on one's time 
are such that it is impossible to concentrate or focus solely on one 
issue, and further that the financial resources available are always 
restricted. For Simon, the operative mode is one of 'satisficing' -
the first alternative that meets a pre-selected or pre-determined set 
of criteria is chosen. Thus a filter mechanism is in operation and 
one in which "decision-makers filter the environment through their 
prior orientation (and) features that do not fit in with their 
attitude tend to be rejected" (Allen, 1979, p. 114-5). 
Simon's concept of 'bounded rationality' has been severely criticised 
because it has its roots in the rational model of decision-making and 
therefore "remains vulnerable to the same criticisms" (Rhodes, 1979 
p.33). Ham and Hill (1984) fault Simon's model on four grounds: 
firstly, as organisations are not homogeneous there will be conflict 
over which values and objectives are to be pursued; secondly, they 
argue that it is nonsense to suggest that an organisation can have 
goals; thirdly, decision-making rarely, if at all, follows a logical 
path; and fourthly, the decision-making process does not identify a 
mechanism for separating facts and values, and means and ends. What 
these critics are criticising is the prescriptive nature of Simon's 
model, however such strictures can be likened to the debate over what 
came first, the chicken or the egg; what is important is not so much 
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what evolved first but rather that there is a model with which to 
relate. Nonetheless, Simon's model is flawed because it assumes that 
corporate identity overrides the views of groups or individuals within 
the organisation. This view may appear to be acceptable for a profit 
motivated organisation but when the organisation is a public body, 
such as the National Health Service, with an array of competing groups 
each with their own perception of, not only, what the problems are, 
but how they should be solved, then Simon's paradigm breaks down 
because such an organisation cannot speak with one voice. 
The theory of organisation decision-making as developed by Cyert and 
March (1963) is a model which attempts to overcome some of the 
difficulties previously identified, although it has its roots in 
Simon's paradigm. They start from the premiss that the organisation 
is a coalition of individuals and/or groups each of whom have 
particular goals in mind for the organisation. The crux of Cyert and 
March's model of the behavioural theory of organisation is based on 
four related concepts which are applied sequentially: 
quasi-resolution of conflict; 
- uncertainty avoidance; 
- problemistic search; and, 
-organisational learning." (Allen, 1979, p.118) 
In short the model firstly assumes that the goals of the members of 
coalitions are always in conflict and that this conflict can be 
reduced by arguing that the goals themselves are constraints on the 
decision-making process. Thus goals are seen as nothing more than" a 
series of independent aspiration-level constraints imposed on the 
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organisation by members of the organisation coalition" (Cyert and 
March, 1963, p.117). Furthermore goals are attended to one at a time 
which means that any conflict between goals can conveniently be 
ignored. 
Secondly, organisations avoid uncertainty by focussing on the short-
term aspects of the problem. They eschew decisions which have long 
term i..T!'.plications particularly when the outcome c.qnnot be reasonably 
accurately forecast or where it is beyond their capability to 
influence or control. Thirdly, problematic search, implies that 
problems can be easily identified, usually as a result of the 
organisation having failed to satisfy a particular goal or set of 
goals and that there is a reasonably simplistic or straightforward 
mechanism for dealing with the problem once known. Simon's (1957) 
concept of problem 'satisficing' is very apt here as the procedure 
suggested by Cyert and March differs little from that outlined by 
Simon, in that a problem is solved either by ensuring that it conforms 
or equates to known criteria or by reconsidering the goal itself. 
The fourth and final factor of Cyert and March's model is that 
organisations learn in the sense that they exhibit adaptive behaviour 
as a result of working through the model. Goals become changed 
according to previous established and agreed goals, performance 
criteria become more refined or amended, and the rules by which the 
organisation responds to problems also become modified. And thus the 
procedure is repeated for each specific problem. The difficulty with 
this approach to decision-making is that it appears to ignore the 
political dimension. It assumes that internal or sub-group conflict 
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can be minimised by ignoring it, and it also assumes that all the 
groups or elements within the organisation, whatever their internal 
difference, agree and share the same overall goal for the 
organisation. In other words, they may question how the organisation 
produces its goods but not the goods it produces. In public sector 
organisations the political environment within which decision-making 
occurs is very important because there is not necessarily an universal 
view of what the organisation should be doing. In this case, 
understanding the political dimension is paramount if one wishes to 
understand decision-making in the public sector (Pettigrew, 1973). 
A final criticism of the organisational process model of decision-
making is that its focus on the organisation is at the macro or 
executive level and consequently does not attempt to discern how those 
at the lower order levels participate in or influence the decision-
making process (Burns, 1969; Rhodes, 1979). Thus the model naively 
assumes that lower order groups have little or no power and also makes 
no attempt to appreciate the way in which the power that they may 
possess is distributed amongst these groups, nor the manner in which 
they choose to exercise their power. 
The Bureaucratic Political Model 
According to Allison (1967) this model of decision-making, which he 
labelled the 'bureaucratic politics paradigm', assumes that each 
player or actor in the decision-making process participates as of 
right, and that the decision outcome is a result of negotiation or 
bargaining. The implications of this is that 'power is shared' 
amongst the decision-makers. This does not necessarily imply 
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equality of power for as Allison acknowledges "positions define what 
players may and must do" (1969, p.709). He also recognises that the 
players or actors in the decision-maki11g 'game' come to it with pre-
determined values and perceptions of what is required of them and 
therefore that an individual's personality can be as (and possibly 
more) important and influential as the power he/she possesses. 
Perhaps the strongest and most outspoken advocate of the political or 
incremental model as he prefers to call it, is Lindblom (1959; 1963; 
1964; 1968; 1979) who, in effect, argues that there is no such thing 
as 'rational man', because the decision-making process is so complex 
that any attempt at instilling a rational order to the process is 
automatically rendered meaningless. In its place, Lindblom suggests 
using a method of 'successive limited comparison', a process whereby 
decisions are made on a continuing basis, taking one step at a time 
and then only by small degrees. 
Lindblom has characterised the differences between the rational 
comprehensive model and his own method as follows: 
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II Rational Comprehensive 
1a Clarification of values or 
objectives distinct from and 
usually prerequisite to empirical 
analysis of alternative policies 
2a Policy-formulation is therefore 
approached through means and 
analysis: First the ends are 
isolated, then the means to achieve 
them are sought. 
3a The test of a "good" policy is that 
it can be shown to be the most 
appropriate means to desired ends 
4a Analysis is comprehensive, every 
important relevant factor is taken in-
to account 
Successive Limited Comparisons 
1b Selection of value goals and 
empirical analysis of the needed 
action are not distinct from one 
another but are closely 
intertwined. 
2b Since means and ends are not 
distinct, means and analysis is 
often inappropriate or limited. 
3b The test of a "good" policy is 
typically that various analysts 
find themselves directly agreeing 
on a policy (without their 
agreeing that it is the most 
appropriate means to an agreed 
objective). 
4b Analysis is drastically limited: 
i)important possible outcomes 
are neglected. 
ii)important alternative potential 
policies are neglected. 
iii)important affected values 
are neglected. 
Sb A succession of comparisons greatly 
Sa Theory is often heavily relied upon. reduces or eliminates reliance 
on theory." ( 1959, p. 80) 
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For Lindblom "the science of muddling through" is a perfeclty 
legitimate method for determining policy or making decisions because 
"policy is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made 
endlessly" (1959, p.86). He justifies his procedure on three main 
grounds: firstly, that since the policy-maker does not nor could not 
ever hope to possess perfect knowledge of the situation, he/she 
compromises as best he/she can by not attempting quantum leaps in goal 
terms. In other words, because he/she is unable to predict outcomes 
beyond his/her or anyone else's knowledge, the policy-maker only makes 
limited or short inroads into a problem recognising that policy 
decisions are usually never final solutions to a problem. This 
procedure has been termed "disjointed incrementalism" because 
decision-makers move forward one step at a time with the consequence 
that policies only change marginally (Rhodes, 1979). 
Secondly, because decision-making progresses cautiously a policy-maker 
is able to learn from past sequences of policy steps such that he/she 
will gain a reasonable understanding of the probable outcomes of 
further similar steps. This knowledge of what to do next is also 
partly derived from the degree of influence likely to be exercised by 
others in the decision-making process. Thus each decision-maker or 
'partisan' is constantly and continually reconsidering or adjusting 
his/her decisions towards the interests and decisions of others. 
This_process of 'partisan mutual adjustment' may not mean that there 
is complete agreement on the goals or objectives of a policy but that 
there is agreement, at least, on the course of action to be taken. 
In other words, decision-makers reach agreement on the decision to be 
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taken through a process of negotiation and bargaining (Barnard, et al, 
1980a; 1980b). 
Thirdly, and finally, as each decision advances sequentially this 
enables the decision-maker to test the relevance of his/her previous 
predictions. Essentially, this form of decision-making is remedial: 
that is, the decision was made to alleviate a known problem. If the 
issue has not been resolved by the decision, then a new method or 
approach is tried. Although this form of decision~making is 
essentially trial and error it does allow for past mistakes to be 
remedied fairly quickly because of the short time horizon of the 
process. Consequently policy decisions are essentially short term and 
are only taken within known information boundaries or constraints. 
As with the previous models of decision-making, the incremental or 
political approach does have some drawbacks even though many 
commentators acknowledge that disjointed incrementalism "is a good 
description of how decisions are actually made in organisations" (Ham 
and Hill, 1984, p.83). Nevertheless despite its apparent relevance to 
the way in which organisations operate, there are a number of 
blemishes to the incremental or political model which are worth 
briefly highlighting. One of the major criticisms levelled at the 
incremental model is that it acts "as an ideological reinforcement of 
the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces" (Dror, 1964, p.153). It 
is not seen as a force of and for change because it does not seek to 
alter the overall direction of the organisation. Another criticism 
is that the model is highly subjective; as Rhodes says "one man's 
increment is another man's revolution" (1979, p. 34). And finally it 
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appears that the model does not recognise or fails to appreciate that 
there are clear differences between competing groups and that they do 
not or are unable to compete on equal grounds thus reinforcing the 
view that the present is "the best of all possible worlds" (Rhodes, 
1979, p.34). 
There would appear to be little to distinguish between disjointed 
incrementalism and that of the principle of bounded rationality 
outlined by Simon (1957) where the decision-maker decides on the basis 
of the option or alternative which by some criteria is considered 
good enough. Likewise there are similarities between the rational, 
comprehensive and the organisational models of decision-making such 
that the latter appears in some ways to be a modified version of the 
former. Thus there is no one model of decision-making, rather there 
are elements of each to be found in the decision-making process. Or 
as Allison puts it these conceptual models are no more than a 
framework which "consists of a cluster of assumptions and categories 
that influence what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his 
question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an 
answer" ( 1971, p. 245). Consequently, "if policy analysis is 
distinctive, its distinctiveness does not lie in a common theoretical 
stance" (Rhodes, 1979, p. 35). 
thread? 
What then (if any) is the common 
Policy Analysis: A Framework for Decision-Making 
Decision-making is an inexact science; indeed, there may well be some 
who would argue that it is not a science at all, but rather a fact of 
life. However one thing is agreed: namely, that decisions are 
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constantly being made by among others individuals, groups and 
organisations. It is this activity which policy analysis seeks 
firstly to understand and secondly to develop a structure or framework 
which would facilitate the phenomenon (Friend, et al, 1974). 
Essentially, policy analysis embodies two main foci: policy content -
how and why policies are developed, and policy process - the procedure 
or methodology by which policies are made (Jenkin, 1978). Policy 
analysis is seen by its advocates as ''an alternative or supplement to 
the more traditional methods of decision-making based on 
incrementalism, intuitive judgement and trial and error methods of 
operation" (Burt, 1974, p.1) because it seeks to bring some semblance 
of order or co-ordination to what has been hitherto an unco-ordinated 
process (Lasswell, 1951; Dror, 1971; Burt, 1974). 
There is a problem here in that there is not an universally shared 
view that policy analysis is necessarily scientific in nature and 
scope. Some commentators suggest that its major contribution is as a 
conceptual framework for understanding the political environment of 
decision-making. Jenkin for example, sees policy analysis as being 
"concerned with the causes, nature and consequences of political 
action occurring at a variety of levels of government" (1978, p. 14). 
This view is also shared by Dye who defines policy analysis as "the 
description and explanation of the causes and consequences of 
government action" (1976, p. 1). Friend, et al, however, see policy 
analysis, not as a single or one-track entity but one which attempts 
"to preserve a balance between representing the structure of complex 
decision problems and ••• representing equally complex patterns of 
human and organisational relations" (1974, p. 23). But perhaps the 
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most wide-ranging description of policy analysis belongs to Wildavsky 
(1979) who defines it as incorporating such attributes as: 
descriptive - problem identification; prescriptive - advisory; 
selective - key actor oriented; objective - outlines alternatives; 
argumentative - rational behaviour; retrospective - draws on the 
past; inventive- fosters innovation; prospective - fonmrd looking; 
and subjective -value conditioned. Clearly Wildavsky's definition of 
policy analysis leaves nothing to chance. What it does highlight is 
that there is no definitive definition of or for policy analysis. 
Its real purpose according to Wildavsky is to identify "problems that 
decision-makers are able to handle with the variables under their 
control and in the time available" (1979, p. 15-16). 
This leads on to the question of how this can be done and to provide 
an answer it is necessary to consider the various characteristics of 
policy analysis. According to Rhodes (1979) policy analysis has four 
features: analytical; multi-disciplinary; problem oriented; and 
client centred. Burt (1974) claims that the strength or 
distinguishing characteristic of policy analysis is its reliance on 
the scientific method which implies that decisions can be tackled in a 
prescriptive and systematic manner. He suggests a five stage 
procedure: formulation - problem determination; search - information 
gathering; explanation - model building; interpretation - option 
selection; and, verification - evaluation of outcome. 
Jenkin (1978) whilst accepting that policy analysis is largely 
systematic raises the fundamental question of whether it is analysis 
of policy or analysis for policy with which one is concerned. In 
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Jenkin's view these are two quite distinct issues. The former, is 
concerned with a better understanding of the procedure of policy 
analysis, whereas the latter focuses on the applied nature and in 
particular on its contribution towards helping to resolve social 
problems (Ham and Hill 1974). Jenkin however argues that policy 
analysis while grounded in a systems perspective must also have an 
organisational behaviour focus because "both the substance and the 
process of policy are centrally dependent on the inner dynamics of 
political and administrative organisations, and that this is of 
importance whether one wishes to understand or amend the system" 
(1979, p. 82). 
To some extent, Friend et al (1974) agree with Jenkin's view but they 
argue that his perspective is wrong: too much attention directed 
towards the top of the decision-making tree - 'the decision-takers' 
and not enough towards those within the organisation who help to mould 
opinion- 'the decision-makers'. The distinction, according to Friend, 
et al, is crucial because it is misleading to assume "that the actors 
within a policy system must all owe allegiance to a single corporate 
organisation" (1974, p. 27). 
Friend and his co-authors consider the policy analysis framework (or 
as they call it, the policy system) as a vehicle for decision-making 
but one which is descriptive rather than prescriptive. They argue 
that the policy system must be flexible, that is adaptable to the 
'class' of decision problems facing policy-makers. They recognise, 
however that even a system with maximum flexibility must contain some 
common elements. These common or key components are described as: 
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1) actors -the people involved in the decision process for the 
particular problem at hand; 
2) action space - the environment within which the decision-making 
process occurs; 
3) internal relations - the way in which the key actors in the 
decision-making process relate to one another; 
4) external relations - outside factors which may influence the 
decision and which may be beyond the control of t_he actors; and 
5) policy guidelines - the set of rules acknowledged by the actors 
as being applicable to the decision problem. 
The collective view seems to regard policy analysis as a multi-faceted 
activity, and one which the literature suggests encompasses a variety 
of apparently conflicting tasks. These seem to range, on the one 
hand, from the so-called 'ideal' or technical approach whereby policy 
choice is facilitated through the objective analysis of data, options 
or alternatives assessed according to known and/or agreed criteria, 
with the most appropriate choice or course of action emerging. On 
the other hand there are those who argue that the policy-making 
process is essentially one of negotiation and bargaining in which 
goals are not explicitly articulated and the various actors involved 
are not necessarily willing to specify their overall objectives 
because neither are they sure about the overall aim of the policy nor 
do they wish to unduly restrict or limit their manoeuvrability or 
bargaining power (Higgins, 1980; Lee and Mills, 1982). 
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About all that can be said for policy analysis, with any certainty is 
that there is no one activity called policy analysis, rather it 
incorporates a range of approaches and tasks, and the mix employed lS 
largely dependent upon the problem at hand (Friend et al, 1974; Ham, 
1980a). Given that the policy process is so complex and open to a 
variety of different interpretations it is perhaps not surprising that 
it is in the health sector that decision-makers saw planning as a 
potentially useful vehicle for not only assisting or aiding policy 
development but also for implementing such policy. 
Planning and Policy-Making in Health Care 
The common thread, hitherto lacking in the discussion, comes from the 
desire to ensure that the policy (decision) making process has a sense 
of structure or order about it, such that the policies determined will 
be universally accepted and implemented. Planning or policy analysis 
provides such a framework because "it includes not only thinking up 
ideas but also facilitating their application" (Wildavsky, 1979, 
p. 10). Thus to Wildavsky policy analysis (or planning) is both an 
'art' and a 'craft'. The 'art' lies in "thinking up ideas"; that is 
the use of creativity and imagination in problem solving. The 'craft' 
lies in the skills which are necessary to ensure that such ideas 
become a reality. 
Self (1981) argues that there is a case for an increase in emphasis on 
policy-making and planning because of the multiple 'overloads' facing 
organisations. These overloads he contends are: 
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i) 'allocational overload' - in the case of the health sector this 
can be described as the problems of reconciling limited or finite 
resources with unlimited or infinite demand on these resources. 
ii) 'System overload' - the desire for greater control or regulation 
over the way in which the organisation functions and how it 
relates to its external environment. 
iii) 'political overload' - in health care the problems of reconciling 
different perspectives of care, such as, in Britain the current 
debate about the public/private mix in health care. 
iv) 'international overload' - vulnerability to shortages of 
resources and the distortion caused by the shift of scarce 
resources between the different health care systems in different 
countries. The problems caused, for example, by the mobility of 
the medical profession affect not only the donor country but also 
the recipient country. 
Self is realistic enough to acknowledge that planning of itself is not 
a panacea for the problems outlined above but he does assert that "the 
case for more effective methods of planning is powerful" (1981, 
p. 222), not because of a desire for greater rationality in decision-
making but rather in recognition of the societal pressure on 
organisations to tackle the problems confronting them. 
How should organisations go about such a task? In trying to answer 
this question one is immediately confronted with a problem and that is 
that planning can be conceived of in at least two different ways: 
firstly, "as a 'backroom' activity concerned with the formulation of 
policies (policy planning)" and secondly "as a framework for the co-
ordination of particular policies and decisions" (Self, 1981, P.222). 
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Whereas Self has suggested a two dimensional role to planning, Blum 
(1981) has identified no less than eight categories or modes of 
planning (figure 3.2 ). Wnat this clearly demonstrates is that 
planning as an activity is just as difficult to compartmentalise as 
are decision- making theories. 
A Rationale for Health Planning 
However the question remains, what is planning? It is generally 
regarded as a means by which policies are converted into act.ion. 
Thus the planning process can be seen as incorporating policy analysis 
as they share some common elements as well as similar theoretical 
backgrounds (Faludi, 1975; Paris,1982; Healey, et al, 1982). As 
with policy analysis, defining planning as an activity creates 
problems as no two definitions are alike, although there does appear 
to be a sharing of some common concepts. For example, Kahn describes 
planning as "policy choice and programming in the light of facts, 
projections, and application of values" (1969a, p. 16), whereas in 
Dror's opinion "planning is a process of preparing a set of decisions 
for action in the future, directed at achieving goals by preferable 
means" ( 1973, p. 330). Blum (1974) however, has taken a much more 
eclectic view when he suggests the following definitions of planning: 
- as an aid or replacement for political decision-making; 
- as a means of anticipating or looking ahead; 
- as a means of improving or fostering social justice; 
- as a means of improving the logical or scientific calibre of problem 
solving; 
- as a methodology and a machinery for turning ideas into blueprints 
for action; 
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Figure 3.2 
HODES Of' PLANNING 
Intervention is not necessary as market forces will 
ultimately resolve the issue. 
Intervention only in order to ameliorate present 
problems by responding to political crisis. 
Resources allocated to remedy current problems 
or to avoid potential problems. Satisficing. 
Intervention focuses on both present and immediate 
future problems. Attempts to reduce uncertainty 
in problem solving. 
Explores options available for any given issue 
selects most appropriate one and makes necessary 
changes to achieve goal. Has a forward looking 
approach. 'Planning towards the future'. 
Decides what sort of future is required and then 
sets about making the modifications necessary to 
realise that desired state. 'Planning from the 
Future'. 
An amalgam of most of the foregoing models in that 
it encompasses planning not only day to day 
activities but also for future requirements. 
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as a sort of 'arbitration' service for obtaining good, democratic 
and equitable decisions; and 
- as a means of control. 
\fuat most, if not all, of these definitions share is the belief that 
planning is a logical and formative process based on the concept. of 
change and embodying the view that such change is manifestly of value 
and therefore desirable. From this it is possible to fashion A 
'standard definition of planning' which in the view of Lee and Mills 
goes something like this;" the process of deciding how the future 
should be different from the present, what changes are necessary, and 
how these changes should be brought about" ( 1982, po 30). 
At this juncture it is worth recalling Crossman's (1972a) definition 
of planning as "making choices about life and death". This sobering 
view is a good reminder that planning is not only a technical process, 
it is also a political and social process. The clear implication of 
Crossmans's statement is that over-emphasis on one side of the 
equation could have unfortunate consequences for some segments of 
society because planning problems are not matters to be considered in 
the abstract since their eventual outcome impacts upon people's 
lives. 
This theme has been pursued, albeit in ideological terms, by Parston 
(1980) and Tannen (1980) who both argue that current approaches to 
health planning have concentrated on the regulatory and medical 
manifestations of health care, to the neglect of the health needs of 
society in general. The crux of their argument is that health 
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planning as it is called has not taken place, instead the focus or 
emphasis has been on medical services planning. This they contend is 
almost entirely due to the undue influence exerted by the medical 
profession on the policy-making process in particular and on planning 
in general: an issue which will be addressed more fully in chapter 
seven. ~ne purpose of briefly hiqhlighting the matter here is to 
reinforce and underline the point made earlier that planning as well 
as policy analysis and decision-making is very much a product of the 
environment in which it occurs. However, in spite of the differences 
in opinion as to what should be the focus of planning, there is at 
least consensus in the literature that planning as a concept and an 
activity is both desirable and necessary. 
Towards a Social Theory of Health Planning 
Unless one understands the context within which all forms of planning, 
especially health planning, operate it is most unlikely that the 
products of the process will be judged as being what society wants 
and/or needs. This implies, of course, that such terms as 'health' 
and 'society' can be satisfactorily defined so that their meaning is 
clear and acceptable to all. Therein lies the planner's and policy-
maker's dilemma - there is no universally accepted definition for 
these terms and where a definition is imparted the result is often so 
vague as to be virtually meaningless in the sense that is raises more 
\, 
questions than it answers. The World Health Organization's (WHO} 
definition of health as being a state of complete physical, mental, 
and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease and 
infirmity, is a case in point. The attainment of the WHO definition 
of health may not be all that desirable since it may raise 
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expectations of health and demand for health care to such an extent 
that they cannot be met; indeed, they may be impossible to acheive. 
Definitional difficulties such as these led planners to search for 
paradigms which, while recognising the desirability of definitional 
consensus, would facilitate the development of planning "as a general 
societal management process" (Healey, et al, 1982, p.S): Healey, et 
al, go on to argue that this 'procedural' planning was by the late 
1970s much discredited largely because of the discord between rheory 
and practice (Alexander, 1984) with "many planning practitioners 
doubting the relevance of much existing planning theory" (Healey, et 
al, 1982, p.6). Before pursuing further this 'paradigm breakdown' 
within the context of health (social) planning, a short journey into 
the origins of planning seems warranted in order to provide a 
backcloth to the ensuing discussion. 
Planning Genealogy 
Planning as it relates to the built environment is very old as the 
ancient cities of Egypt, Greece and Rome attest; however, as an 
established profession it is comparatively young, dating from this 
century (Midgley, 1984). The earliest forms of formal planning were 
those developed to bring order and design to urban society and this 
form of planning had its antecedents in the growth of the urban 
environment. The Industrial Revolution provided the watershed for 
urban planning which arose in response to the many social and economic 
problems caused by the rapid acceleration in industrial development. 
The economic impact of the Industrial Revolution saw scores of people, 
mainly from the countryside, come flooding into cities and towns. 
Villages grew almost overnight into large towns and cities. The 
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problem was not one of economic opportunities in these towns and 
villages but the lack of the necessary social facilities such as 
housing, public services, health and education to cope with this 
sudden influx of people. People thus had to endure appalling 
conditions both at work and at home. 
The poor home environment led a number of industrialists to the 
conclusion that a healthy workforce was a better workforce. This 
philosophy was endorsed by a number of industrialists in the late 
1800s such as Salt (Saltaire), Cadbury (Bourneville), and Lever (Port 
Sunlight) in the United Kingdom (UK) and Pullman in the United States 
(US), who built towns around their works and endeavoured to combine 
working and living in a healthy environment. This idea of harmony 
between working and living was enthusiastically endorsed by the so-
called pioneers of modern planning - Louis Mumford, Ebenezer Howard 
and Le Corbusier, and led directly to such ideas as 'Garden Cities of 
Tomorrow', the social city, the segregation of different land uses, 
and the development of high density, open space housing (Hall, 1974). 
In essence, however, these early planners were concerned with physical 
solutions to complex issues and there was the naive belief that a new 
urban form would resolve many of the socio-economic problems inherent 
in an urban environment. 
It was during this period (late 1800s, early 1900s) that social 
welfare planning also originated. In the US, social welfare planning 
or social planning grew out of the model city concept and the Charity 
Society Movement (Gilbert and Specht, 1977). Social planning in the 
UK also had similar roots, although the process started earlier with 
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the Public Health Act of 1848, the Sanitary Act of 1866, and the 
Public Health Act of 1875. These Acts established sanitary controls 
and invested power in local authorities to enforce these controls 
( Ha 11, 1 9 7 4 ) . However, it would be fair to say that this so-called 
'social' planning was largely concerned with the physical 
manifestations of change and not necessarily, other than indirectly, 
with fundamental societal changes. For example, good health was seen 
as 3. fun c-t. i.on of AcleqlJat.e se' ... ,age. pure f.N.:tter and so on, not as a 
function of a basic health care structure. 
Planning as an activity, came into its own following the Second World 
\A/ar. In the aftermath of the ".'7ar the desire to build a 'better' 
society upon the foundations of the old, was very strong on both sides 
of the Atlantic. In the US the emphasis was mainly on Planned 
Economic Development whereas in the UK the extensive war damage meant 
that greater attention was given to land use development and 
associated activities (Hall, 1974). 
From this base planning has developed so that it embraces not only 
land use or as it is often referred to, town and country planning, but 
also aspects of social planning, from housing and education, to 
health. A conceptual view of how the various branches of planning 
have evolved is shown in figure 3.3. However, in so doing, the basic 
underpinning philosphy of planning has changed from a concern with the 
physical environment as the key to a better society, to a debate about 
the inter-relationship of the very factors with which society is 
composed (Conyers, 1982). It is within the framework of the wider 
'igure 3.3. 
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debate that the social concepts and processes of health planning are 
to be discussed. 
Social planning of which health planning is one aspect, shares many of 
the characteristics discussed above, and indeed, is open to the same 
criticisms. Advocates of social planning argue that it can be 
distinguised from other types of planning on the grounds that it is 
concerned with social reality (Kahn, 1969a; 1969b; Mayer, 1972; 
Eversley, 1973), and as such "deals directly with social issues and 
problems" (Midgley, 1984, p. 15). Social planning, although grounded 
in rational decision-making, eschewed the 'architectural determinism' 
favoured by urban or town planning and instead focused its attention 
on the human element (Broady, 1968; Gans, 1968). Thus for social 
planners the determinant and dominant factor was people and therefore 
social planning was concerned with promoting and fostering social 
relationships between people (Broady, 1968). 
In health care terms, this relationship has been described as the 
'health field concept' (Lalonde, 1974) or the 'diamond-model' (Long, 
1984). The 'health field concept' sees health care as comprising four 
main components: human biology- man's inherent susceptibility or 
resistance to disease and illness; environment - the conditions 
(social, economic, cultural) in which one lives; life style - the 
manner in which one chooses to live and the regard one holds for 
personal health; and, health care organisation - the structure 
created for the provision of health care facilities and services. 
The rationale underpinning the 'health field concept' is that these 
four elements are not mutually exclusive, each impinges upon the 
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other, so that the changes in one will impact to a varying degree on 
the others. Lon'}'S Diamond model adds a fifth element to those 
comprising the health fieln concept; the interface between health and 
illness. It is arguable whether this is a truly separate component 
or just an academic refinement of the original four. The fact that 
there are four or five elements is largely incidental since both 
models admirably demonstrate that health care cannot be divorced from 
the wider milieu in which it is placed. 
If one accepts that substance of this supposition, it logically 
follows that the planning of health services must also be faithful to 
the philosopy of the health field. Therein lies the difficulty. 
is clear from the volume of literature on urban planning (Harvey, 
1973; Goldsmith, 1980; Healey, et al, 1982) and to a lesser extent 
that on social and health planning (Midgeley and Piachaud, 1984; 
Parston, 1980; Gilbert and Specht, 1977) that the developments in 
planning have not kept pace with societal changes (Healey, et al., 
1982; Paris, 1982). This is true in the field of health (Parston, 
It 
1980) and Dear (1984) attributes this to the extensive and ill-defined 
field of health services planning; a consequence of the fact that the 
field is highly fragmented. Even so, it appears that three broad 
categories of study can be distinguished; disease ecology; 
accessibility to and utilisation of health care; and, organisation 
structures of health services (Dear, 1984). 
Dear further argues that these three branches of health services 
planning, while important because they determine the nature of the 
health care facilties provided, are regarded as separate and distinct 
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entities so much so that an overconcentration on those well-defined 
problem areas is preventing a necessary analysis of the wider context 
of illness, health, and society . The solution, advocated by Dear, 
is for a social theory of health embodying three main elements: 
conceptual - a concern for the way in which health care as an 
institution has evolved; practicable - the structure and application 
of health care resources; and contextual -health care must be firmly 
set within the broader political spectrum. 
Dear's newfound advocacy for a social theory of health may be a 
relatively new concept for a geographer (which he is) however this has 
been apertinent issue in health planning for some time now. Indeed, 
some of the recent literature on health planning has focused on this 
theme (Parston, 1980; Haywood and Alaszewski, 1980; Lee and Mills, 
1982). Proponents of a social theory of health planning acknowledge 
that it is the interaction between the various actors in the process 
(providers, planners, patients) and the community at large which is of 
crucial importance. What seems to be less clear is how these various 
actors interact; it is this process which requires illumination and 
is a subject which is returned to in Chapter Seven. 
So much for theory but what actually happens in practice? Do 
decision-makers behave in a rational manner as most proponents of 
policy analysis and planning advocate or do they largely react to 
events beyond their ability to control? In a sense the answer is 
contradictory because the literature suggests that decison-makers not 
only respond in a proactive (rational) way but also in a reactive 
(incremental) manner. Thus it could be argued that decision-making, 
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policy analysis or planning is ruled by paradoxes - a point 
emphatically made by Wildavsky (1979). 
Inspite of these conceptual difficulties most commentators argue that 
planning is a vauable tool or aid to decision-making. Most agree 
that if planning is to be meaningful then it must proceed in a 
sequential or cyclical fashion which begins with problem definition as 
the first step on through until a policy and/or a programme is 
implemented. However, the activity does not cease with 
implementation because the process itself creates changes which in 
turn produces different problems and/or variations of the original 
problem, such that the whole procedure is repeated. 
The trouble is that things in life, of which decision-making is one, 
are not so simple. They are inordinately complex and this creates 
difficulties when it comes to devising a procedure or system for 
responding to life's problems. 
Theoretical explanations of how things occur or develop are not always 
borne out in reality. Having said this, theories of decision-making, 
policy analysis and planning are both useful and valuable in that they 
aid understanding of complex processes. However it would be unwise 
to read too much into the desire for structure or orderliness in 
planning and policy-making partly because of the strong pressures on 
policy-makers not to threaten "the social order and established social 
relationships" (Crichton, 1981, p. 29), and partly because the 
decision-making process is essentially one of 'trade-offs' and 
'bargains'. 
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Policy-making and the plans associated with them is an imprecise 
process; as Crichton has observed, "some policies may have evolved 
within organisations and become structured into the fabric without 
really being recognised as policies by many, and that other policies 
may be very consciously worked out and presented to constituents for 
consideration, adoption and implementation" (1981, p.30)~ Crichton 
argues that those policies which have evolved within the organisation 
have been largely ignored by students of policy-making because they do 
not appear to conform to the established or traditional model of 
policy-making. Nonetheless, evolved policies may be just as 
important in introducing changes within organisations as the more 
accepted mode; that is where policy issues are discussed against a 
known and understood background according to a pre-determined 
procedure. It is this comparison which underpins much of the 
investigation and analysis described in the rest of this thesis. 
The investigation and analysis is not solely confined to a study of 
the impact of variations in the policy-making process, it also 
considers what Rodwin has identified as 'the health planning 
predicament'; namely the questions of "who should participate in 
health planning and whose interests health planners should serve" 
(1981, p. 231). These questions are of fundamental importance for 
both planners and policy-makers who have what some might consider a 
thankless task in that somehow they must reconcile a seemingly 
unlimited demand for health care at a potentially unlimited cost 
within a strictly limited resource base. How they manage to do this 
(if at all) is the thrust of the research to be described herein, and 
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where a number of the assumptions underpinning the planning and 
policy-making process discussed above will be critically evaluated. 
However, before commencing such a task, it is first important and 
necessary to describe the development of health planning in the NHS. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE NHS PLANNING SYSTEM - A REVIEW 
This chapter describes the background to the creation and introduction 
of a formal planning system in the National Health Service (NHS). It 
is both important and necessary to understand the rationale 
underpinning the NHS planning system in order to appreciate the manner 
in which planning has been practised in the Health Service. After 
setting the planning scene with regard to the NHS, the chapter goes on 
to reflect on a particular conceptual model for health planning in 
order to firstly suggest a theoretical framework within which planning 
should function, and secondly as a mechanism for testing out the way 
in which planning was actually practised in the NHS. 
The creation of the NHS in Britain was grounded in the notion that 
'health' was a national asset and that every citizen regardless of 
financial means, age, colour and creed had a 'right' to this asset. 
Implicit within this 'right to health' was the concept of equal 
opportunity and access to health care for the country as a whole. 
Such laudable objectives were unfortunately founded on a 
misconception; namely that once health care became a 'free good' the 
health of the people would improve to such an extent that expenditure 
on health services would decline because of falling demand. 
The fallacy of such a view soon became evident with a seemingly 
exponential relationship between health care expenditure and demand. 
The more resources devoted to health, the greater became the demand 
for care and for more resources to meet that demand. This spiralling 
effect of demand for health care on expenditure quickly became a cause 
- 58 -
for concern. This concern was manifested through the establishment of 
a committee of inquiry (the Guilleband Committee) specifically charged 
with the responsibility to investigate the costs of the NHS. The 
report of the committee recommended, among other things, that more not 
less resources should be committed to the NHS (MOH, 1956) with the 
consequence that "attempts to constrain spending were replaced by a 
policy of commitment to real growth for nearly t·t~enty years" (Bevan 
and Spencer, 1984, p. 95). 
Despite this early attempt to question the efficiency and 
effectiveness of health services expenditure it was evident that 
overall concern for the manner in which these resources were being 
employed did not appear to be on the political agenda even though 
questions had been raised about the wisdom of such a philosophy 
(Carter and Peel, 1976; Cochrane, 1972). Central planners, if not 
primarily concerned about the effectiveness and efficiency of the NHS, 
did not attempt to influence the manner in which resources were 
allocated. The system operated in such a way that those areas of the 
country which had a reasonable or high level and standard of care got 
more resources whilst the poorer or less well-endowed areas received 
little. Thus the system had an inbuilt distributional bias against 
the poorer regions which was recognised and the 'Crossman' formula 
(1972b) was an attempt to rectify this anomaly. Under the formula 
resources were allocated to the various regions on the following 
basis: 50% according to the populations served; 25% according to the 
number of beds; and 25% according to the number of cases treated. 
It was evident that this method, whilst an improvement, still favoured 
to a large extent the wealthier regions. This is not altogether 
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surprising given the tripartite structure of the NHS in which 
responsibility for patient services was split between Regional 
Hospital Boards (hospital facilities); Local Authorities (health 
visiting, home-nursing) and Family Practitioner Committees (general 
medical, dental, pharmaceutical and optical services). Rumblings of 
discontent with this tripartite arrangement were frequently heard 
during the 1960s and early 1970s which culminated in proposals to 
radically alter the structure and organisation of the NHS (DHSS 1972). 
The essence of the case outlined in Management Arrangements for the 
Reorganised National Health Service was that the hospital based 
services of the Regional Hospitals' Board should be amalgamated with 
those health-related activities of the local authorities. Family 
Practitioner Committees were largely left intact but their mode of 
accountability was changed. The revised managerial arrangements 
which were implemented in 1974 are depicted in figure 4.1. 
A Rationale for Planning 
The rationale for such a fundamental change lay principally in a 
desire to integrate and improve the services for patients. Implicit 
in this 'patient-centred' approach was the notion that the 
decentralisation of decision-making could be counter-balanced by 
greater accountability. As the Departmental document put it, 
"delegation downward should be matched with accountability upwards" 
(DHSS 1972 p. 10). It is one thing, however, to advocate such a 
laudable goal, it is another to realise it when no procedure or 
mechanism previously existed within the NHS for translating goals into 
reality. Prior to the 1974 re-organistion of the NHS, no official 
mechanism existed for achieving 'delegation downwards, accountability 
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upwards' and as this slogan was clearly a "vital element in the 
management of the NHS" (Lee and Mills, 1982, p. 140), it became 
incumbent upon the government to find one. One such tool which 
seemed to have particular relevance to the health care field was PPBS 
(planning, programming, budgeting system). 
PPBS was regarded as being particularly relevant for the health 
sector, because it was developed to encompass the two main concerns of 
how health service policies a:ce cleveloped ancl the manner in which they 
are implemented. Thus PPBS was seen as providing "an appropriate 
structuring of the planning debate, and to introduce an explicit link 
between planning and budgeting" (Lee and Mills, 1982, p. 81) . 
Unfortunately expectations were far greater than its achievements; 
indeed, its acceptance within the u.s. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare was not unequivocable, nor did it achieve the 
hoped for success (Rivlin 1977). The experiment with PPBS in the US 
Federal agencies also was not successful as had been hoped such that 
they rapidly became disillusioned with the systems approach and began 
to search for other approaches. Failure in the US, however, did not 
prevent other countries from considering PPBS for themselves. 
The Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) in Britain began 
to experiment with PPBS, or 'the programme budget' as they preferred 
to call it, during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The DHSS came to 
the view that programme budgets were inappropriate for operational 
management and should be used primarily for planning. The rationale 
for this was that health policies were more usually expressed as 
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services instead of outputs (Banks 1979). Three reasons were put 
forward for the DHSS using programme budgeting as a planning tool: 
1. "to assist in the DHSS internal planning system; 
2. to act as a basis for guidelines to the NHS; 
and 
3. to act as a means for monitoring and control." (Lee and 
Mills, 1982 p.86). 
Thus, increasingly in the 1970s the programme budget became the basis 
on which guidance was issued to the NHS on future strategies. 
The documents Priorities for Health and Personal Social Services 
(DHSS, 1976b) and The Way Forward {DHSS 1977a) are examples of the 
programme budgets developed for specific services by the DHSS as 
"illustrative indications of the national long-term direction of 
strategic development" (DHSS 1977a, p. 15). Here, programme budgeting 
was considered to be an appropriate mechanism for costing policies; 
for evaluating priorities within realistic financial constraints; and 
as a forum for examining future strategies. 
At the same time, as the DHSS became convinced of the merits of 
programme budgeting, it was becoming equally concerned about the state 
of planning in the NHS. Health services planning was extremely 
fragmented with the dominant mode of planning being hospital or 
capital planning, not service planning. It was called capital 
planning primarily because the finance for hospital construction came 
from capital monies - monies specifically earmarked for building 
construction, repairs, and/or maintenance. The focus on capital-led 
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planning stemmed from the publishing in the early 1960s of the 
Hospital Plan for England and Wales (HOH 1962) which articulated the 
concept of the District General Hospital, comprising a relatively 
standard set of medical and surgical specialities to service a pre-
determined population base. Little consideration was given within 
the document to the health services in support of, or complementary 
to, those contained within the hospital setting. 
This over emphasis on capital planning per se, was increasingly 
considered inappropriate for dealing with the increasing complexities 
of the NHS. Most chracteristically it reflected an 'incremental' 
approach to planning - a reactionary form of planning responding to 
specific events or crises as they arose - and was considered most 
unsatisfactory by central policy~makers. What was required it was 
claimed was a more rational and comprehensive form of planning. 
Three inter-related factors can be advanced to explain the progression 
towards, and eventual adoption of, a rational comprehensive planning 
model for the NHS. Firstly, there was a growing awareness of, and 
interest in, the ideas associated with corporate management. 
Secondly, there was increased pressure exerted on all central 
departments by both the Treasury and the Public Expenditure Survey 
Committee (PESC) to contain costs and to present their financial 
forecasts in a more comprehensive and rigorous manner. The third 
factor for a 'different' planning approach arose because of 
developments occurring in the NHS. The continued improvement and 
expansion of high technology medicine and the costs associated with 
it, led the Service to give some considerations to the evaluation of 
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the care being provided and to ways of providing such care more 
effectively and efficiently. 
Thus a rationale for introducing a formal planning system for the NHS 
was established: the concern to move away from the fragmented and 
capital-led planning of the 1960s and early 1970s; the desire to 
integrate and improve the services for patients; and the wish to make 
the planning of these services more responsive to the 'needs' of the 
patient. This was stated in the following terms: "health services 
can only be evaluated in relation to the identifiable needs of the 
community for different kinds of health care (which) must be expressed 
in terms of proposed developments of the components parts" (DHSS, 
1972, p 50-51). In other words, planning was considered important as 
a means through which change could occur whilst ensuring that the 
proposed changes were compatible with the perceived needs of the 
community. 
The mechanism for translating this philosophy of planning into reality 
was described in the manual The NHS Planning System (DHSS 1976a). 
The foundation of the NHS planning system was its emphasis upon the 
'rational comprehensive' model of planning. It was 'rational' in 
that it assumed that all planning issues could be objectively 
appraised and a decision taken solely on the merits of each proposal. 
It was 'comprehensive' in that it implied that all aspects of any 
particular issue or topic could be assessed, and the implications of 
any course of action weighed accordingly, thus ensuring that the 
'best' or most appropriate choice emerged. 
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A Conceptual Model for Health Planning 
There is also general agreement that if planning is about change then 
some sort of structure or methodology is needed to achieve this. 
There are almost as many planning methodologies as there are planning 
definitions and the analytical frameworks usually discussed bear a 
remarkable similarity to those of policy analysis considered earlier 
in Chapter Three. A critique of planning methodologies or frameworks 
will not be considered here since the same arguments in the foregoing 
chapter on policy analysis apply with equal force. Instead, the 
discussion will focus on one particular model or framework as an 
example of a planning system. The model outlined is very similar if 
not identical to the one introduced into the NHS. 
Before considering each step or stage in the conceptual model it is 
first necessary to highlight a number of caveats. Firstly, the 
identification of a sequence of steps or a set procedure does not 
imply an attempt at introducing scientific rigour into the process, 
even though many would welcome such a step. Secondly, it must be 
acknowledged that what constitutes a planning or policy problem will 
differ greatly between the personnel involved. Thirdly, these 
differences will lead to the application of possible conflicting 
values and judgements on the part of those involved. Fourthly and 
finally, the procedure itself does not imply the existence of a 
panacea for health problem solving (Barnard, 1974). 
Bearing these pitfalls in mind, it is now possible to describe the 
conceptual model of health planning (figure 4.2). The model 
documents five stages or co-ordinated steps: formulation; 
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;igure 4 · 2 • A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF HEALTH PLANNING 
FORMULATION 
I t\~PLEMENTATION 
I CONCEPTUALIZATION I 
Source: After BURT ( 1974} and JENKINS ( 1978} 
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conceptualisation; design; evaluation; and implementation. The 
first step, formulation is the initialising stage, whereby the issues 
are defined, the objectives clarified, and the operational limits of 
the problem determined. It is here that decisions are made on what 
are the relevant factors or variables which contribute to the problem 
and how they may be measured. The importance of this stage cannot be 
over-emphasised for it is here that the real not the perceived problem 
should be identified. If the problem is relatively complex and/or a 
large number of factors are involved then this part of the procedure 
could consume a disproportionate share of the available time and 
resources. 
The second step, conceptualisation, incorporates in part a data 
gathering exercise; in particular the data required according to the 
variables identified in the first stage. It is here that the 
possible and probable alternatives or options are outlined in 
conjunction with the data gathering procedure. An element of choice 
or judgement becomes necessary because often the data required is not 
available, or if available is in a form unsuitable for planning 
purposes. Thus decisions are necessary about the time and resources to 
be spent on data collection bearing in mind that the critical task is 
determining when enough data is available to conduct an analysis of 
the problem. 
The third step is the design or model-building stage. The model 
enables each option or alternative to be assessed on the grounds of 
costs, performance and output. Although such models may be either 
simple or sophisticated, their value lies in their explanatory 
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function or capability and not in their complexity because models 
change according to the assumptions made about a problem and the data 
employed. 
The fourth step, evaluation, is where conclusions are derived from the 
analysis. From these conclusions or observations, one particular 
alternative or course of action is identified. This alternative, 
generally regarded to be the preferred option, emerges out of an 
evaluation filtering process in which the initial range of options or 
alternatives are weighed according to a pre-determined set of 
criteria. At the same time as this set of known evaluation criteria 
are being applied there are other factors or constraints also 
impacting upon the process, Of these uncertainties, the political 
environment is possibly the most crucial because the political 
circumstances surrounding the selected option can largely determine 
its success or failure as a policy or plan. 
The fifth and final step is implementation. It is at this level 
"that the chips are cashed". In other words, for a policy to be 
effective it must be implemented and for it to be implemented there 
must he agreement from those concerned that they are willing to not 
only support but also to work the policy. This commitment to the 
policy or plan can be garnered in a number of ways. Ideally this 
... 
should be done by involving in the planning or policy-making process 
those individuals or groups who have the responsibility for providing 
the service. Thus for planning to have a successful outcome, it is 
necessary to secure the will and the compliance of the interested 
parties through the formulation of viable policies which will prove 
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attractive to these influential interest groups (Barnard, 1974; Lee 
and Mills, 1982). 
The problem with any conceptual model of planning and policy-making is 
that it is not fool-proof. It does not come with an iron-clad 
guarantee that all one's planning or policy problems will be resolved 
through the application of the model. In essence it is people, or to 
be more precise, their particular values and perceptions and how they 
are applied, which make planning a success or failure, not the 
structure or mechanism to be followed. Thus a form of planning which 
places undue emphasis on the prescriptive aspects of the process is 
bound to create a degree or climate of frustration because it cannot 
deliver the anticipated changes. Earlier attempts at planning in the 
NHS has been severely criticised on precisely this ground (Royal 
Commission on the NHS, 1979; DHSS, 1980a). In reality, the ultimate 
outcome of planning is conditioned by the behaviour of individuals and 
groups at all levels in the process and each is largely driven by 
their own values and beliefs and not necessarily by a desire to 
achieve the common good. It is the conciliation of these conflicting 
views which the planning process seeks to facilitate, recognising 
however that "the question is not how planning can supplant the 
political process but whether and how it can fit into that process" 
(Lee and Mills, 1982, p. 55). These informed observers of planning 
in the NHS have developed this issue further by noting that "although 
planning does not, and cannot, seek to replace the political decision-
making process it will, if successful, modify that process. And, 
equally, to be successful it must adapt to the political realities of 
decision-making" (Lee and Mills, 1982, p. 55-6). This presupposes 
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that planning is somehow an apolitical activity but as will be shown 
in Chapter Seven it is very much grounded in a political environment. 
Planning Systems and Priority Services 
The NHS planning system was seen as an enabling mechanism, one which 
would facilitate a more effective use of the scarce resources 
available for health care. The introduction of the NHS planning 
system coincided with increasing concern in the DHSS that the demand 
for health services was constantly outstripping the capacity of the 
NHS to meet it, and that the resources available for health care were 
not infinite. The response of the DHSS to this dilemma was the 
publication of a consultative document, Priorities for Health and 
Personal Social Services (DHSS 1976b) which was based on a series of 
programmes or range of services for certain groups. With 
considerable justification, the DHSS could claim that this was "the 
first time an attempt has been made to establish rational and 
systematic services" (DHSS 1976b). The reasons for the DHSS 
publishing their strategies for the future were fourfold: 
i) that the responsibility for promoting certain 
services at the expense of others was one shared by the DHSS 
and the NHS; 
ii) to indicate the changes in demand, both present and future, 
of different client groups; 
iii) to highlight the areas where past neglect had led to 
serious deficiencies in health care; and, 
iv) to promote the effective and efficient use of available 
resources. 
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The cornerstone of the proposals contained in the document was the 
concept that an appropriate standard of service should be maintained, 
in the light of unknown and expected resource constraints. 
Together, the documents on priorities and the simultaneous 
introduction of the NHS planning system were an attempt by the DHSS to 
break away from the historically capital-led development of the health 
service and to "put people before buildings". It was widely assumed 
that, by establishing in the NHS a standard procedure for health 
service planning, based upon the twin concepts of rationality and 
comprehensiveness, services could be provided according to the 'needs' 
of the population. 
The reaction from within the NHS to the priorities identified was very 
mixed, ranging from warm acceptance to out-right rejection. Such was 
the outcry from certain vested (medical) interests within the health 
sector that the follow-up publication - The Way Forward (DHSS 1977a) -
contained a more pragmatic approach not only on the question of 
priorities but also on the issue of standards of service. As Klein 
has pointed out, "The Way Forward is strong on exhortation (but) it is 
singularly weak on suggestions about how to bring about the hoped for 
economies" (1977, p. 1096). There is a basic and fundamental issue 
at stake here - namely, the dilemma of imposing a national strategy 
whilst allowing local discretion. Insistence on a national strategy, 
for example, could mean that in some places improvements may be 
incompatible with local circumstances. Whereas, if the strategy is 
considered a desirable but non-binding level of service, there is the 
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risk that a continuing debate over priorites will overshadow any 
meaningful discussion on service improvements. 
The resolution of these two major issues presents the DHSS with a 
basic and fundamental problem - the dilemma of ensuring adherence to a 
degree of local discretion in determining how the strategy should be 
implemented. The difficulties facing the DHSS can be spelled out in 
the following manner: insistence on a fairly rigid interpretation of 
national policy could mean that changes occur in some localities which 
could be deemed to be inappropriate or incompatible with prevailing 
local circumstances. However, if national policies are seen as 
desirable but non-binding, there is the danger that they will become 
meaningless and empty exhortations to health authorities to do 
better. 
The Changing Face of NHS Planning 
By the late 1970s it was apparent to the majority of NHS planners and 
decision-makers that the NHS planning system was not working. The 
very reason for the introduction of a formal planning system - to 
instil a sense of rationality and comprehensiveness into NHS decision-
making - was ironically the very reason proffered for its failure 
(Royal Commission, 1979; DHSS, 1980a). 
The reasons for the failure of the NHS planning system introduced 
with considerable fanfare in 1976 have been discussed already in 
Chapter One (p.3-5} and therefore need not be considered at length 
here. What is necessary, however is to headline the major criticisms 
of planning as these are germane to the following discussion of the 
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changes introduced, subsequently to NHS planning. Thus to re-
iterate, the rational, comprehensive mode of planning was held to be 
unsuitable for the NHS on the following grounds: firstly, the 
prescriptive nature of the planning process tended to overshadow any 
attempts to broaden-out policy formulation (Barnard, et al, 1979; 
1980a; 1980b); secondly, NHS decision-making was (and still is) 
largely incremental which frustrated most attempts to introduce 
rational order (Irving, et al, 1981; McNaught, 1981); thirdly, 
pressure to adhere to a strict planning timetable thwarted most 
efforts to evaluate those policies which planners succeeded in 
implementing (Barnard, et al, 1979; 1980a; 1980b); and finally, 
planning as an activity was seen as being rather separate from 
management and consequently the task or responsibility was often 
delegated to relatively junior staff within the organisation (Barnard, 
et al 1979; 1980; Weller and Williams, 1982). 
The new Conservative government moved quickly to establish its 
position by publishing a series of discussion documents of which 
Patients First (DHSS 1980a) created the greatest impact. The 
outcome of these were proposals for re-structuring the management 
system of the NHS. The plank of the proposed changes was that one 
tier of management, the AHAs, should be abolished and their 
responsibilities devolved to new DHAs (DHSS 1980a). The proposed 
changes were ratified in July 1980 and the timetable for the 
changeover from AHAs to DHAs was fixed for 1st April 1982. 
Central to the government's view on the NHS was the "profound belief 
that the needs of patients must be paramount" (DHSS, 1980a, p. 4): a 
re-affirmation of the philosophy underpinning the 1974 reorganisation. 
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The means for achieving this objective, in the government's opinion, 
was to have the decision-making process as close to the local 
community as possible so that the views of those within the community 
plus those providing direct patient care could figure prominantly in 
the decisions reached. 
Consumer participation in the decision-making process in the NHS prior 
to 1974 was not very strong and along with the desire to develop 
health care commensurate with the needs of people it was decided to 
give the consumer a voice through the medium of CHCs. Briefly, CHCs 
had a responsibility to represent the interests of the public in the 
health service. There was, on average, one CHC for each AHA (and 
later one for each DHA) and there were reasonable clear criteria 
established which governed the relationship between these two bodies 
(DHSS, 1975). Specifically all health authorities were required to 
consult with CHCs, as well as others, with regard to any policy 
changes in services delivery. 
CHCs, as an innovative concept, had problems in establishing their 
credibility with the NHS. Many NHS personnel view the need to 
consult on policy issues as an unnecessary and time consuming task 
and argued that CHCs therefore had outlived their usefulness (Royal 
Commission, 1979). Even Patients First, while acknowledging that 
CHCs had played a useful role, questioned whether there was a need for 
them now that decision-making was to be brought more closely in touch· 
with the needs of the community, (DHSS 1980a). Despite these threats 
to their viability, CHCs are still very much in existence, as it would 
appear that the devolvement of decision-making to the local level has 
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not negated the role of the CHC as a representative of the consumer of 
health care. One could comment that bringing the management function 
closer to the point of delivery of the service does not necessarily 
mean that those who receive or use the services provided are any more 
likely to be involved in decisions pertaining to those services than 
hitherto. The ability of the CHC to influence the policy-making 
process is considered in more detail in Chapter Eight, in the light of 
what was learned from the study. 
A 'New Look' Planning System 
It is argued above that NHS planning had become bogged down in a 
quagmire of paper with the net result that very few plans were ever 
implemented. And if they were, the policies or programmes which were 
implemented seemed to bear little resemblance to that originally put 
forward. In short, planning was judged to have become both "stilted 
and stultified" (DHSS 1980a). Against this background, it was 
decided that the NHS planning system would benefit from major surgery 
which emphasised the strategic or long-term elements of planning 
(DHSS, 1982). The decision to modify the 1976 planning system 
embodied a tacit admission by the DHSS that a rational, comprehensive 
model of decision-making, while highly desirable was manifestly 
unworkable in the NHS. This was the main message contained in 
Barnard, et al's (1979} report of their investigation into the NHS 
planning system and accompanying this message was the recommendation 
that the planning system would benefit from a structural change that 
would acknowledge and incorporate the inherent tendency of incremental 
decision-making in the NHS. In short, Barnard and his colleagues 
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were advocating the adoption of a version of the 'mixed-scanning' 
approach to planning. Mixed scanning was a term coined by Etzioni 
(1967) to describe a planning methodology which recognised that both 
the rational and the incremental modes had particular attributes which 
were important to retain. In essence, Etzioni was arguing that 
elements of the rational model, specifically its attention to detail, 
are a necessary discipline for planners but instead of a comprehensive 
detailed examination of all issues, the emphasis should be directed 
towards the immediate. Incrementalism would be applied to those areas 
or issues considered to be of lesser importance, as a form of 
'truncated' review, whereby the issues would be kept under 
surveillance and changes made as and when necessary. An issue would 
move from the overview to the detail stage and vice versa as values 
and priorites changed. 
The revised planning system introduced in early 1982 eschewed the use 
of labels such as 'rational', 'comprehensive', 'incremental' and 
'mixed-scanning', nonetheless, it is quite clear from the changes 
being implemented that the advice of Barnard and his co-researchers 
had had a profound impact upon the central planners of the DHSS. 
This is readily apparent by the fact that the revised planning system 
consisted of three elements: the strategic plan; the annual 
programme; and annual planning review (DHSS, 1982). Of these three 
elements, the strategic plan was considered to be the most important 
with the others regarded as subordinate in the sense that the annual 
programme and annual planning review are considered to be the 
mechanisms by which the policies embodied in the strategic plan are 
implemented. 
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The relationship between these three elements of the revised NHS 
planning system is depicted by figure 4.3. Health plans are now 
produced on two levels. Firstly each DHA is required to prepare a 
strategic plan covering a ten year planning period. In addition each 
DHA must produce a short-term (two year) programme which describes the 
steps that will be taken towards the implementation of national and 
local policies delineated in the strategic plan (DHSS, 1982; 1984). 
The second level of activity occurs at the RHA. Each RHA is 
responsible for preparing a Region-wide strategic plan that draws 
together the strategic plans from the DHAs within its boundary. Prior 
to this task, however, each RHA must prepare and circulate to its DHAs 
an outline strategy which identifies those issues seen within the RHA 
as being of particular concern and warranting specific consideration. 
These outline strategies must be approved centrally after which they 
become the cornerstone upon which each DHA prepares and constructs its 
strategic plan. 
The final step in the planning process requires each Regional 
strategic plan to be submitted to the DHSS. In this manner the DHSS 
is able to construct a composite picture of the degree of adherence to 
national policies and to identify any deviance from established 
targets. This so-called 'top-down, bottom-up' approach to planning 
is justified on the grounds that "it provides the opportunity for the 
Government's policies and priorities to be reconciled with available 
resources (while) it also enables health authorities to appraise 
systematically their own services and to influence the Government" 
(DHSS, 1980a, p. 18). Thus, through resource distribution and 
indications of national priorities the DHSS imposes its views on RHAs, 
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who then redraw such issues for their own context and set the 
parameters for District plans. Each DHA considers its own priorites 
and needs through planning teams, which are then channelled up the 
system. And so the cycle continues. 
This chapter sought to trace, albeit very briefly, the backgound to 
the creation and introduction of a formal planning system in the NHS, 
the transformation that the system underwent when the original concept 
founded on the twin pillars of rationality and comprehensive was 
judged inappropriate. The changes described herein occured during 
and after the fieldwork for the research was undertaken, however, it 
is unlikely that the alteration to the planning system of a procedural 
nature will necessarily have a major impact upon those charged with 
planning responsiblities since the context within which planners plan 
is largely independent of the structure or process employed. This is 
a view which is shared by many of the informed observers of planning 
and policy-making in the NHS (Haywood and Alaszewski, 1980; Ham, 
1981; Lee and Mills, 1982; Glennerster, et al, 1983; Rodwin, 1984) and 
it is also a central issue of particular concern in this thesis. 
The narrative so far has dealt largely with background material and 
the theoretical and conceptual framework within which this study of 
planning and policy-making in the NHS has been conducted. The next 
chapters, which form the body of the thesis, set out to attempt to 
answer the questions posed in the Introduction to the study. The 
issues under investigation in the following chapters are the 
interaction that occurred between planners, providers, and policy-
makers charged with the responsibility of bringing a range of health 
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care services and facilities to an urban population, and the way in 
which NHS planning, as originally conceived and latterly amended, 
has had an effect upon the sequence of events which unfolded. 
However, before getting to the substance of the thesis, it is first 
necessary to describe in some detail the manner in which health 
services planning was conducted in the study area. The background to 
planning in NHA and the chronological sequence of events which 
occurred within the planning framework are recounted in Chapter Five. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
HEALTH PLANNING AND POLICY-MAKING - THE PRACTICAL MANIFESTATIONS 
Health services planning as was noted earlier in Chapter One has been 
a relatively recent acquirement in the NHS. Although the discussion 
centred on the reasons which underpinned the introduction into the NHS 
of a formal planning system, little insight was offered as to the 
manner in which health authorities undertook the task of translating 
theory into practice. It is the practical manifestations of the NHS 
planning system which is the concern of this chapter. It describes in 
general terms the approach adopted by Newcastle Health Authority (NHA) 
in setting up the planning function in the light of DHSS guidance. It 
goes on to examine the workings of the planning system in some detail 
through an appraisal in particular of health services planning as 
applied to two particular groups; the elderly and the mentally 
handicapped. It concludes with a brief outline of a number of 
hypotheses which appear to effect planning and policy-making, each of 
which will be the subject of considerable analysis in later chapters. 
An integral feature of the NHS planning system was its emphasis upon 
the 'health care group', thus recognising that there were certain 
groups or populations in society whose particular needs or demands for 
health care often encompassed much of the totality of care available. 
"In practice the health care needs of the community are highly 
diverse and a single individual or family may simultaneously require 
health care for several different conditions ••• (therefore) it is 
useful for planning purposes to distinguish a limited number of broad 
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'health care groups' with special needs and to differentiate some 
categories of care . so as to quantify the services required" so 
stated the DHSS in its justification for introducing structural 
changes in the NHS (DHSS, 1972 p.51). This focus on health care 
groups as a cornerstone of NHS planning was reinforced by the 
publication of a consultative document 'Priorities for Health and 
Personal Social Services' (DHSS, 1976b) which mapped out the national 
priorities according to the care group approach. The virtually 
simultaneous publication in 1976 of the NHS planning system manual and 
the Priorities document ensured that the structure of planning in the 
NHS focussed upon care groups rather than on facilities and services, 
per se. 
The effective application of the NHS planning system was based on two 
fundamental characteristics; operational or short-term planning, and 
strategic or long range planning. The former encapsulated the 
procedures through which the health authority intended to carry out 
agreed policy changes by documenting those activities which it 
believed it could implement in the short term. The latter was the 
health authority's statement in outline form of the sort of heatlh 
care policies which it wished to develop in the future. Thus 
strategic planning set the policy agenda for health care and 
operational planning stated the necessary steps needed to achieve or 
implement the policy. 
The manual which accompanied the introduction of the NHS planning 
system urged that planning should be a multi-disciplinary activity 
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incorporating, where feasible, all those who were involved with the 
delivery of health care. 
The vehicle for administering this multi-disciplinary approach to 
planning was the 'health care planning team' (HCPT). Its role and 
purpose was to consider the health care needs of a particular group or 
population and to put forward proposals and/or policies designed to 
'improve' the accessibility, quality and quantity of care available to 
that group. The difficulty with this approach was that the focus of 
the HCPT was largely insular - considering the health care 
implications only of the issues confronting them - whereas it is well 
known that many of the so-called 'health problems' facing society are 
beyond the capability of the health sector to overcome and command the 
attention of a large array of bodies and agencies if any progress is 
to be made (Carter and Peel, 1976, DHSS, 1980a). 
The tendency for health authorities to look inward was recognised 
early on by the DHSS who issued guidance which recommended a form of 
joint planning between health and local authorities as being most 
appropriate given the well-known overlap or complementarities of 
responsibilities between authorities which existed and would continue 
to do so (DHSS, 1976c; 1977b). These joint planning teams (JPT), or 
joint care planning teams (JCPT) as they were sometimes called, were 
multi-disciplinary in composition and care group oriented. 
Health Services Planning in Newcastle 
NHA, in line with most health authorities in England and Wales, 
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followed the recommendations embodied in the NHS planning system 
manual (DHSS, 1976a) and established multi-disciplinary HCPTs on a 
care group basis, in line with those identified in the Priorities 
document (DHSS, 1976b). With the issuance of the guidance from the 
DHSS pertaining to joint care planning, NHA amended its existing 
planning arrangements of HCPTs and replaced them with five JPTs for 
each of the client groups of complementary health and local authority 
services, viz the elderly, the mentally ill, the physically 
handicapped, and children and families with children. At the same 
time that the decision was made to move from HCPTs to JPTs, the health 
authority also established an overarching JCPT (figure 5.1). The 
JCPT, composed of senior officers and professionals from both the 
health and local authority, was the principle planning body for the 
two authorities. Its chief functions were as co-ordinator and 
facilitator. Its co-ordinating role was to oversee the activities of 
the JPTs which were in reality sub-groups of the parent JCPT. The JPTs 
were responsible for the formulation of operational planning proposals 
as well as the preparation of strategic or longer term policies, which 
were then channeled through the JCPT for scrutiny and modification (as 
appropriate) before being passed to the respective authorities for 
endorsement and ratification or rejection. 
The facilitating role of the JCPT was to channel policy matters to the 
various JPTs for their consideration in the light of their collective 
expertise and knowledge. Because the JPTs were sub-groups of the 
JCPT, they necessarily had to report to the JCPT on a periodic basis 
what progress was being made on the issues before them. The JCPT was 
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thus able to be kept informed of the continuing activites of each JPT 
and was also in a position to steer or influence, as appropriate, the 
direction - policy wise - in which each JPT was heading. 
The JCPT, however, had one particular responsibility over and above 
that of its relationship to the JPTs and that was its concern with the 
allocation and distribution of joint finance monies. It was the JCPT 
which decided how the monies should be allocated, to whom, for what 
project or proposal and for how long. Usually a particular joint 
finance programme was drawn up by the JCPT for the current financial 
year and this was agreed by the appropriate JPTs as not all were or 
would be in receipt of joint finance monies. 
This then was the framework or environment within which planning in 
NHA occurred. The balance of this chapter is concerned with how 
these planning teams operated in practice. This will be articulated 
through a consideration of the events which befell two JPTs - the 
elderly and the mentally handicapped. The investigation of the 
workings of these two JPTs was largely confined to their strategic or 
policy-making activities rather than their operational 
responsibilities as it was the former which were of particular 
concern. Each of the selected health care groups is examined in 
turn, and the sequence of events which were fundamental to the 
emergence of policy initiatives and their outcome is traced 
chronologically. 
Services for the Elderly 
Early on in its planning history NHA moved from HCPT to joint planning 
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teams as advocated in the DHSS circular HC(77)17/LAC(77)10 Joint Care 
Planning: Health and Local Authorities (DHSS, 1977b) and consequently 
a joint planning team for the elderly (LTPTE) was established which 
held its first meeting in July 1977. Its early record was largely 
undistinguished and its sole cause celebre was to press for more in-
patient accommodation (hospital beds) for the elderly. The team 
originally met on a monthly basis but by the end of 1978 it met very 
infrequently (10 times over the period 1979-1981) and appeared to have 
a knack for running into controversy. Figure 5.2. shows the major 
sequence of events of the JPTE over the research period. 
The strike by Social Workers occurring at the end of 1978 and lasting 
until early 1979 resulted in cancellation of all JPTE meetings until 
the dispute was resolved, as the social worker members of the team 
refused to participate in any meetings on behalf of the local 
authority until their grievances were resolved. 
DHSS circular HN(79)35 A Programme for Improving Geriatric Care in 
Hospital (DHSS, 1979) countenanced the introduction of measures 
designed to bring about changes in the attitudes of staff working with 
the elderly (in particular, hospital staff) to one considered to be 
more sympathetic towards the elderly. In other words, the document 
was placing considerable emphasis on the twin concepts of 'care' and 
'caring'. This circular caused some conflict within the JPTE 
primarily because the health authority's Personnel Officer believed 
that it should be given preferential treatment and that a training 
programme should be prepared forthwith. Others counselled that a 
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Fiaure 5.2 
Services for the Elderlv: seauence of events 
joint planning team established 
infrequent meetings and when held 
only discussed possible effects of 
national policies. 
no JPT meeti~gs, social workers strike. 
discusses implications of DHSS circular 
on nurse training. 
FIELDWORK BEGUN 
new chair for JPT but still in medical 
hands. 
infrequent meetings due to lack of 
business. 
research proposal from local GP, discussed 
by JPT and referred for more details. 
report from Joint Working Group on 
housing considered by JPT. 
JPT began to look more closely at local 
issues but still only met infrequently. 
copy of joint strategy received for 
consideration. 
* 
* 
Policy Group for the Elderly put 
forward. Proposals for the future 
development of services for the 
elderly involving HospLtal A and 
Hospital B. 
RHA questions. Basis of proposals 
for future services for the 
elderly, especially the Walkergate 
Project. 
series of discussions between NHA 
and RHA over strategy for the elderly. 
* Medics enter debate over services for 
the elderly and question Walkergate 
ProJect. 
* medics draw in CHC in local MPs. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
RHA agrees to support some of 
proposals but not Walkergate option. 
Walkergate project deferred pending 
feasibility study. 
discussion on configuration of beds 
for the elderly in Hospitals R, F 
and N. 
agreed protocol reached for beds for 
elderly but when proposals published 
some backtracking occurred. 
* Forum for the Elderly - public 
meeting held. 
* Joint Strategy for the Elderly - a 
consultative document published. 
New planning arrangements for NHA under consideration. Proposal to 
devolve planning down to Unit (Hospital) level is major change which 
would mean demise of both the JPTE and PGE. 
- 89 -
more low key approach should be adopted and that the circular should 
be placed in context with all other issues confronting the JPTE, 
This difference of opinion was apparently unresolved, however it did 
cease to be an issue in the sense that it no longer appeared as an 
agenda item for the JPTE after mid-1980. This change could, in part, 
be attributed to the fact that a new chairman was appointed to the 
JPTE who seemed to have a different opinion on how it should be 
organised and what issues should come before it. The attention of 
the JPTE shifted from the concern over 'beds' to a consideration of 
the merits of 'half way' houses for elderly patients who no longer 
required normal hospital-type care. As with the 'beds' issue 'half-
way' houses became the major concern of the JPTE however this time it 
took the relatively bold step of setting up a Joint Working Group 
(JWG), incorporating health, housing and social service personnel to 
look into specialist housing for the elderly. A report was prepared by 
the JWG and discussed at the July 1981 meeting of the JPT(E), although 
no policy initiatives or proposals emerged which were forwarded to the 
parent bodies for consideration. 
Although the JPTE was considered by NHA to be the forum for policy-
making and planning, the lack of progress achieved by this body was of 
major concern to the planners and administrators employed by NHA. So 
concerned was this group of NHA planners and administrators that they 
created their own Policy Group for the Elderly (PGE) as a means of 
taking things forward. It should be noted that some members of the 
PGE were also members of the JPTE. It would appear that the 'real' 
planning was done by the PGE with the consequence that the JPTE became 
- 90 -
essentially a forum for discussion and therefore largely ceremonial as 
none of the key issues exercising the PGE did not appear to have been 
forwarded to the JPTE for their considered response. 
The major activity of the PGE was the articulation of a strategic 
policy for the elderly in NHA. There were two related issues of 
concern; a shortage of acute and long-stay hospital-type 
accommodation amounting to some 148 beds; and a lack of psychiatric 
services for the elderly especially beds on the general hospital site 
in accordance with DHSS policy. Two related proposals were put forward 
by the PGE for resolving these problems. These were, firstly, the 
opening of long-stay/rehabilitation beds for the elderly at Hospital A 
(currently 'moth-balled') which could be accomplished fairly quickly 
and, secondly, the closure and subsequent redevelopment of Hospital B 
to provide a range of facilities, including local authority services. 
This latter was clearly a long term proposition which would have 
major implications for both the health and local authorities. The 
PGE believed that this proposal for the redevelopment of Hospital B 
provided a unique approach to joint planning by considering more 
innovative ways of providing services for the elderly. 
In accordance with established procedure, NHA put the proposals out to 
consultation to all those considered to have an opinion on their 
endorsement. The proposals, as might be expected, came under close 
scrutiny from a number of sources, but surprisingly not from the 
JPTE. On the one hand a number of hospital consultants questioned 
the wisdom of these proposals and in particular, a consultant 
psychiatrist was especially disturbed by the Scheme for Hospital A 
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and expressed concern at the apparent lack of support for more beds 
for the elderly severely mentally infirm (ESMI). His solution was to 
suggest the creation of an ESMI unit at a different hospital. The 
Regional Health Authority, on the other hand, was more concerned with 
the proposal to re-develop Hospital B; it disputed the financial cost 
involved and doubted whether it would become available and also raised 
questions regarding potential staffing problems of the scheme. In 
short, the RHA was challenging the viability of the Hospital B scheme, 
as is its right in accord with its overall responsibilities. However, 
a cynic would argue that their zealousness in this instance could well 
have been influenced by the fact that Hospital B was where the RHA's 
administrative headquarters was located and the proposed redevelopment 
of the Hospital appeared to jeopardise the continuation of this 
arrangement. 
The picture became even more complicated when the Local Medical 
Committee (LMC) also expressed concern about the feasibility of 
Hospital B scheme, arguing that action was needed now not in the 
future. In response to this comment the chief officer of NHA cited 
recruitment difficulties, especially of nurses, as the main reason for 
the delay in implementing any short-term measures. 
The pressure on NHA to take some action was increased when two 
clir;1icians enlisted the aid of the Community Health Council (CHC) to 
press for more acute beds in the General Hospital - part of which had 
remained unopened because of staff problems - as an extension of the 
service currently provided at Hospital B instead of the proposed re-
development. A third clinician, not content with the efforts of the 
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RHA, CHC and LMC, wrote to his Local Member of Parliament (MP) and a 
neighbouring MP (who passed a copy of the correspondence to the 
Minister of Health) deploring the current shortage of beds. He 
suggested that the re-development of Hospital B was unnecessary 
because of unopened beds elsewhere and alleged that the whole service 
was in danger of an imminent collapse. The response of the chairman 
of NHA to these critics was to re-affirm that the policies outlined by 
the PGE were considered to be the most appropriate strategy. Indeed 
the NHA in an attempt to move forward wrote to the RHA asking it to 
sanction an increase of 25 acute beds for the elderly in the general 
hospital along with approval for both Hospital A and Hospital B 
schemes. After a considerable lapse of time the RHA agreed to the 
request, with the exception of the proposal for Hospital B which it 
still considered to be inappropriate and/or unnecessary. 
The position regarding Hospital B remained deadlocked with pressure 
continuing to mount on the NHA to do something immediately. The PGE 
however was adamant that the key to improved services for the elderly 
lay with the scheme for Hospital B. Indeed so committed were they to 
the scheme that they attempted to husband financial resources for it 
by reallocating a small portion of NHA's recurring revenue budget to 
the project, with the monies being employed in the short term to 
finance projects with non-recurring resource implications. Such 
projects tended to be one-off capital (building) schemes or purchase 
of supplies and/or equipment. 
Whilst the PGE was trying to generate the necessary financial 
resources to underwrite the project, a number of original supporters 
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of the scheme for Hospital B began to express doubts about its 
feasibility. By June 1980 it became apparent that an appraisal of 
this and other related proposals was warranted, and after discussion 
with the clinical and other staff involved, a view emerged that what 
was required was a far more imaginative approach to the care of the 
elderly than had been hitherto postulated. Consequently, a 
feasibility study of the Hospital B strategy was undertaken, with the 
express purpose of clarifying the policy first before commencing any 
of the design work. 
The outcome of the feasibility study was a report concluding that the 
initial scheme proposed for Hospital B was unrealistic and 
inconsistent with current thinking on care of the elderly. Concern 
was expressed that the concept of care originally envisaged might be 
counterproductive if it meant cloistering elderly people away from 
society. The project was reassessed within the conventional wisdom 
that elderly people should be able to maintain as independent a life 
as possible and the facilities of NHA and the local authority should 
be marshalled accordingly. It is interesting to note that this 
reappraisal of part of the strategy for services for the elderly 
occurred quite independently of the JPTE, whose energies still 
appeared to be concentrated on matters more operational than strategic 
in nature. 
Concurrent with the difficulties being experienced by the PGE in its 
efforts to affect a strategy for the elderly in NHA, the JPTE began to 
evolve a more assertive role for itself by turning its attention to 
issues of distinct local relevance. In the main, the local issues 
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considered by the JPTE could be classified under two headings: 
operational and research. 
Under the 'operational' banner, the JPTE considered such matters as 
staffing needs for the professions supplementary to medicine (for 
example, chiropody, speech therapy); a carers support scheme whose 
aim was to provide assistance and relief to families caring for 
elderly relatives; a consideration of the use of 'check lists' for 
health visitors, and in particular for new staff, to help identify the 
'needs' of the elderly patient; and discussion of the problem of 
providing adequate ambulance facilities in an under-served area of 
NHA. From the evidence available it would seem that the role of the 
JPTE in discussing these operational issues was to offer advice to its 
parent body the JCPT or to the Management Team of NHA, on the priority 
which each of these issues should enjoy relevant to the overall list 
of demands upon NHA's resources. 
Not surprisingly the number of items for consideration under the 
'research' label was small; in fact only one proposal was discussed. 
This was a project to evaluate the needs of older people within a 
general medical practice. The research was to focus on identifying 
the clinical, social and psychological needs of the elderly population 
in general practice in a particular area of the city and would require 
five years to complete. The proposal received initial support from 
the JPTE subject to the preparation, with costs of a more detailed 
research protocol. A revised proposal was duly submitted which 
satisfied the JPTE as to its acceptability and the JPTE agreed to 
support the research and recommended that the JPCT should make 
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available the necessary funds. The recommendation was accepted by 
the JCPT. The research project has had a troubled existence since it 
was approved and supported by the JPTE in June 1982. A difference of 
opinion arose between the general practitioner (GP) who instigated the 
project and the research staff employed by NHA to undertake the 
research. This difference of opinion was essentially over the 
research protocol and focus. The researchers sought a more active role 
in the project whereas the GP wished to retain complete control over 
the manner in which the research developed. By the time the research 
field work was completed (August 1984) there was considerable 
uncertainty over the future of the project because of the GP's 
decision to sack the researchers. This led to the financial support 
for the project being reconsidered in the light of these events. It 
does appear that the irreconcilable split between the GP and the 
research staff effectively led to a withdrawal of funding for the 
scheme. 
Despite the efforts of the JPTE to take a more active role in planning 
by turning their attention to so-called 'local' issues, it was the PGE 
who de facto remained the principal policy-making body for the elderly 
in NHA. However, even the best efforts of the 'experts' often go awry 
as the furor over the Hospital B project has demonstrated. 
As is often the case in planning and policy-making, another issue 
arose at the same time as the PGE was attempting to salvage something 
of the Hospital B proposal which threatened to shipwreck the carefully 
prepared plans of the PGE. This was the immediate, and potentially 
disruptive problem of the distribution of beds for the elderly between 
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the three general hospitals of NHA. This issue was of sufficient 
importance to side-track the PGE from its concern over the Hospital B 
scheme, not least because of the long term implications of the bed 
distribution issue which if unresolved could jeopardise any agreed 
policy proposals for the elderly. 
The distribution of the beds for the elderly in NHA has to some extent 
always been an underlying problem generally because of the apparent 
shortfall between the number of beds required according to DHSS norms 
and those currently available, and its transformation into a critical 
issue occurred during the winter of 1981-82. This was a particularly 
severe winter which saw a great many elderly patients admitted to 
hospital for a variety of ailments. It is a commonplace that during 
the winter months more elderly are admitted to hospital than at other 
times of the year. What was unusual about the winter of 1981-82 was 
the scale of admission; so many were admitted that beds in other 
specialties within the hospitals had to be found for these elderly 
patients. Not surprisingly perhaps, this caused considerable disquiet 
amongst the clinical staff of the hospitals concerned who found their 
beds 'blocked' by these elderly patients. They were blocked in the 
sense that there was nowhere that these elderly patients could be 
transferred to and thus free the bed for use as originally specified. 
For a more detailed discussion of the blocked bed see Hall and 
Bytheway ( 1982) • 
This matter was further complicated by the fact that one particular 
hospital (Hospital R) treats many more elderly patients than the other 
two hospitals (Hospital F and Hospital N) but has no designated 
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Department of Geriatric Medicine providing hospital facilities and 
care specifically for the elderly, and therefore was unable to supply 
a comprehensive service. Pressure was brought to bear on NHA to 
produce a formula acceptable to all concerned for resolving this 
thorny issue. 
given the PGE. 
The task of 'pulling the rabbit out of the hat' was 
A variety of proposals were proffered none of which 
was particularly easy to implement and all had different advantages in 
that some were obviously short-term interim solutions whereas others 
were much more long-term in that it would take many months to 
implement. 
Inspite of the agreed immediacy of the problem by all concerned, the 
proposals put forward by the PGE had a very mixed response 
particularly amongst the clinical staff with each clinician favouring 
the option which best suited themselves. After a series of 
protracted negotiations conducted over an eight month period an 
agreement of sorts was reached on an acceptable configuration of beds 
for the elderly in the three hospitals. The agreed conformation was 
Hospital F -50 beds, Hospital R- 50 beds and Hospital N - 80 beds. 
Unfortunately as might be expected this did not satisfy everyone. 
The geriatricians (clinicians whose major responsibility is the 
elderly patient) at Hospital C felt particularly aggrieved because 
this plan would see their bed complement fall from 80 to 50, which was 
not acceptable. They were not placated with the fact that this 
reduction in 30 beds was to be largely offset by opening an additional 
25 beds for the elderly at Hospital N. Discussion is still continuing 
but progress has been slow with each hospital vigorously defending its 
own corner. 
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The demise of the Hospital B project resulting from the report of the 
feasibility study indicated to both NHA and the local authority that 
a complete re-appraisal of the level of care and need for services for 
the elderly in the City was warranted. The vehicle for achieving this 
objective was an open meeting or forum to which participants from all 
interested parties were invited. The purpose of the forum was 
twofold: firstly, to consider new ways of providing services for the 
elderly and; secondly, to impress upon those present that the specific 
needs of the elderly often transcend the facilities offered by the 
health and local authorities. 
This proposal, initially mooted by the Director of Social Services, 
and referred to as a Joint Strategy for the Elderly was essentially a 
joint venture between the health and local authorities. It was the 
PGE of NHA, however which undertook to organise the forum by 
canvassing potential participants and seeking and inviting submissions 
for discussion at the forum. The forum sought to undertake three 
parallel objectives: 
- to review the levels and balance of care provided by health and 
local authorities. 
- to review the special arrangements for the elderly provided by 
such bodies/agencies as police, transport, housing, and so on. 
- to review and consider the perceptions that the elderly 
themselves have of these agencies, the problems they face, and 
how best to respond. 
The response to the letter of invitation sent to a variety of agencies 
was very good indeed, with the result that the forum was held in early 
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May 1982. A variety of issues were aired and even though nothing 
conclusive came out of the discussion, a considerable number of ideas 
meriting further study were put forward. The responsibility rested 
with the NHA and the local authority to keep this initiative alive by 
putting forward a number of proposals for services for the elderly 
which reflect the sense if not the nature of the discusssion of the 
Forum. 
This responsibility was discharged with the publication of a document 
Joint Strategy for the Elderly (NHA, 1983) in which many of the 
ideas raised at the open meeting were incorporated, along with the 
presented papers. The document was distributed very widely within 
the city and comments were invited on the practicability or otherwise 
of the issues contained therein. The intention was, that out of this 
document and the ensuing consultation would emerge an outline 
strategy/policy for the elderly. Although the issue had gone to the 
JPTE, more out of courtesy rather than conviction, for its 
consideration and comment, it is interesting to note that by the end 
of August 1984 the consultation process was still in progress. 
Whilst these local activities were engaging both the JPTE and the 
parallel body the PGE, government policy was still being propagated 
with the expectation that health authorities would respond 
accordingly. The reaction locally to such central initiatives often 
resulted in strained relations between the RHA who was seen as being 
the prolocuter for central policy and the health authorities which had 
to implement the policy. 
illustration. 
The following example will serve as an 
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Early in 1983 the Health Advisory Service of the NHS published The 
Rising Tide (HAS, 1983) a policy document on the development of 
services for mental illness in old age. The Report commented on the 
increase in the elderly population which has already occurred and the 
likely effect of future projected increases. It expressed 
dissatisfaction with the general level and standard of care provided 
for this group of people in the NHS and argued for a more informed, 
understanding and caring form of service for the future. In short 
the Report advocated a more positive and innovative approach for those 
elderly persons suffering from some form of psychiatric disorder. 
The DHSS when releasing the Report provided an opportunity of 
additional resources for selected innovative schemes for service 
provision for this group. 
NHA in accordance with the advice contained in The Rising Tide and the 
regulations governing the special funds available, submitted a bid for 
monies to the RHA in support of a scheme. NHA was led to believe 
that their proposal was not acceptable but received no official 
explanation as to why this should be the case. This led some 
officers of NHA to express their dissatisfaction with the standard of 
planning and guidance which they received from the RHA. They 
particularly complained of lack of perception and understanding on the 
part of RHA of the problems facing NHA and felt that the advice they 
received was superficial in the extreme. In general the outcome was 
such that there now seems to be a cloud over-shadowing the 
relationship between NHA and the RHA. That this should happen is 
most unfortunate since the two agencies are not competitors but allies 
sharing a common goal. 
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By 1980 the DHSS in its wisdom decided that the planning system 
introduced and operated since 1974 was not living up to its initial 
expectations, that it had become bogged down in procedural issues and 
was overly bureaucractic and therefore that modifications were 
necessary (DHSS, 1980a). The publication of circular HC(82)6 Health 
Services Development - the NHS Planning System (DHSS, 1982) heralded 
the thinking within the DHSS on how the planning system should be 
restructured. The essence of DHSS reasoning was that planning teams 
had out-lived their usefulness and should be disbanded. This was a 
view which commanded considerable support within the NHA and although 
the JPTE was still functioning it was clear by August 1984 that its 
future was very much in doubt. This was primarily because the overall 
responsibility for service planning was under review and the perceived 
wisdom in NHA was that this responsibility should be devolved from the 
PGE and JPTE to the new Unit (Hospital) Management on the grounds that 
this would bring the planning and policy-making processes closer to 
those who are providing the services. 
To a certain extent, the JPTE was partly to blame for the rise of 
voices within NHA which were critical of planning in general and 
planning teams in particular. This was because the JPTE seemed to be 
very uncertain as to what its role and responsibilities should be, it 
displayed a lack of initiative, its leadership seemed poor and also it 
appeared to seek an 'easy life' through an avoidance of those issues 
which might be considered to be difficult or contentious. In 
summary, the performance of the JPTE provided the ammunition sought by 
those in NHA who were strongly advocating a review of planning and the 
policy-making process. 
~ ~ 
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The apparent failure of the JPTE to take the planning bit between its 
teeth led to its supplantation by the PGE \·lho took upon themselves the 
planning role. The reasons why the JPTE should behave as it did and 
the role played by some members of the PGE are in part the subjects of 
Chapters Six to Nine of the thesis. However, before beginning a 
discussion on the implications of the machinations of the JPTE and the 
PGE it is first necessary to compare and contrast the planning of 
services for the elderly with the events and activities relevant to 
the second planning area under observation, services for the mentally 
handicapped. 
Services for the Mentally Handicapped 
The joint planning team for the mentally handicapped (JPTMH) was the 
first joint planning team to be established (April 1977) in the 
locality under the auspices of the 1977 Joint Care Planning circular 
(DHSS, 1977b), and it differed from the JPTE in one significant 
respect in that it also included representatives from an adjacent 
health authority which provided on a 'subcontracted' basis all 
inpatient care for mentally handicapped persons from the study area. 
Figure 5.3 shows the historical pattern of events for the JPTMH. 
From the outset the JPTMH concerned itself solely with policy issues 
and the planning of the services acccording to declared policies. As 
there were no hospital-based facilities in NHA for the mentally 
handicapped, the planning team was not hindered by the existence, 
organisation, and usage of current facilities. 
room for manoeuvre was largely unrestricted. 
In other words, its 
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Fiaure 5.3 
Services for the Mentallv Handicapoed: 
Joint planning team established, regular 
meetings but very little in policy or 
plans emerged, discussion generally 
dealt with documents produced by the 
National Development Team for the 
Mentally Handicapped. 
FIELDWORK BEGUN 
seauence of events 
10 * CHC letter to Minister of Health 
* 
* 
2 
DHA given directive to prepare policy 
for mentally handicapped. 
Blueprint for mentally handicapped. * 
* 
* 
* 
JPT replaced by Mental Handicap Management 
Partnership. 
CHC secretary seconded as interim secretary 
for partnership. 
CHC and voluntary agencies seek and get 
equal representation. 
DHA allocates ElOO,OOO to Partnership. 
Psychiatrists voice concern over role 
of Partnership. 
* Request to use monies to bolster nursing 
support for community psychiatric team. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Acting secretary expresses wish to return 
to CHC. 
Local Authority unwilling to take 
responsibility for post of Partnership 
secretary - DHA does instead. 
Partnership agrees that Family Resource 
Centre major priority. 
DHA approve use of hospitals as base for 
Resource Centre. 
Proposal for strengthening and expanding 
Community Mental Health Team before DHA. 
Partnership secretary appointed as part 
of DHA management compliment. 
3 Proposal under consideration to devolve planning to Unit (Hospital) level. 
If agreed would not effect Partnership which would continue. 
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The first task undertaken by the JPTMH was to determine the precise 
numbers of mentally handicapped people, both children and adults, 
within the NHA. The Social Services Department for the corresponding 
local authority suggested that some consideration should be given to a 
policy on future building requirements and the type of client such 
buildings would be expected to cater for. The result was a 
consultative paper prepared for the JPTMH and published in October 
1977 which outlined the proposed development of services for the 
mentally handicapped. This strategy for the mentally handicappped was 
given reasonable circulation and comments were invited by the JPTMH. 
The strategy, duly amended in the light of the commments received, was 
incorporated into the NHA's strategic plan. 
The perusal of the relevant records suggested that little of 
importance was discussed by the JPTMH after this initial flurry of 
activity other than considering the various reports and papers issued 
by the DHSS on behalf of the Development Team for the Mentally 
Handicapped - a national advisory body, established by the DHSS, whose 
task was essentially to raise the consciousness of the NHS to the 
plight of mentally handicapped patients. In short, the JPTMH was 
relatively dormant for a period of about two years, until early 1980 
when it began to consider a specific proposal for two small 
residential homes, each to contain five places for severely mentally 
handicapped children. However, the need for these units was 
questioned by the JCPT on the grounds of the financial commitment 
necessary, and that there were other, and more worthy, competing 
demands. 
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It was during the debate on this issue that a number of events 
occurred which ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the JPTMH by 
the JCPT. The JCPT decided to assume resonsibility for the duties of 
the JPTMH on the grounds that it had become moribund and that, 
therefore, a new initiative was required. This new initiative was 
ultimately to emerge in the form of a partnership between NHA and the 
local authority, with a specific remit to implement an agreed policy, 
for the mentally handicapped. The sequence of events which 
precipitated this dramatic change are outlined in the following 
paragraphs. 
The Social Services Department's response to an earlier NHS strategy 
for the mentally handicappped was to place considerable emphasis upon 
community support for parents and families with handicapped members. 
At the same time a paper discussed by the JPTMH suggested that a 
particular unit, then being considered for closure, could be re-opened 
as a family support unit for parents of mentally handicapped children. 
The JPTMH's attention to these issues was diverted by an open letter, 
from the local CHC, to Dr Vaughan, then Minister of Health. In the 
letter, the CHC deplored the lack of provision for the mentally 
handicapped within the NHA and further criticised the NHA for not 
having a 'real' plan for future services. The letter concluded with 
an invitation to the Minister to enquire into this apparent lack of 
progress and poor state of affairs. The response of the NHA to the 
CHC's letter was to chide them for their lack of faith by saying that 
NHA believed that it was important to develop services in close co-
operation with the local authority and that it was important that this 
be done properly and without undue haste. Indeed, the CHC were 
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reminded that they had been party to the discussions on a possible 
strategy for the mentally handicapped and also that the NHA had partly 
underwritten the cost of a study on mental handicap services that the 
CHC was conducting. The implied but unstated message to the CHC was 
that their activities could jeopardise the limited progress to date; 
progress that depended a great deal on the continuing goodwill of all 
parties involved. 
In tandem with this activity, a number of proposals by the CHC, the 
local authority, NHA planners, psychiatrists and others were put to 
the JPTMH for consideration; proposals which, in one form or another, 
stressed the desirability of a community-based service. An element 
common to all of these various papers, proposals, and reports was the 
need for some form of support for families, such as a resource centre 
or similar unit providing counselling services, information and 
advice; a base for community staff; and some provision for short-term 
relief/day-care faciliites. The culmination of this activity was the 
publication of a report focussing upon the needs of mentally 
handicapped people and their families (NHA, 1981). 
The report called for the establishment of a partnership/joint venture 
between representatives from the NHA, the local authority, and from 
the community (including parents of the mentally handicapped). 
The report was endorsed by all concerned and subsequently the 
Partnership superceded the JPTMH thus explicitly recognising that 
there were certain advantages to a jointly planned and operated 
service. The Partnership was to be a consortium of three officers and 
three members from the NHA and local authority, with two 
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places for community/voluntary groups. Not surprisingly, the local 
co~~unity/voluntary groups were not particularly happy about having 
only two places on the Partnership, since it could be argued that the 
odds tended to favour the statutory bodies; hence they pressed for 
equal status. Indeed, an agreement was reached which gave the 
consortium of community groups equal representation on the Partnership 
with the nominated members from the NHA and the local authority 
(Petfield, 1983). 
Notwithstanding these teething problems, a start was made towards the 
establishment of the Resource Centre for the mentally handicapped by 
securing the agreement of the local CHC to the secondment of their 
secretary, as the interim manager for the Resource Centre. 
The necessity to find a suitable location for the centre-piece of the 
Partnership - the Family Resource Centre - was the major task pre-
occupying it in the early days. An extensive review was undertaken 
of potential NHA and local authority premises but none were considered 
to be suitable. Part of the NHA long range plan for hospital usage had 
identified spare capacity in Hospital S, which it duly earmarked as a 
future site for its headquarters as an alternative to the rented 
accommodation presently occupied. The Partnership became aware of 
this vacant space in Hospital S and a formal request was made to use 
this space earmarked as its future headquarters as the base for the 
Family Resource Centre. The request for the use of the space in 
Hospital S as the Family Resource Centre and to defer the transfer of 
NHA headquarter's was duly granted in June 1982 even though the cost 
to NHA was high as it was effectively foregoing a saving of some 
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£100,000 per annum which would have been achieved through the 
transfer. This courageous decision served to underline the degree of 
the commitment of NHA to the partnership scheme. 
One of the early issues to arise and one which has proved difficult to 
resolve was the question of who held executive responsibility for the 
Partnership. This arose as some of the clinical and professional 
staff in NHA questioned the partnership's role and responsibility to 
determine the services and facilities necessary for the mentally 
handicapped. For example, a consultant psychiatrist was worried that 
responsibility for psychiatric services would be transferred to the 
Partnership whereas at present these services were hospital based and 
specifically under his control. The argument was essentially about 
professional prestige and accountability with this particular 
clinician demanding reassurance that his authority was not about to be 
undermined. He was assured by NHA that the responsibility for 
psychiatic services was not likely to become part of the Partnership's 
remit. 
There arose also a difference of opinion between those officers in NHA 
with responsibility for personnel and the Partnership over who had the 
mandate and authority to decide the staffing requirements of the 
Partnership. This dispute originated when the Partnership decided, 
after considerable discussion, that the field staff required to form 
the nucleus of the community handicap team should be a clinical 
psychologist and some community nurses. The view of some of the 
professionals in the Partnership and in the NHA was that, in the first 
instance, the staff appointed should only be community nurses. This 
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potentially damaging situation was eventually resolved by the NHA 
itself who stated that the Partnership's constitution gave it the 
authority to decide its o~1 staffing levels within the agreed 
financial sum set aside for the Partnership. The outcome was that the 
usual line relationship for staff would apply but the Partnership had 
overall responsibility for the policy under which staff would work and 
also how its £100,000 funding should be allocated. In summary, those 
working for the Partnership were considered employees of the health or 
local authority as the case may be but were ultimately accountable to 
the Partnership for their duties, and as such the onus was on the 
Partnership to draw up the necessary job description. 
The Partnership was originally launched in June 1981 on an agreement 
which saw the secretary of the CHC accept the post as Partnership 
manager on a seconded basis for six months. Towards the end of the 
seconded period the Partnership manager expressed the wish to return 
to the CHC and it was agreed that a permanent manager should be 
appointed and that the post should be advertised. It had initially 
been agreed that the post would be a local authority appointment but 
that the salary for the position would be paid for by the NHA. The 
reason for this arrangement was to ensure that the post did not become 
part of the NHA management complement under the exercise to reduce 
management costs introduced simultaneously with the change in the 
structure of the NHS (DHSS, 1981). Unfortunately, and in spite of 
the support of the Social Services Department, the local authority's 
personnel department refused to sanction the scheme on the grade and 
salary level considered by the Partnership to be appropriate. The 
personnel department would only approve the scheme on a lower grade. 
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The NHA not unnaturally, considered this to be totally unacceptable, 
arguing that the higher grade was essential in order to attract the 
necessary calibre of candidate for the position. The local authority 
refused to alter its view and the NHA proceeded, unilaterally, and 
advertised the post as a health authority appointment on the grade 
originally agreed, even though it would have profound implications for 
the NHA as a result of the review of management costs being conducted 
by the DHSS (DHSS, 1981). This illustrates once again the degree of 
commitment of NHA to the Partnership and its determination that it 
should succeed. Such intransigence on the part of the local 
authority is difficult to understand as the financial cost of the post 
was being borne by the NHA. One could perhaps deduce from this that 
the local authority did not necessarily share the same commitment to 
the Partnership as NHA. 
Despite the intention on the part of the NHA to appoint a permanent 
manager for the Partnership, the post was not filled until June 1983. 
The delay was due primarily to the reorganisation of the NHS which 
commenced in April 1982. Part of the restructuring was the decision 
to curtail and/or reduce the level of management in the NHS and 
consequently any new posts or changes in posts had to be formally 
approved by the RHA. 
Concomitant with the approval of the NHA to base the Family Resource 
Centre at Hospital S, the NHA also agreed that the Community 
Psychiatric Service and the Community Chiropody Service should be 
transferred to the same location. Because considerable building work 
was necessary before the hospital could accommodate all of these 
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functions, it was thought unlikely that the Family Resource Centre as 
orignially proposed would be ready before August, 1984. However, an 
interim arrangement was reached and the Family Resource Centre began 
operations from Hospital S in October, 1982. 
With the establishment of the Family Resource Centre, the next major 
issue for the Partnership was the creation of a Community Mental 
Handicap Team (CMHT). This has been a rather protracted process 
which, according to the first report "has been the subject of much 
discussion, involving 39 representations of the various professional 
interests over some 10 meetings" (NCC/NHA, 1982, p.S). However, the 
discussions have not been in vain as the core or nucleus of the Team 
has been identified and broadly consists of the following personnel: 
Professional Adviser, 
Occupational Therapist, 
Educational Psychologist, 
Teacher, 
Doctor, 
Clinical Psychologist, 
Nurse, 
Speech Therapist, 
Parent, 
Administrator, 
Physiotherapist, 
Pre-School Adviser, 
Social Worker. 
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It was envisaged that some, but not necessarily all of the above, 
would be based at the Resource Centre. A request was sent to the NHA 
for the additional funding required for a modest start to be made to 
the CMHT. The funds were sought for 2 physiotherapists, 1 
physiotherapist-aide and 2 additional community nurses, costing some 
£50,000. The NHA approved the request but passed it on to the RHA 
for consideration on the grounds that RHA monies were a more likely 
possibility given the severe financial constraints in which the NHA 
now found itself. The response from the RHA to this request for 
additional resources, at the time of writing, had not been 
forthcoming. 
The Partnership was charged with the responsibility for identifying 
gaps in the existing level and mix of professional skills and to 
assess the specialist staff required to meet demands. The 
Partnership has the capability, of not only determining what 
additional staff were required but to appoint the necessary staff 
subject to the availability of resources. 
Work was also progressing on the establishment of a Register of 
clients and two working groups have been convened to identify and 
develop plans firstly, for short-term relief for parents and families 
of mentally handicapped children and secondly, long-term care 
facilities. An initial report from each of these working groups was 
presented and discussed by the Partnership at its October 1982 
meeting. In general, the two reports were well-received and 
endorsement for the proposals outlined in each report, was given. It 
was agreed that the Partnership should be kept fully informed of the 
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development concerning the two reports and also that back-up support 
by the Partnership would be required for the schemes proposed for 
short-term relief. 
During this time the Partnership published an outline strategy for the 
development of services for the mentally handicapped which 
incorporated a range of ideas and proposals put to the Partnership for 
the expansion of such services. The document discussed four major 
scenarios initially approved by the Partnership and outlined a 
posssible investment programme for the next three to five years. In 
essence, this manifesto was seen as the basis of a joint policy for 
the development of mental handicap services and the Partnership was 
seeking the endorsement of both Authorities of its overall strategy, 
Shortly after the Partnership produced its manifesto the RHA published 
a policy document on services for the mentally handicapped; the 
contents and implications of which were considered by the Partnership. 
The document was also discussed by the NHA and it was highly 
critical of the whole focus and ethos of the Regional policy. The 
Partnership endorsed the views expressed by the NHA but added its own 
criticism of the policy. The Partnership was unhappy with the 
Regional strategy on three grounds: firstly, it deplored the lack of 
emphasis on the prevention of mental handicap; secondly, it believed 
that the proposal for sub-regional specialisation would mean the 
aggregating of mental handicap persons in large institutions which ran 
counter to current thinking; and, thirdly, that the segregation of 
mentally handicapped people from the main stream of health care 
provision was not only naive but potentially dangerous. 
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That the Partnership and NHA felt able to respond so strongly to the 
RHA's policy for the mentally handicapped demonstrated a maturity of 
perception that would have been unheard of had the Partnership not 
been created and given the opportunity to grow and develop. Indeed, 
it would not be unreasonable to assume that if the Partnership had not 
been created then the archetypical thinking embodied in the Regional 
report would have been unequivocally acceptable to all concerned. 
Two major issues still remained as potential obstacles. These were 
the membership and constitution of the Partnership, and that, inspite 
of the fact that a policy document on services for the mentally 
handicapped has been endorsed, the local authority continued to pursue 
projects for the mentally handicapped independently of the 
Partnership. These unresolved issues are largely inter-related since 
an agreed constitution would presumably dictate the procedure for each 
authority to follow in referring schemes/projects to the Partnership. 
Although the Partnership has yet to reach a firm position on these 
matters it is interesting to note that the minutes of the April 
(1983) meeting stated-
"The general principle of the tri-partite nature of the 
Partnership being reflected at the various levels of its 
activities was considered to be of fundamental importance to all 
present." 
There is every reason to believe that these sentiments still hold 
good, and the latest intelligence (March 1985) suggests that the 
concept is continuing to prosper even though a number of the original 
aims and objectives are under review. 
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It is clear that the Partnership has been the 'success story' of the 
research, although it was not without some problems; notably the lack 
of an agreed constitution and policy framework. These factors 
notwithstanding, there still remains a commitment to the Partnership 
and a desire to see it succeed. 
Finally it seems as though the tripartite structure of the 
Partnership has had a profound effect upon the perceptions of all 
concerned. For example, the professional members of the Partnership 
found that their clinical or professional views were being challenged 
by the lay people. These challenges were not frivolous but well-
founded with the result that many of the professionals have had cause 
to re-consider their views. The exercise has also proved illuminating 
for the lay representatives as they have come to appreciate more fully 
the constraints which handicap the ability of the professionals to 
respond to a given situation. Clearly some of the professionals 
concerned regard the questions from the 'public' as unwarranted 
attacks on their professional judgement but others have been quick to 
see the benefits of such a dialogue. The end result has been that 
the Partnership has been a beneficial learning experience for the 
majority of those involved. 
It will be apparent from the foregoing analysis that, although each 
joint planning team had a common origin and overall philosophy, each 
chose to interpret and carry out its remit in very different ways. 
This evolvement of a separate planning and policy rationale occurred 
inspite of the fact that each planning team shared a common core 
membership, comprised of NHA officers, health professionals, in 
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particular medical personnel, and representatives from the Social 
Services Department of the local authority. Why these two planning 
teams should choose to function so differently is difficult to 
determine empirically, but a number of hypotheses, with supporting 
evidence where applicable, can be advanced and each will be discussed 
in turn. The hypotheses or distinguishing features which enabled one 
planning team to succeed where the other failed were: a committed 
leadership; lack of constraining services or facilities: relatively 
little conflict between planners and the caring professions on the 
type of service required; and a shared sense of urgency that 
something had to be done. These features form the core of the 
discussion in the following Chapters Six - Nine, beginning first with 
a consideration of the questions of leadership and power in planning 
and policy-making. 
CHAPTER SIX 
POWER AND INFLUENCE IN HEALTH PLANNING AND POLICY-MAKING 
This chapter marks the beginning of a different and new phase to the 
thesis where the emphasis shifts from the theoretical and descriptive 
to the contextual. The previous four chapters were concerned with 
setting the scene for planning and policy-making in the NHS through an 
investigation of the process as it was conducted within one health 
authority. What now follows is a discussion and analysis of how the 
planning process unfolded as a result of the investigation. The 
conventional wisdom regarding planning and policy-making as 
articulated by informed observers is complemented and contrasted by 
the findings of the research and from interviews conducted with some 
of the main protagonists involved in the process. 
Policy-making and the decisions taken in support of the policies, at 
least in the health service, could be described as organisational 
chaos. The procedure is organisational in the sense that there is a 
known, if not agreed mechanism and structure for determining policy 
and for the decisions that follow therefrom. It is a chaotic process 
because almost everyone working in the health service is a decision-
maker. Or as Klein has put it, "what makes the NHS unique is 
precisely the fact that health care is the product of countless 
individual decisions made every day by men and women with a wide range 
of professional and occupational skills, each of whom tends to enjoy a 
large degree of autonomy or discretion in his or her own particular 
domain of activity" ( 1984b, p. 1706). 
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Clearly the degree and scope of individual autonomy will vary 
according to professional and occupational status with the medical 
profession ostensibly having the greatest domain of influence. Thus 
from an organisational perspective it is very difficult to state 
precisely who is responsible for what - who is the decision-maker. 
Paradoxically, when everyone is a decision-maker, in essence no one 
is, because one's ability and scope for making decisions is 
constrained by everyone else working in the health service. 
Consequently, "the reality of decision-making in the NHS is different 
from the constitutional theory on which its organisational charts are 
based" (Klein, 1984b, p. 1706). 
This diverse and pervasive form of decision-making, characteristic of 
the NHS, distinguishes it from nearly every other type of organisation 
be it public and/or private. Therefore, as Klein has noted, 
decision-making in the NHS does not lend itself to examination through 
conventional means, nevertheless there are aspects of organisation and 
management theory which do mirror or parallel that which does occur in 
the health service. This chapter will discuss some of these common 
aspects beginning with leadership and then going on to consider 
questions of power and influence drawing on the similarities and 
identifying the major differences where appropriate between the NHS 
and conventional wisdom gleaned from elsewhere. The discussion will 
be buttressed with specific examples drawn from the research domain to 
either substantiate or refute the application of standard 
organisational theory to a NHS setting. 
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Leadership 
Leadership, like management is an elusive concept; one intuitively 
knows what it is, yet one has difficulty in fomulating a precise 
definition. Longest, for example, defines leadership as "the 
accomplishment of organisational objectives as the result of 
interpersonal relationships between the leader and those he or she 
leads" (1984, p. 151). This definition, he readily acknowledges is 
untidy in the sense that it could also be construed as a definition 
for management itself and yet the two concepts are not the same. 
Management incorporates planning and organisation whereas leadership 
is the art (or science) of getting others to follow. Thus a good 
manager might be a poor leader and a good leader could be a bad 
manager. The ideal, of course, is that both characteristics should 
be manifest in the same person be they planner or policy-maker. 
Leadership if considered within a management context, can then be 
defined as the "ability to inspire and influence others to contribute 
to the attainment of objectives" (Longest, 1984, p. 152). A similar 
definition of leadership is that give by Liebler, et al who see it as 
"the influencing of individuals to strive willingly towards the 
objectives of the group; it is the art of inducing members to accept 
and accomplish the work necessary to reach the objective" (1984, p. 
146). Both these writers perceive leadership as an attribute which 
is bestowed upon an individual by virtue of ability, and not 
necessarily derived from that person's position or possession of 
power. In other words, leadership in this context obtains from a 
variety of factors, some personal, some not, and not because that 
individual has some position of power whereby they can force others to 
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do their bidding. As Leibler, et al note, "leadership is 
distinguished from power in that force is not a factor in leadership 
as it is in power relationships" (1984, p. 144). Having said this, 
of course, it does not mean that power is not a factor in leadership 
as it clearly is relevant in the hierarchical structure of an 
organisation >vhere it is of lesser importance is ·.vhen dealing with 
groups comprised of individuals of similar rank and status in an 
organisation, such as in the NHS. 
In formal organisations where there is a clear line relationship the 
functions of the leader are relatively straightforward. He/she is 
expected to influence, control and persuade the group to work 
towards/within the overall objectives of the organisation. In less 
formal settings where there is no clear line of responsiblity or 
accountability, the role and function of the leader become more 
difficult to define since a position of leadership could be bestowed 
upon a person because that individual is recognised as possessing the 
ability to create the necessary climate of change which is essential 
to the organisation's continued survival (Bennis, 1973). 
Leadership can be expressed or exercised in several different ways and 
the operative style is primarily derived from the leader's personality 
and behavioural characteristics. This combination of personality and 
personal traits gives rise to a 'leadership style' of which the 
following are illustrative. 
Autocratic leadership - this style of leadership is one in which exact 
and precise details are given to a subordinate of how a particular 
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task is to be undertaken. There is no room for initiative on the 
part of the employee or other members of the group. The form of 
leadership displayed here is one in which there is a high degree of 
centralisation coupled with a fairly narrow span of management 
(Liebler, et al 1984). The leader is the decision-maker with no 
participation in the process by others. In this case power resides 
with the leader who brooks no challenges to his/her authority - the 
so-called 'Theory X' of management identified by McGregor {1960). 
This style of leadership is not common in the NHS although there is no 
doubt that specific examples could be found if one looked long and 
hard enough. In the study area, there was no evidence to suggest 
that this model was applicable to the decision-making behaviour 
demonstrated by the planning process. 
Laissez-faire leadership - this style is in many ways the antithesis 
of the autocratic school of leadership because the leader operates on 
the assumption that everyone in the group is capable of self-
motivation or leadership. Thus there is no real requirement for a 
leader only for an adviser or consultant as and when requested. 
as with the autocratic form of leadership there is little or no 
evidence to suggest that the laissez-faire model is typical of the 
Just 
NHS. It may be that certain groups pursue specific issues or operate 
in a somewhat autonomous manner (such as doctors and to a lesser 
extent other professions allied to medicine) but each would 
acknowledge that they are part of an organisation and as such 
subscribe to its rules. 
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Bureaucratic leadership - this is considered to be similar to 
autocratic leadership because the institution's or organisation's 
rules and regulations are the driving force behind this style of 
leadership. Gibb (1971) has used the term 'defensive leadership' to 
describe similar activities. The bureaucratic model of leadership, 
indeed as does the autocratic style, inhibits or hinders innovation 
and experimentation and instead encourages the maintenance of the 
'status quo'. Most informed observers of the NHS whilst not 
commenting on leadership per se in the health services appear to 
suggest that this modality is very common in that there is a lack of 
innovative and change-oriented decision-making and that this timidness 
on the part of those in charge is primarily associated with a desire 
to live within the rules for fear of annoying or upsetting certain 
professional groups or members of that group (Ham, 1981; Haywood and 
Alaszewski, 1980; Parston, 1980). An acknowledgement that there are 
those who, although outside the standard management structure, 
nonetheless exert considerable influence in a covert way over the 
decision-making process (Johnson, 1972; Wilding, 1982). This theme 
of professional power and influence will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Seven. 
Participative leadership - this method is generally characterised by a 
strong determination of the leader to totally involve the group in the 
decision-making process. Consultation is the watch-word of the 
participative leader as he/she seeks to maximise to the full the range 
of talent and experience embodied in the group. The leader is the 
facilitator of this process of group involvement in policy- and 
decision-making. Consultation does not imply or suggest dilution of 
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formal authority or responsibility since in most cases it is the 
manager or leader who retains the right to make the final decision. 
This style does have certain advantages, not least of which is the 
high degree of commitment generated for the agreed policy or programme 
which in turn greatly enhances the likelihood of the implementation of 
the decision. Participative leadership or 'Theory Y' is predicated 
on the assumption that people are essentially responsible and self-
motivated provided that management creates the necessary enviro~~ent 
for such traits to flourish (McGregor, 1960). 
The purpose of this chapter is not to create a lengthy treatise on 
leadership, but rather to suggest that leadership is a crucial element 
of policy- and decision-making irrespective of whether or not one is 
dealing with a hierarchically aligned organisation or one such as the 
NHS, which is a polyglot of different professional groups ostensively 
sharing a common goal. The styles of leadership discussed above 
could also have been expressed as a continuum (figure 6.1) which 
illustrates most forcibly the point that none of these modes of 
leadership are mutually exclusive that is separate and distinct - as 
elements of each are generally to be found, to a greater or less 
degree, in any leader or manager and should be varied to suit the 
particular demands of the task, situation, and followers. 
Such diverse yet interlocking styles of leadership were evident in the 
study area. Each JPT, although possessed of a common origin and 
overall philosophy, chose to interpret and exercise their specific 
remit in very different ways. This application and implementation of 
separate planning and policy rationales occurred despite the fact that 
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each planning team shared a common core membership, comprised of NHA 
officers (mainly, but not exclusively from the policy and planning 
division), health professionals (particularly, medical and nursing 
personnel), and representatives from the Local Authority's Social 
Services Department. Why these two particular planning teams should 
exhibit different behaviour is difficult to determine empirically; 
however a number of possible 'explanations' can be advanced, with some 
supporting evidence. 
In many of the recent studies of policy-making, planning and decision-
making the question of leadership has not been a major topic of 
investigation, at least not in any explicit sense. For instance, 
Battye, et al (1980) in their study of the NHS planning system at 
District level did not consider, inter alia, questions of leadership 
nor were they particularly c~ncerned about the role of the chairperson 
of such teams (the de jure if not de facto leader) when assessing the 
overall effectiveness of the team approach to planning. They did 
suggest, however, that the administrator, the community physician and 
the hospital consultant were key personnel or actors in the planning 
process. It is not unusual to find that one of these individuals is 
chairperson of the planning team. 
Most analysts of policy- and decision-making in the NHS have tended to 
focus their attention on the various actors in the process and how 
they exercised the power and influence generally attributed to them 
through the organisational structure. This is largely true of the 
work of Barnard, et al (1979), Battye, et al (1980), Ham (1980a), 
Haywood and Alaszewski (1980) and Hunter (1980) among others. 
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Leadership, while not a specifc issue considered at length by these 
observers of the NHS, was at least implicitly acknowleged in their 
analysis of policy and decision-making and its attribute planning; 
that the role of the chairperson was crucial to the outcomes 
identified. 
At the recent European Conference on Planning and Management for 
Health held in The Hague a report Leadership in Planning and 
Management for Health stated that "if planning is about securing 
action, leadership is about ability to create constructive ideas on 
how to launch this action" (WHO, 1984, p. 5) and how to ensure efforts 
are channelled to achieve the task goals. Such leadership, to be 
effective, combines the formal and the informal and assumes that roles 
and tasks will vary according to the actors involved and the 
particular planning structure in operation. In general, however, 
leadership in this context, and especially in the health sector "is 
not so much a question of power as a question of competence and 
ability to influence through provision of facts" (WHO, 1984, p. 6). 
With this in mind, attention turns to the question of leadership in 
the NHS as demonstrated through an assessment of the behaviour 
exhibited by the chairpersons of the joint planning teams studies -
JPTE and JPTMH. As Fiedler (1967) has demonstrated, the chairperson 
of any group can be considered, de jure, to be the leader of the 
group. It is clear from the assessment in Chapter Four of how each 
joint planning team operated that, not only was the role of the 
chairperson crucial, but so too were the supporting roles played by 
the NHA planning staff. In an attempt to more fully understand the 
relationship and role of the chair in the policy-making and planning 
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process, views were sought from team members as to their assessment of 
the chairperson's duties and how these were discharged. In effect, 
what was being asked of them was their appraisal of the chairperson 
and by inference what should be the attributes necessary for good 
leadership. In general, the consensus of opinion on the chairperson 
was that the position was one of crucial importance. As one medical 
member of the JPTE planning team put it "committees stand or fall by 
virtue of the ability of the chair", who through the efficacy of his 
position "can put through or block developments". A nurse member of 
the same planning team, however, saw things slightly differently and 
whilst conceding that the chairperson was important, was of the 
opinion that the style of leadership appertaining owed more to the 
fact that the chair was a medical person who tended to view matters in 
medical terms and as a result this was the context in which policy 
affairs were discussed. The Local Authority member of the team added 
a different dimension to the traits necessary for good 
leadership/chairpersonship and this was a "credibility factor"; the 
ability to react to suggestions and ideas and to get things done. 
The JPTE has had, since its inception, two chairpersons, both of whom 
have been medical personnel - one was community-based, the other 
hospital-based. Given the importance which Fiedler (1967) attaches to 
the chair and the opportunity that goes with it to play a major role 
in determining policy outcomes one would expect the chairpersons of 
the JPTE to play a more dynamic part in the decision-making and policy 
formulation process if only because of their considerable influence 
over determining which items should or should not be included on the 
agenda. 
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The behaviour of the two chairpersons of the JPTE in conducting 
meetings was, in many ways, symbolic of the ;defensive leadership' 
described by Gibb (1971). This style of leadership is characterised 
by low trust, data distortion, persuasion bordering on coercion and a 
high degree of control. Gibb's analogy does not fit exactly the role 
played by the chairpersons of the JPTE, as there were also elements of 
the 'bureaucratic'' and 'laissez-faire' schools of leadership. The 
common features from Gibb's model that were in evidence were low trust 
(restriction of discussion to the local significance of matters of 
national policy) and high control (manipulation of agenda items) but 
there was also some evidence that the manner in which discussion 
occurred was similar to that of 'laissez-faire' leadership in that the 
discussion was largely unstructured and free-ranging with little or no 
substance of much relevance emerging. What did emanate from the 
planning team were planning recommendations generally in line with 
existing policies and patterns of care. There appeared to be little 
urgency to the deliberations of the planning team with the leadership 
displaying some of the more obvious signs of the bureaucratic style by 
'playing safe', thus those occupying the chair were more concerned 
with appearances than with any serious attempt to tackle matter of 
substance. 
It was not surprisjng, therefore, to find that the JPTE was bypassed 
by the NHA planners, because in their opinion, the planning team for 
the elderly was altogether too conventional by seeking solutions to 
local problems through national policies. In the eyes of the NHA 
planners this type of planning behaviour only served to reinforce and 
perpetuate the traditional model of planning because the suggestions 
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proffered for the amelioration of local problems were generally 
couched in terms of improvements to existing services. As far as the 
planners were concerned this was 'bureaucratic planning' at its worse 
because it tended to perpetuate the medical approach towards 
preserving what exists, the apparent modus operandi favoured by the 
JPTE, whereas the NHA planners were committed to a different, more 
innovative approach to local problems. In other words, the NHA 
planners were concerned with local issues entirely, felt less 
constrained in their regard for existing services and therefore were 
less inhibited in their search for solutions. Indeed, it appeared 
that the planners relished their somewhat unorthodox approach by 
challenging the so-called conventional wisdom, as articulated by the 
JPTE, about what should be the overall pattern of care for the 
elderly. The reason that the planners did not feel constrained in 
the same way that the JPTE did could be attributed to the fact that 
they clearly perceived their task as producing a policy which 
maximised the potential benefits for the elderly and consequently then 
appeared to have no qualms about pursuing such a policy. Their 
motivation for so doing is discussed later on in Chapter Seven when 
the role of the planner in the planning process is considered in some 
detail. 
The JPTMH, although similar in concept and composition to the JPTE, 
appeared to enjoy a very different form or style of leadership, at 
least, in the latter stages of its existence. In its earliest days 
its leadership was as moribund as that shown by the JPTE but things 
changed early on in its development that eventually led to the JPTMH 
taking a very distinctive path. Why these two planning groups should 
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function so differently is difficult to ascertain precisely but 
professional background and prior experience would appear to be an 
important factor. In the case of the JPTMH both of the chairpersons 
were administrators, the first one from the NHA and the second from 
the Local Authority's Social Services Department. One reason why 
these chairpersons were more successful in developing locally based 
policies than their JPTE counterparts could be attributed to the fact 
that they were both used to working with committees and therefore were 
more astute at manipulating events and guiding issues through the 
joint planning team. An additional and possibly related factor was 
the personalities of each chairperson - they were both very 
charismatic individuals, who, when committed to a project, were 
determined to see it through to implementation which may well have 
produced a sort of 'band-wagon' effect which influenced the other 
members of the JPTMH to respond accordingly. Or, as one professional 
member (psychologist) of the team suggested the team's success could 
be ascribed to the somewhat unorthodox chairpersonship of the JPTMH 
whereby existing standards and norms for care and services of this 
client group were largely jettisoned in favour of a team oriented 
approach to the problems. This unconventional approach to leadership 
sounds remarkably similar to McGregor's 'Theory Y' or democratic style 
of management where everyone has a personal stake in the outcome. 
Thus the installation of a sense of collective ownership by the 
planning team in the final product - the policy or plan - is of 
particular importance and it would appear that such a commitment is 
very dependent upon the style of leadership adopted. 
One conclusion which could be drawn from this assessment of the role 
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of the chairperson in planning and policy-making is that although the 
role is a crucial one it is but one ingredient in the recipe of 
success for planning and policy-making. In Handy's (1976) parlance 
the leader is both an ambassador - representing his group to people 
and other groups and by screening out organisational 'noise' so that 
the workings of the group are expedited - and a model - the embodiment 
of the organisation which those in the group are striving to emulate. 
Elements of Handy's paradigm were discernible in the leadership 
provided to the JPTMH and which were not evident in the JPTE. 
However, as Barnard et al concluded, "it is not enough to allocate 
certain roles •...• and expect the system and the individual to respond 
accordingly (since) the resources available to individuals are 
certainly a significant factor in the way they perform their roles as 
are structural and political forces" (1979, Vol. 2, p. 83). 
Nonetheless, leadership, as embodied in the chairperson is important 
because of: 
a) influence over agenda items; 
b) an understanding of the political nature of the issues under 
consideration; 
c) the commitment brought to the position; and, 
d) the ability to inspire and/or motivate others to work for 
common goals. 
In a monolithic organisation, such characteristics in a leader may be 
sufficient for managerial success, whereas in a polyarchical 
organisation such as the NHS there are other forces at work which may 
determine whether or not a particular policy is acceptable. In the 
NHS responsibility for decision-making is diffused over several groups 
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- professions - which have a greater or lesser say in the outcome. 
The end product of such a process is in many ways dictated by the 
power and influence which these groups wield, either in conjunction or 
in competition with the leader. 
Power and Influence 
Before discussing the various ways in which different groups obtain 
and apply the power and influence attributed to them it is first 
necessary to define these two related concepts. Liebler et al defines 
power as "the ability to obtain compliance by means of coercion, to 
have one's own will carried out despite resistance' (1984, p. 134). 
They go on to offer a definition of influence as "the capacity to 
produce effects on others or to obtain compliance but it differs from 
power in the manner in which compliance is evolved" (p. 135). Thus 
there is a subtle but important distinction here and that is; power 
equates with force (either explicit or implicit) whereas influence 
facilitates consensus. 
Influence is meaningless without power - influence supplements power. 
Yet Handy suggests that possessing power itself is not as important as 
the ability to influence since "the power to influence is something 
that most people would like more of, in some respect, even if they do 
not want the responsibility that may go with it" (1976, p. 111). 
Perhaps then the real issue is the power to influence people for as 
Likert (1961) has revealed, in those groups where the members feel 
that they each have more influence there appears to be a corresponding 
increase or improvement in their decision-making capabilities. The 
possession of power or ability to influence (resource) does not 
- 133 -
necessarily lead to the application of influence (process) and 
therefore it is important to distinguish between them (Handy, 1976), 
Since influence derives from power it is apposite to consider, albeit 
briefly, the sources of power. Before doing so, there are some 
necessary qualifications or considerations that should be borne in 
mind and these are the relativity, the balance and the domain of 
power. 
The relativity of power - the effectiveness of the power possessed by 
any one person is a function of the environment or circumstance in 
which that person is placed and therefore will rise or fall according 
to the composition of the group and the changes which occur in its 
membership. In other words, if A's source of power has no meaning 
for B in a particular situation or circumstance, then A's power is 
ineffective either because it is not acknowledged or because it is 
judged to be unimportant (Handy, 1976). 
The balance of power - power is not absolute in the sense that A has 
power and B has none. There is always the opportunity for 
subversiveness or 'negative power' when someone believes that they are 
being unduly oppressed by the exercise of power. Therefore, just 
because A possesses power it does not automatically follow that A can 
influence B as this is dependent upon the power which B holds (Handy, 
1976). 
The domain of power - the exercise of power is rather like a game in 
which individuals are constantly trying to increase their own power 
while restricting that of their rivals. As Handy states "few sources 
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of power are universally valid over all constituencies" (1976, p. 
11 3) • Also if one's source of power is challenged it may not 
necessarily mean that the power base is destroyed but only constricted 
(Handy, 1976). 
The foregoing aspects of power condition to a large extent the manner 
in which the holder is able to exercise power which may be derived 
from one of several sources. The classification applied here is that 
used by Handy (1976) which is itself a variation on that proposed by 
French and Raven (1959). The sources of individual power are: 
1) physical power- the power of superior force; 
2) resource or reward power - resources, either material or 
non-material are possessed and which are desired by others; 
3) position power - legitimate power (authority) derived from 
one's role or position in an organisation; 
4) expert power - the power that is ascribed to a person 
because of his/her particular expertise; 
5) personal power - this form of power derives directly from an 
individual's charisma or personality; and 
6) negative power - the capacity to prevent or hinder things 
from happening or to distort the eventual outcome. 
It is from these various power sources that one is able to exert 
influence of some kind over others. 
The classification of power discussed by Handy and briefly outlined 
above has been done for the sake of convenience, one should be under 
no illusions that power is exercised in such precise ways. According 
to Bachrach and Baratz, power is never applied in a straightforward 
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manner, it is somewhat two-faced in its application. 
"Power is exercised when A participates in the making of 
decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A 
devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and 
political values and institutional practices that limit the 
scope of the political process to public consideration of 
only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. 
To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, 
for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any 
issues that might in their resolution be seriously 
detrimental to A's set of preferences" {quoted in Parston, 
1980, p. 39). 
Bachrach and Baratz {1970) have termed this process of conflict 
minimization 'non-decision making' because contentious matters are 
never allowed onto the agenda. In many ways the activities of the 
JPTE accord with this model since local issues were excluded from the 
agenda and were replaced by matters deriving from national policies. 
Thus the local and by definition contentious issues were substituted 
by the non-threatening national policies. Group cohesiveness and 
solidarity was considered to be more important than any serious and 
potential disruptive debate over local problems. 
The activity described herein is very close to Luke's third 
dimensional view of power which he defines as the "contradiciton 
between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests 
of those they exclude ••• who may not express or even be conscious of 
their interests" {1974, p. 25). How this situation developed is 
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difficult to describe clearly and concisely but has in part been 
explained by the various sources of power available to the leadership 
(planning team chairperson) and how that power was exercised. This 
does rather leave open the question as to why the JPTMH should 
function so differently even allowing for the distinctive leadership 
styles displayed. It does seem clear, however, that it cannot be 
attributed to power and influence alone. What seemed to have taken 
place might best be described as 'synergism' - the term used by Claus 
and Bailey (1977) to refer to the power of co-creation and 
collaboration whereby the skills and expertise (power) of others is 
considered to be an essential and necessary ingredient of successful 
po Hey-making. Their PAIL (Power/Authority/ Influence/ Leadership) 
model (figure 6.2) would seem to epitomise the sort of conditions and 
factors which underpinned the working patterns of the JPTMH and its 
reincarnated self - the Partnership. It would appear, therefore, 
that there was some sort of collective understanding or sharing of 
power sources to enable one planning team to achieve the progress it 
did while the other planning team, sharing a similar core membership, 
was essentially moribund. 
Power and influence alone cannot be the only explanation for such 
different behaviour between planning teams; so other factors must 
hav~ been operating here. As Bachrach and Baratz have noted "power 
is neither the only nor even the major factor underlying the process 
of decison-making" (1970, p. 39). To pursue this line of reasoning 
further would require a major shift away from the domain of power and 
into the realm of politics, and that is the subject of the next 
chapter. However before leaving this discussion it is important to 
Figure 6.2 
Leadership Throughput - The Power/Authority/Influence/Leadership Model 
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establish the context within which the wider issue of politics is to 
be considered and also to show that the political domain is a natural 
extension of the debate about power, influence and leadership. 
At the beginning of this chapter reference was made to the diffused 
nature of decision-making in the NHS. This diffused decision-making, 
according to Klein (1984) is a consequence of several factors or 
elements all of which exhibit a constraining influence on the outcomes 
of the process. These inhibitors are in the main: 1) history -
past decisions invariably influence future ones because of the impact 
these have (or had) on the available resources and, 2) clinical 
autonomy - hospital doctors are quite free to decide who should 
receive treatment and what sort or type of treatment they should 
obtain which means that the health authority cannot make decisions 
regarding delivery of services. Thus there is a very clear "mismatch 
between the distributions of nominal authority and effective power" 
(Klein, 1984, p. 1706). The impact and the effect that this has had 
on policy formulation, planning and decision-making in the NHS has 
been quite well documented (Ham, 1981a; Haywood and Alaszewski, 
1980). 
A central feature of the NHS is the clinical autonomy enjoyed by the 
medical profession, which ensures that the best clinical conditions 
are made to practise medicine. A related issue is the general power 
and influence enjoyed by other health professionals over matters of 
policy with the doctors pre-eminent among them. As Illich notes, 
"they determine what shall be done and for whom" (1978, p. 342). 
Together these factors can be seen as imposing a formidable barrier to 
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change - a barrier which inhibits innovation and/or experimentation 
and encourages planning which amounts to little more than a 
repackaging of existing services. 
Alford (1975) in his seminal study of the politics of health care in 
New York City argued strongly that there are certain and particular 
'structural interests' in health care which prevaricate against 
measures and attempts at reform. These structural interests are 
considered to be more than just interest groups seeking the 
appropriate opportunity or circumstance to present their particular 
care, rather "structural interests either do not have to be organised 
in order to have their interests served or cannot be organised without 
great difficulty" (Alford, 1975, p. 14). These structural interests 
have been classified as, dominant, challenging, and repressed. The 
dominant group are also referred to as 'professional monopolists' and 
are generally regarded as being in the main, medical, but other 
professional groups are also included. According to Alford, the 
professional monopolists .••• "are satisfied with the status quo and 
do not form part of the •.• reformers ...• except when their powers 
and prerogative are threatened by others" (1975, p. 195). 
The second group, the challengers or 'corporate rationalists' are 
those in management and administration charged with the responsibilit~ 
of planning and managing the health network. They see that their 
ability to discharge their responsibilites effectively and efficiently 
is in many ways hindered by the power and influence and independence 
enjoyed by the professional monopolists and therefore actively seek 
ways to minimise their impact. The third group, the repressed, are 
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in Alford's term, the rest, those groups such as consumers, patients, 
patient advocates (Community Health Councils) and the like who are 
important elements in the health care network but who are little more 
than pawns in the health care chess game being played between the 
dominant and challenging forces. 
It is the conflict between the dominant and challenging groups which 
is political because, although they pursue different claims, they do 
share a common concern and that is to exclude or at least to hold at 
bay the claims of the repressed interests for a say in the debate. 
The political environment in which these protagonists operate and the 
manner in which they conduct themselves are not easy to define in 
precise terminology because of the rather complicated and entangled 
web each weaves in its attempt to outwit or put one over on the other. 
One way of trying to get an insight into this complicated and 
convoluted process was to start with a consideration of the philosophy 
and rationality which underpins the stance of each group. This is 
taken up in the following chapter which looks at different 
philosophies of care, the concept of need and demand in health, and 
how these are translated into a package of services. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
POLITICS OF POLICY-MAKING AND PLANNING 
The discussion, so far, has been content to consider planning as a 
process - through an examination of the procedures involved and their 
impact upon policy-making. It was noted that the planning undertaken 
in the study area displayed distinctive features and these 
distinctions persisted despite the fact that there existed a common, 
formal mechanism for governing the planning process. There are several 
factors which seem to influence planning and policy-making in health 
care and the foregoing chapter has considered the importance of 
leadership and its companions, power and influence in decision-
making. 
Inherent in the discussion has been an implicit notion of health and 
health care and it has been assummed that this notion is one which is 
generally shared. It would seem prudent at this stage to consider this 
notion of health, in order to place in context the assumptions 
(acceptable or otherwise) which underpin the proceeding discussions 
and which also buttress the hypothesis advanced herein. 
The ultimate goal of any health care system is often considered to be 
health - an illusive and undefined concept which is generally accepted 
as necessary and important. The problem of health is that it is both 
an ideal and a norm (Miles, 1978). As an ideal it can be defined in 
very general terms as in the WHO slogan 'Health for All by the 
Year 2000'. As a normative concept, its definition is much more 
problematical since health is in the eye of the beholder. Society 
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places considerable store on health, or at least the image of health, 
and such definitions of health care made in the social context. For 
example, in much of Western Society, good health is often associated 
with the 'body beautiful' -to be slim means to be healthy, whereas, 
in other societies, the converse is taken as a sign of health. 
This background of conflicting values and definitions of health 
provides the setting in which planners, providers, and policy-makers 
consider the package of health care services to be made available for 
a given population or area. The political argument centres on who 
should provide the services, who should determine what resources are 
to be made available, and what should be the criteria on which health 
plans and policies are to be decided. Such questions, as Topliss 
(1978) suggests, can only be understood and considered in the light of 
four main themes: social significance of the state of health; the 
individual and health care; institutions and communities; and the 
medicalization of society. 
The first - social significance of the state of health - refers to the 
different perceptions of health and illness which are manifest within 
society. Compare, for example, the tolerance given to the so-called 
minor ailments such as colds and 'flu, with the pressure placed on 
individuals and parents to ensure that they and their children are 
protected via immunisation against certain diseases. Differences such 
as this, whilst difficult to explain, nonetheless do seem to 
contribute to the 'politics of health' in that concern over specific 
illnesses leads to particular legislation to control and/or regulate 
access to health care. The totality of health care made available 
- 143 -
stems to a large extent from the value placed on particular aspects of 
health by society. 
The second factor - the individual and health care - is in many ways 
an extension and refinement of the first theme, in the sense that an 
individual's perception of health is a consequence of the values or 
beliefs held. Generally speaking, it is the individual who decides 
when he/she is ill and also how much he/she is prepared to sacrifice 
for good health, or for an acceptable state of health and/or to avoid 
ill-health. It is this personal judgement which also governs the 
extent to which a person will accept and follow professional advice. 
Probably the best example of this behaviour is attitude to smoking; 
there is considerable medical evidence to suggest that there is a 
strong association between smoking and coronary heart disease and yet, 
in spite of considerable publicity about the hazards, people still 
smoke though many accept that to continue to do so may well be 
harmful. 
The third condition - institution and community - highlights the 
separateness of the two entities. To go into hospital, for whatever 
reason, is often regarded as a form of removal from society. 
Hospitalization has a certain negative connotation within society, 
possible failure or some sort of inadequacy suggestive of individual 
failure or weakness. The separateness of institution and community 
is evident in the fragmentation of services offered by provider 
agencies. The joint planning practice in NHA clearly supports this 
contention since both providers of services, the health and the local 
authority tended to take a sectarian view of problems in that in 
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considering services for the elderly, for example, the issue tended to 
revolve around the question of whether the nwnber of hospital beds 
available was consistent with regional and national norms. By taking 
positions, which in many ways polarised the joint planning process, 
both authorities became drawn into a political debate over who should 
be considered to be responsible, with each attempting to blame the 
other for the apparent problem. 
The fourth proviso - medicalization of society - underlines the 
growing gap between the medical model of health and the inability of 
such a process to make much of an impact on many of the major 
illnesses evident in contemporary western society; the so-called 
'diseases of lifestyle' such as cancer, coronary heart disease, and 
hypertension. As medical care becomes more specialised, people's 
expectations rise accordingly because they are often led to believe 
that more resources for this or for that will have a direct and 
profound benefit on health. Heart transplantation is one form of 
specialisation which may foster the belief in people that they need 
not pay attention to diet, smoking and/or alcohol consumption because 
if problems develop they can be 'cured' with a transplant. The issue 
of the 'medical model' versus the 'social model' of health will be 
returned to later on in this chapter. 
Health Field Concept 
Trying to reconcile these four inter-connected issues places planners, 
providers and policy-makers in a dilemma in that there is no accepted 
or recognised procedure for dealing with such matters. This is 
because tradition has it that all improvements in health care have 
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grown out of advances in the art and/or science of medicine. Such a 
~osy picture fades somewhat when one considers that many of the so-
called advances in health came about through changes in diet, the 
physical environment and habits of procreation. The fact that 
medicine alone was not responsible for the significant changes which 
have occurred in health, does suggest that planners and policy-makers 
must broaden their field of enquiry to include other related factors 
such as lifestyle, environment and the health care organisation 
itself. 
The linking of these three key elements with a fourth (human biology) 
has been called the 'health field concept' - a term first promulgated 
in 1974 when the (then) Federal Minister of Health for Canada, M. 
Lalonde published A New Perspective on the Health of Canadians 
(1974). In essence, the document argued that health policy matters 
were most generally but wrongly seen as problems for and with the 
health care system or organisation and not of consequence to the other 
three constituents (figure 7.1). 
The rationale for this approach to health care development was that 
policies rooted only in medical care or those aspects of it acceptable 
to the health care structure tended only to perpetuate existing 
patterns of care and consequently had little effect or influence on 
the general level of health in a population. This is a point which 
Parston emphatically makes when he states that "nowhere is planning 
conducted on all fronts of the health field irrespective of the 
political and economic administration of health services" (1980, p. 
86). 
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Figure 1.1. THE HEALTH FIELD CONCEPT 
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It was hoped that the 'health field concept' would overcome this 
rather narrow approach to planning and policy-making through the twin 
aims of 1) providing a better understanding of the factors which 
contribute to health and disease; and 2) facilitating the 
identification of the various courses of action which might be taken 
to improve health. This model of planning in many ways epitomises 
the ideal which everyone aspires to but actual practice suggests 
sights are considerably lower with service provision largely 
determined by concepts of need and demand. The reasons why 'the 
health field concept' has not been uniformly endorsed by planners and 
policy-makers alike are that firstly, it is complex and the inter-
relations between the four elements are not always clearly understood. 
Secondly, the model accepts that medical care is fallible, a 
condition which is decidedly unpalatable to certain elements who argue 
that there are little or no grounds for such a view. And thirdly, 
the cornerstone of the model rests on radical behaviour changes not 
only for the consumer or user of health care but also for the 
provider; changes which unfortunately have not been generally 
forthcoming. 
Planning for 'Need' 
The cornerstone of health care delivery and the planning of services 
was the 'needs' of the various groups making up the population. This 
concept of 'need' is difficult to define and measure since individual 
requirements for health care are often different from those of a 
particular group. For example, in dentistry the service response to 
the patient's needs seems relatively straightforward; prevention, 
fillings, and removal and/or replacement of teeth. Whereas the needs 
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of the elderly may encompass a wide range of different services, both 
health and local authority provided, in order to provide a complete 
programme of care. What is patently clear is that the concept of 
'need' whilst most difficult to define and measure, nevertheless 
requires discussion since it forms the foundation upon which health 
care services are to be provided. It is important, therefore, that 
the concept of need and its application to the planning of the health 
services be understood. Kalino (1979) has defined 'need' as the 
difference between observed and ideal levels of health. In other 
words, he is suggesting that the 'total needs' of a population can be 
determined through an understanding of the current demand for health 
services in combination with the perceived need. Unfortunately, he 
does not elaborate on how this perceived need might be determined or 
by whom. Bradshaw (1977), on the other hand, has argued that there 
are four definitions of need which are used by administrators and 
providers. These are: 
Normative need - a 'desirable' standard or level of care is set 
and is then compared with the existing standard or level of care. 
Any ensuing shortfall implies that an individual or group is in 
need. Relying on pre-determined standards does not necessarily 
mean that a need exists in an absolute sense, since it may not 
correspond with a need established through alternative means. 
Also different providers may well have different views on the 
desirable or appropriate standard or level of care. In the end, 
it is a value judgement by the so-called experts on whether or 
not resources should be devoted to meeting the need and whether 
or not the necessary skills are available to solve the problem 
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that determines the standard or desired level adopted. 
Felt need - determined by asking the people what they want and as 
such fails to measure 'real need' because the responses obtained 
by this procedure are limited by the individual's perception of 
the problem. For instance, some people may not know if a service 
is available, and consequently will not regard themselves as 
being in need. If they do know, they may not know how to use it 
properly, and may consider themselves in need, when in fact they 
are not. 
Expressed (or unmet) need - this view of need equates with the 
demand for a service. In other words, a population is 
considered to be in need when the demand for a particular service 
exceeds the current available supply. A good example of 
expressed need is hospital waiting lists because, in general 
terms, they imply that there are more people needing a service 
than the current resources are capable of supplying. Some 
pundits have argued though that waiting lists are symptomatic of 
popular demands for a particular service, and therefore, not 
indicative of need per se. 
Comparative need - is determined by studying the characteristics 
of a population or particular sub-group of that population who 
are in receipt of a service. Those with similar characteristics 
but not receiving the service are considered to be in need. 
Caution is just as important here, as with the preceding 
descriptions of need, because any absence of a service according 
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to a comparative study does not necessarily indicate that the 
area or its population without the service is in need of that 
service. 
The rationale for highlighting those four concepts of need is not to 
give undue weight to the measurement problems associated with each 
concept, but rather to re-iterate Bradshaw's point that together these 
four definitions of need approximate 'real need' and that collectively 
they do go some way towards measuring 'real need'. Indeed, this 
position is endorsed by MacStravic (1978) who argues that a reasonable 
picture of need can be determined through a combination of four 
measurement techniques; population survey - asking people what they 
want; demographic characteristics - what features set certain groups 
apart from others and why; utilisation analysis - how a population or 
particular sub-group uses the health services; and consensus-reaching 
- planners, providers and consumers discussing, collectively, the 
implication of these findings and what they mean to the devlopment of 
health services. 
However desirable these approaches to determining needs may be there 
is real difficulty both conceptually - stemming from the various 
different perceptions of need - and practically - particulary a lack 
of appropriate data - to developing a realistic measurement of need. 
In the end, one is left with a combination of demand factors, value 
judgements and professional interpretations among others as the basis 
on which need is most often determined. It is important to realise 
that this imperfect formula for determining need is widely employed 
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and it is this formula which, more than anything else, has largely 
determined the current structure of the health services. 
Furthermore, this process has become self-perpetuating since the 
present structure or pattern of service provision has largely 
determined the parameters on which the requirements for future 
provision are judged. The reason for such a state of affairs lies 
with the obvious difficulty associated with the development of 
appropriate and quantifiable measures of need thus dictating that an 
acceptable surrogate or alternative method was needed. The surrogate 
so employed has been to use demand as an indicator of need; a demand 
which stems in the main from the existing configuration of services 
and the use made of them. 
The consensus that demand is an apparent acceptable alternative to 
need raises important questions such as 'what is need' - an attempt 
has already been made to address but not necessarily answer this 
question - and ·'who determines need'? This latter subject presents 
one of the greatest challenges to health care providers, managers and 
consumers because, although they each would acknowledge that the other 
has a role to play, each party seeks to maximise its own contribution 
to the procedure for determining need and the configuration of 
services which follow therefrom. 
The political aspects of this process are clearly apparent from 
Alford's study of health care in New York in which he noted "that 
there is a reasonably high correlation between ideologies and personal 
incentives of doctors, researchers, administrators, and the 
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organisational interests of the medical profession, hospitals or 
public health associations. That is, there is a high probability 
that elites will take a public position consistent with the interests 
of their organisation" (1975, p. 21). This theme will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter Eight, but mention of it here serves as a 
poignant reminder that professional judgement and values are formed 
within a political framework that is not altogether made explicit to 
others also involved in the negotiations over service related needs 
and demands. 
The environment in which these groups (professional, managers, and 
consumers) operate largely determines their respective stances as far 
as equating service provision with need is concerned. Although the 
environment referred to here can be sub-divided into several 
components, in reality only two divisions are of interest: the macro-
level and the micro-level (Pettigrew, 1985). The macro-level refers 
to the national environment and the policies and/or guidance which 
emanate from this source; namely the policies determined either by 
parliament through changes in legislation or those initiated by the 
DHSS. Both policy sources can produce fundamental change in the NHS 
or paradoxically, little or no alteration. This is because some of 
the policies are compulsory in the sense that health authorities are 
required to implement them, whereas others are advisory with no 
sanctions applicable should any particular health authority decide not 
to effect the policy. The role of the professions or rather their 
corporate associations is also crucial at this stage since the 
collective views of a particular association will obviously condition 
how that profession will respond, either to a specific national policy 
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or to changes in professional workload such as that which may arise 
from innovations in medical technology. 
The micro-level relates to the local environment within which a health 
authority operates and is used to describe the sorts of activites 
which occur therein. Here the interplay between providers or 
professionals, managers and administrators, and consumers is acted out 
with the main action occurring between the first two groups. At this 
level, local facilities and resources very much influence the policies 
adopted and implemented. The problem is further exacerbated because 
the protagonists are clearly employing different criteria derived from 
different models of care in assessing need and demand for health care. 
The two models enlisted are the 'medical' versus the 'social' 
pattern of health care. 
The medical model dictates that doctors occupy a central role in the 
provision of health care and that within such provision the hospital 
plays a major role. The model is predicated on the assumption that 
ill-health is a consequence of some sort of malfunctioning within the 
body and as such can be dealt with by specific measures. Ills ley 
(1980) suggests that the medical profession tend to see illness in one 
of two ways: firstly, as a disease rising from pathological 
processes; and secondly, as an engineering problem requiring 
technical repairs. The outcomes of such thinking suggests Ham is 
that "the medical model emphasises specific, individual courses of 
illness and searches for specific individual cures for these 
illnesses" (1982, p. 157). It is this approach which has led McKeown 
(1976) to the view that because the body is regarded as little more 
- 154 -
than a machine, this breeds an indifference to external influences and 
personal behaviour and it is these two factors which are the real 
determinants of health, 
The social model of health care is that which links ill-health to the 
external environment and personal behaviour. The major conceptual 
difference between the medical model as described above and the social 
model is that it is misleading to view illness as a biological 
malfunction which can be easily repaired by technical means. 
Proponents of the social model, such as McKeown (1976) and Lalonde 
(1974) argue that the body is not a machine and cannot be treated in 
the same way one might deal with an automobile which needs repairs. 
The body is a complex system over which the individual has some 
control but not absolute control. What this means is that attempts 
to remedy illnesses through medical or medical related interventions 
alone has not proved to be all that successful. The Black Report 
(DHSS, 198Gb) on inequalities in health stands as a damning 
testimonial to the inadequacy of the medical model. It is not 
surprising that many planners and policy-makers sought to undermine 
the dominance of the medical model by arguing that one cannot look at 
health services in isolation and therefore attempts have been made to 
link the planning of health services to the wider environments in 
which health care issues are rooted. 
Politics of Provision 
Lee and Mills (1982) identified one of the problems of joint planning 
to be that it was specifically concerned with strategic or long-range 
planning, and consequently the issues under discussion seemed to lack 
a sense of urgency. Furthermore, because most local authorities' 
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social services departments did not operate a forward planning system 
their interests resided primarily with operational issues - that is, 
with issues deserving of immediate attention. To a certain extent this 
scenario was consistent with the position adopted by the JPTE but 
these features did not appear to be present in the workings of the 
JPTMH. 
One explanation for this difference was that the health authority 
provided a service for its elderly population but none for the 
mentally handicapped. Arguably, existing or established services 
restrict any planning team's degree of manoeuvrability. For example, 
both the health authority and the local authority provide services for 
the elderly but these services are primarily based upon different 
philosophies of care. The health authority's services are 
essentially rooted in the 'medical' model of treatment and care 
whereas the services provided by the local authority may be 
generalised as a 'social' mode of support and containment - an 
alternative for those elderly who find living alone difficult. There 
is a danger in polarising the strategies in this way, but they do, 
ultimately, determine and condition the approach each authority will 
adopt to the problems at hand. It is argued that these different 
viewpoints were partly instrumental in the JPTE choosing to discuss 
policy issues emanating from the DHSS rather than to grapple with the 
thorny issues of determining local policies for the elderly. As 
Barnard et al observed, there is a tendency to concentrate on issues 
which "do not immediately threaten to disrupt people's established 
patterns of behaviour" (1979, Volume Four, page 30) [emphasis in 
original]. The outcome of this reluctance on the part of the JPTE to 
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grapple cogently with local issues was that their potential for 
influence was usurped by the health authority's planners who took 
upon themselves the task of producing a plan for services for the 
elderly. 
In contrast, there was no service provision for the mentally 
handicapped within the health authority. Thus the planning team was 
not unduly constrained in its debate on the problems of the mentally 
handicapped and possible solutions, by any predetermined service 
infrastructure. In other words, the absence of services and 
facilities meant that any in-built inertia or resistance to change was 
unlikely to be an inhibiting factor as far as the planning of future 
services was concerned. 
Resistance to change within the health service is not an 
inconsequential matter for as Stocking has acknowledged; "In the 
Health Service for example staff may not be convinced that change is 
necessary; they may have invested a great deal of time and energy in 
the established order and change is then an implied criticism of all 
they have worked for; change may mean much uncertainty and may even 
be against the personal interest (such as status, work patterns, etc) 
of those affected." (1985, P• 22-23). This is a theme which Parston 
( 19.80) most certainly implicitly endorses in his assessment of why the 
health care system in Britain evolved in the manner in which it did. 
Parston's explanation for the particular pattern of health care 
services which resulted was; "Buildings are easy to envisage, imply 
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readily identifiable roles in a health care system, and, consequently, 
are quite easily managed by both planning and funding decision-
makers." ( 1980, p. 91) 
It is quite clear that while professional diversification and 
stratification, and existing patterns of care do not prevent 
innovation from occurring (Stocking, 1985), they do, nonetheless, 
present very formidable barriers to change. This state of affairs 
was quite evident from individual discussions held with a selection of 
some of the protagonists involved in the planning and policy-making 
processes in the study area. The views proffered by those 
interviewed, especially in relation to the question of whether or not 
an existing panoply of services acted as a barrier to change tended to 
reflect professional lines: that is, while the planners, nurses, and 
others were highly critical of the dominating influence of the so-
called 'medical model' in dictating the balance of care provided, the 
medical profession, not unnaturally say the lack of progress is a 
consequence of inadequate resources, and unnecessary and needless 
bureaucratic interference. 
Organisations do change and new products are developed and research 
has showed that such change usually occurs because of the efforts of 
one committed person who champions or pushes the innovation through 
the organisation. The term used to describe this sort of person is 
'product champion' (Stocking, 1985). One of the 'product champions', 
a health authority planner largely responsible for creation and 
implementation of the Partnership was rather scathing about the 
medical input into the planning process. His interpretation of the 
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lack of progress of the JPTE in policy formulation was due to the fact 
that ideas generated "did not fit with the views of the medics" who 
saw proposals for change or suggestions for alternative approaches 
towards providing care for the elderly as "an attack on (their) 
professional status". Furthermore this person was rather dismissive 
of the ability of the medical profession to contribute positively to 
the planning process because of their tendency to think in terms of 
"beds only", which "tends to inhibit innovation." 
This planner reckoned that the success of the Partnership and its 
innovative offshoot, the community mental handicap team (CMHT) was, in 
part, attributable to the fact that there was no medical input. The 
reason for this, it was suggested, was that doctors were not really 
interested in mental handicap because its derivations did not fit very 
easily the medical model of health; that is there was (is) no cure. 
This lack of interest in the problem rebounded on the medical 
profession who consequently found themselves confronted with a policy 
decision not of their making and a service profile in the CMHT which 
excluded them. The result of this coup, according to the NHA 
planner, was that some members of the medical profession tried to 
undermine the policy by challenging not only the grounds on which the 
CMHT had been created but also its composition ostensibly because they 
disagreed with what they regarded as the apparent minor role of 
medicine in the overall programme. It did not appear as if this 
challenge had been successful although there was a promise of talks on 
the future medical contribution to the team. 
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The nurse member of the JPTE attributed the so-called 'poor showing' 
of the team to the fact that the major concern lay with existing "beds 
and provision and the location of the beds", thus emphasising the 
dominance of the medical model in determining health plans and 
policies. One explanation offered in support of this view was that 
the chairperson was a doctor who tended to see service issues in terms 
of medical care and because the planning support from the health 
authority was relatively low key; this reinforced by default the 
emphasis on a medical (hospital-based) solution only to the problems 
confronting the JPTE. This approach to the major issues was 
regretted by the nurse who believed that some consideration should 
have been given to the role played by those who worked in the 
community. 
Some of the medical personnel involved in the planning process, 
perhaps not surprisingly, did not share the view of their nursing and 
administrative colleagues that the main culprit to building successful 
plans and programmes was the dominance of the medical model. In 
their opinion lack of progress lay not in the so-called myopic nature 
of the medical model but rather in the slow-down/cessation of 
development monies. There was an acknowledgement from some of the 
doctors that they were in many ways pre-occupied with running a 
service, and one which they considered to be quite successful in the 
past but was now facing certain pressures which had largely arisen 
because of financial restrictions on new investment. In this respect 
there was a degree of concordance with the widely held view that the 
existing configuration of services does have an influence on the 
future development of proposals and plans. Where the two camps 
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differ is over the degree of influence with the medics seeing it as 
the problem of resource constraints and the planners holding to the 
view that medical narcissism is the real barrier to successful 
planning and policy-making. 
The outcome of this assessment of how different philosophies of care 
as manifest in the 'medical' and 'social' models of health care, in 
conjunction with different interpretations over the concept and 
definition of need, has inevitably led to the painting of a seemingly 
confused picture of planning and policy-making in a particular health 
authority. Confusing though this picture may be it is still not 
wholly complete for, although reference has been made to a plethora of 
actors in the planning process, little attention has been given to 
specific roles, other than in passing. Nonetheless, it is evident 
from the foregoing that certain individuals, especially those who 
adopt the role of 'product champion', can and do influence the policy-
making process. The next chapter explores in considerable detail not 
only the role that these actors play on the planning stage but also 
will consider the rationale which underpins their respective stances. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
PLANNERS, PROFESSIONS AND THE PLANNING PROCESS 
The role played by the various actors in the planning process also 
influences the degree of success achieved in formulating plans and 
subsequently, in implementing the plans and policies produced. There 
are many groups involved in planning, some of whom are more 
influential than others; an important distinguishing feature of the 
two planning teams in the research study which despite a common core 
membership, chose to follow very different paths. Thus, in order to 
better appreciate the delicate relationship between planning and 
policy-making in the NHS, it is crucial that the machinations of the 
various actors involved in the planning process, the particular role 
adopted by the designated planners, and the environment or arena in 
which planning operates, are well understood. 
This chapter considers, in turn, the interface between the various 
actors, the planners' role, and the planning environment from a 
general or theoretical standpoint and also with particular relevance 
to the study area. It should be borne in mind, however, that it is 
somewhat artificial to look at each of these concepts separately 
since, in reality, they are closely intertwined. 
Actors in the Planning Process 
There are many individuals, possessing different skills and expertise 
from very dissimilar backgrounds, contributing to the planning 
process. Precisely because there is such a plethora of actors 
involved in the planning process, a number of significant issues arise 
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which require explanation or, at least, discussion. A central question 
is the one of power and influence, be it between the centre (state) 
and the periphery (local health authority), or between the various 
professions within the health service. Although Chapter Six 
discussed the concepts of power and influence in some detail, the 
inter-relationships between the professions was only briefly touched 
upon and consequently this theme is continued in this chapter. 
Another theme addressed earlier (Chapter Seven) but left incomplete 
was that concerning the environment, be it social, political or 
cultural, within which the planning process operates. It was clear 
from the earlier discussion that the values, perceptions and 
judgements of those involved are of particular importance and, when 
allied to a specific power base, can have a disproportionate impact 
upon the outcome. A starting point for this journey is the 
consideration of the impact upon planning and policy-making of three 
distinct yet related groups or elites: political, technical and 
administrative. The relationship between these three protagonists is 
shown in figure 8.1. The use of the term 'elite' to describe the 
different conditions of participants or actors in planning is not new 
as it accords very closely with the work of Haywood and Alaszewski 
(1980) who argue that local decision-making in the NHS is essentially 
elitist in nature. 
Political elite - the decision-making body which is concerned with 
making choices. Such choices are influenced by pressure from the 
community, advice received from the administrative and technical 
elites, and the membership's perception and understanding of what sort 
Figure a.1. ACTORS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS 
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of health care service or system is required. The question of 
community pressure on decision-makers will be addressed in more detail 
in Chapter Nine, and therefore, a short illustration will suffice 
here. 
In 1980 the community health councils for Newcastle and Northumberland 
took advantage of a ministerial visit to the health authority by the 
then Minister of State for Health, to present an open letter to the 
Minister decrying the lack of facilities for the mentally handicapped 
in Newcastle. The purpose of the Minister's visit to Newcastle was to 
discuss the outcome of a large development to one of the hospitals in 
the city, and a consequence of his receiving the open letter was to 
preface his approval of the development with the condition that a 
development plan for the mentally handicapped must be produced by the 
end of March 1981. 
The joint intervention by the CHCs probably had little effect in the 
sense that there is no doubt that a plan would have been produced 
eventually (Petfield, 1983); what they did achieve was to sharpen the 
sense of urgency about the problem (via the Minister) such that a 
development plan emerged much earlier than it might otherwise have. 
The ability of this elite to effect choice is largely constrained by 
the role adopted by both the administrative and technical elites, and 
by the diffuse nature of the membership of the decision-making body. 
This body is essentially composed of lay members, buttressed by a 
handful of professionals (usually but not exclusively doctors) who are 
appointed essentially for their understanding of or interest in health 
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care. Thus "the criteria for nomination and selection was suitability 
for the job and not representative skills." (Haywood and Alaszewski, 
1980, p. 87). The particular role of health authority members 
(political elite) was to act as a detached counterweight to the many 
opinions and perspectives likely to emanate from within the service 
and to monitor the effects of current policies and any policy 
changes. 
In general, the impact of members in the decision-making process was 
mainly ineffectual (Royal Commission on the NHS, 1979). One reason, 
according to Brown (1979), was that there was considerable overlap 
between members' responsibilities and the duties of their officers 
whilst lacking constituency and watchdog roles. Haywood and Alaszewski 
suggest that member ineffectiveness was not one of role weakness but 
because of the "absence of disagreements and alternative options" 
(1980, p. 90). In essence the lack of clout by the political elite 
cannot be laid at the door marked 'technical deficiencies' but rather 
it is attributable more to the game of 'power politics'. The 
following passage puts the case most succinctly. 
"Some members felt that officers had too much power, which 
could be curbed if members knew what they were doing. 
Inspite of the general philosophy of openness, too, some 
officers were reluctant to risk interference by offering 
information too freely. Like many technocrats, they saw lay 
intervention as potentially irrational and damaging" (Brown, 
et al, 1975, p. 100) 
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The central argument expounded is that in the case of the NHS the 
political elite (health authority members) is susceptible to pressures 
both from without and within the organisation, and that this pressure 
creates a sense of decision-making impotency. It would appear that 
the power brokers in the planning and policy-making process are the 
technical and administrative elites. A prime source of their 
influence is their ability to determine, or at least to manipulate, 
the 'need' for a particular service (Illich, 1978; Taylor, 1979; 
Wilding, 1982}. 
Technical elite - this group has a virtual monopoly on skills and 
knowledge. In the health sector, it is this group which provides the 
necessary care and services and, consequently, they are well placed to 
exert considerable influence over the policy process. Such influence 
is often expressed through their work place behaviour either by 
agreeing to implement a particular programme or policy, or by refusing 
to do so. In fact it is their use of the power of veto that is 
particularly telling in the policy process. The application of this 
power can be exemplified with the following quote from Perrin in his 
report to the Royal Commission on the NHS; "the exercise of clinical 
autonomy ought not to be allowed to extend to a veto on reallocation 
of beds to cope with changes in need. We came across a flagrant 
example of such a veto" (1978, para, B7.6). 
Although composition of the technical elite can be construed to 
include all the professions involved in providing health care or 
services, in reality, it is the medical profession which dominates and 
characterises the behaviour of this elite. Thus the combination 
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described herein resembles very closely Alford's concept of the 
dominant or monopolist interest group, who have "nearly complete 
control over the conditions of their work" (1975, p. 194). This 
implies that they have a considerable degree of autonomy in 
determining how they organise their activities and that they tend to 
see issues either in terms of professional (and personal) satisfaction 
or as questions of esteem. 
The medical profession often sees issues in clear unambiguous terms: 
namely that, as a demand exists for a service, a requisite number of 
beds and resources must be provided. Historically, as has been shown 
above, the medical profession has played a particularly dominant role 
in NHS decision-making and has been most capable of ensuring that the 
decisions obtained were compatible with their interests (Taylor, 1977; 
Haywood and Alaszewski, 1980; Illsley, 1980). Lee and Mills have 
observed that "despite the existence of the NHS planning system and 
provision for the systematic consideration of projects, planners had 
difficulty in combining the ability of influential clinicians to 
bypass the planning system and lobby decision-makers directly" (1982, 
P• 141). 
It could be argued that this elite not only saw issues from a very 
parochial standpoint but paradoxically their position on any planning 
or policy matter was influenced by their observations and 
understanding of what the patient seemed to want or need. Thus it is 
not unusual for clinicians and other health care professionals to 
paraphrase their comments on a particular issue in such a way as to 
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suggest that they are speaking on behalf of the patient and not for 
themselves. 
There is evidence to indicate that both factors - bypassing the 
planning system and purporting to speak on behalf of the patient -
were manifest in the workings of the JPTE. Several of the clinicians 
concerned with elderly patients became impatient with the lack of 
progress and voiced their concern to higher authorities in an effort 
to move things along. The reason for this, in the opinion of a 
medical member of the JPTE, was because attention was directed towards 
those proposals and projects which would attract joint financing 
monies and not, as he argued should have been the case, concern with 
the overall health care needs of the elderly. 
In contrast, medical influence over the developments procured by the 
JPTMH was largely negligible and can be considered to be a direct 
consequence of the lack of established services for the mentally 
handicapped. Put another way, there was not a cadre of clinicians 
available, capable of influencing, in a substantive way, the 
deliberations of the planning team. Indeed, this lack of medical 
dominance was one reason cited by a member of the planning team (a 
psychologist) as of particular relevance because they have no vested 
interest in the outcome and therefore adopted a much more positive 
stance in the discussions concerning a policy and plan for the 
mentally handicapped. 
Administrative elite - their main responsibility, to put it 
simplistically, is to execute the decisions made and the policies 
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determined by the political elite. In other words, legitimacy for 
their actions comes from the politicians and yet, in the health 
sector, it has been argued that the politicians in the guise of health 
authority members are severely constrained in discharging their 
responsibility in a meaningful way (Alford, 1975; Haywood and 
Alaszewski, 1980). Ham has nicely captured the essence of the 
decision-making dilemma confronting the political and administrative 
elites when he noted that "where there are many different interests 
and where power is not concentrated in an individual or group, it is 
easier to prevent change than to achieve it" (1981, p. 197). 
However, as Alford (1975) has clearly demonstrated, the administrative 
elite (corporate rationalists) are not a passive element in policy-
making as they do exert some influence on the decision-making process 
through their ability, if not to control, at least, to interpret 
agenda items and also their skill and expertise in the analysis and 
dissemination (control) of information to health authority members. 
Although the role of the administration is generally a supportive one, 
they are not without influence which, in many cases, places them on a 
collision course with the technical elite because they both, to a 
certain extent, depend upon each other in order that any agreed 
decision can be implemented. That is why the relationship between the 
administrative and technical elites can be seen as either harmonious -
working well together - or conflicting - encroaching upon each other's 
perceived territory. 
- 170 -
It is worth quoting Parston at some length since the following passage 
in many ways encapsulates that special and poignant relationship which 
exists between planners (corporated rationalists) and clinicians 
(professional monopolists). 
"Questions regarding distribution of health care resources are 
legitimately open to the health services planner. Naturally, 
debates . • . . arise over how the resources and the services 
which they accommodate should be distributed. And these debates 
often embroil the planner in the arguments between providers and 
users of health services. After all, it is the providers of 
se~1ices - that is, physicians - who lend the authoritative 
professional weight to prescriptions of acceptable health 
services. Planners argue with physicians over how services are 
to be provided and, more frequently, who is to decide" (1980, p. 
167-8). 
The relationship between the main protagonists or elites in policy-
making in the health sector is an uneasy one, borne of dependence, to 
ensure that policies do get formulated, agreed or accepted, and 
implemented. Thus decision-making in the NHS, of consequence, is 
diffuse and in many ways weak because "decisions taken at clinical 
level and defended by the principle of clinical autonomy create costs 
and de facto policies which impede planning and financial control" 
(Illsley, 1980, p. 95). 
There is a burgeoning literature on professionalism and policy-making 
which not only considers the sociological viewpoint but also those 
from behavioural and organisation settings. Little purpose would be 
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served by reciting the vast array of literature on the topic as that 
is a major work in itself, however, at this stage it is worth a brief 
travel through the material in order to discuss some of the more 
significant features of professionalism and the manner in which they 
impact upon policy-making. 
There is no doubt that professionalism, or the technical elite, is the 
dominant partner in decision-making in the health sector (Alford, 
1975; Haywood and Aleszweski, 1980; Illsley, 1980; Ham, 1981). The 
reasons for this state of affairs is worth exploring because "the 
history of the British health service is the history of political 
power, ministers, civil servants, Parliament, accommodating itself to 
professional power" (Klein, 1974a, p.7). 
Wilding in a powerful indictment of professional power puts forward 
three suggestions, in partial explanation, as to why decision-making 
in the NHS is particularly susceptible to the professional view. 
"Firstly, and most importantly, professional influence 
means that in many issues the decisions made serve professional 
interests rather than the public interest. A second indictment 
of professional influence is that it leads to services organised 
according to professional skills and ideas rather than according 
to client need. Thirdly, it means that certain elements and 
interest within the professions are able to dominate decision-
making because of their greater prestige and status." (1982, p. 
23) 
The role of the technical elite or dominant professions in the health 
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sector could be characterised as 'power without responsibility'. They 
stress their altruism, arguing that tight controls would undermine 
their ability to respond according to each patient's needs. A 
fundamental concept which underpins their special relationship with 
the administrative and political elites is the inalienable belief in 
their right to define problems and determine need. It is this which 
is primarily the root cause of the tension and conflict with the 
administrative elite in the planning and policy-making process. 
Perhaps it is the professionals' Jeckyl and Hyde relationship with 
policy-making which accounts for much of this conflict and tension 
since, on the one hand, they wish to be seen as a group able to secure 
and protect their own autonomy, whereas, on the other hand, they are 
also dependent upon their relationship with the other elites in the 
system (Ham and Hill, 1984). 
The planner as a representative of the administrative elite or 
corporate rationalisers is often characterised within the health 
sector as the main combatant of the medical profession. However, the 
planner, unlike the professional may have less prestige and status 
riding on his/her position and it is perhaps useful at this juncture 
to briefly review the various stances which a planner may adopt. In 
trying to identify who are the planners one immediately is presented 
with a dilemma in the sense that no one, yet everyone, is a planner. 
For the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that the planner is 
a public official, a bureaucrat, who possesses the title 'planner' or 
acts in a planning capacity. Consequently the roles they adopt are 
generally conditioned by their position in the bureaucracy that is the 
health service, and the values they hold. 
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Role of the Planner 
Many planners/administrators tend to regard planning as a technical 
activity - whether or not a service was above or below a pre-
determined standard or norm. To some extent the prescriptive nature of 
the NHS planning system precipitated this normative approach to 
planning, with its emphasis on planning according to the 'needs' of 
the population. Unfortunately as was indicated earlier (Chapter 
Seven), 'need' is a concept which is very difficult to define 
either qualitatively or quantitatively, thus necessitating some form 
of shortcut, such as standards or norms against which existing 
services may be compared. McNaught (1981) argues that the use of 
norms in planning is a consequence of a 'generalist cult' in the 
administrative hierarchy of the NHS, which implies that administrators 
should be capable of a variety of tasks and activities but not 
necessarily expert at any. McNaught goes on to suggest that planning 
should be removed from the bailiwick of the generalist and given to 
specialist planners (see also Rathwell, 1982). 
If the logic of this argument is accepted at face value this raises 
many questions concerning the precise nature of the role that the 
specialist planner may play. How does the planner fit into this 
particular picture? There is no easy nor is there a definite answer to 
this question because the response depends, in part, on how the 
planner chooses to interpret and discharge the duties assigned to 
him/her, and, in part, upon the planner's own value system. Bearing 
these factors in mind, there are several views which can be 
promulgated on the role of the planner (figure 8.2). 
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Figure a.2. WHAT ROLE FOR THE PLANNER ? 
-175 -
Platonist - the planner seeks to prescribe a good solution to the 
problem. This role equates with that pursued by such utopian planners 
as Howard and his concept of the garden city. This view of planning 
recognises no constraints or obstacles likely to inhibit the creation 
and implementation of the 'ideal' solution. One such proponent of 
idealised planning was Ackoff who argued that this was a valid 
approach because it "forces those involved to rethink each aspect of 
life" through the pursuit of "truth", "plenty", "goodness", and 
"beauty" (1976, p. 300).This form of planning while theoretically 
attractive has little following and in the health sector where 
resource constraints are the order of the day, it takes a particularly 
brave individual to champion something as unrealistic as the 'ideal'. 
Furthermore, critics argue that such an outlook on planning patently 
ignores the fact that planning as an activity operates within a 
conflict or power relationship (Parston, 1980; Ham and Hill, 1984). 
Apparatchik - this type of planner is one who takes pride in being a 
good administrator with great emphasis placed on process and keeping 
within the stated regulations. The term neutralist has also been used 
to describe this sort of planner but apparatchik would seem to be a 
more apt description since the term is generally taken to mean someone 
who undertakes or carries out his/her duties without question. The 
role is then seen and interpreted in a non-political and non-
controversial way. The concept of neutrality in the planner is central 
to any planning system based on the twin notions of 'rationality' and 
'comprehensiveness'. 
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Satisfaction for this type of planner lies in doing a good job which 
in the health service has usually been interpreted as producing a good 
well-documented set of plans by religiously following the many steps 
and stages laid down by the NHS planning system (DHSS, 1976b). Thus 
planning is expounded as a technical activity within which there are 
certain conventions or rules to be followed and therefore any requests 
that accord with these rules are acceptable whereas those which do not 
are not entertained. 
One of the strongest arguments for the planner as neutralist was 
promulgated in a paper by Davidoff and Reiner (1962) who argued that 
the planner is merely a technical resource either for the community 
or, more likely, for political leaders. What this means is that the 
planner neither imposes or even articulates his/her own views or 
opinions nor does he/she contribute to the goal setting process. 
Dyckman has interpreted this role as one which "operates in the 
absence of conventional profit motives, with the presumption that the 
planner will be sparing in the intrusion of his own values and will 
venerate 'objectivity'; and is first and foremost a community servant 
who will put the common good above self-interest" (1973, p. 244). 
Most planners in the NHS would seem to be of this mould in that they 
see their duties as mainly those of making the planning system work 
and in many respects, but not all, the planners in Newcastle operated 
within this convention; that is of pursuing a rational approach to 
problem solving (policy-making) while maintaining political 
neutrality. 
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Facilitator/orchestrator - a planner who is keen to insure that 
planning works and consequently devotes considerable time and effort 
into 'making it happen'. The forte of this planner is the ability to 
lobby and generate support for planning through persuasion, striking 
deals or bargains, in order to ensure a successful outcome. Planning 
in this context is seen very much as a 'moral' activity in which there 
should be general support and it is the responsibility of the planner 
to engender that support. 
This view of planning argues that the planner has a political role to 
play in the crusader sense where "the success of planning depends in 
large part on the ability of existing networks of influence to adapt 
and change to support planning programmes. Planners can make 
important contributions to this process not only in finding technical 
solutions to physical planning problems but also in creating a 
framework of support" (Rabinovitz, quoted in Faludi, 1973, p. 236). 
The facilitator operates within the bureaucratic framework laid down 
by the planning system but obviously takes a more liberal view as to 
how the system should operate. From observations in Newcastle of the 
manner in which the planning process was undertaken it is difficult to 
be precise but there were indications that the facilitator role was an 
important influence upon the way in which the planners carried out 
their responsibilities. A good example of the facilitator role was 
the intervention by the planners, in the absence of any clear policy 
directions emerging from the JPTE, to prepare an outline strategy for 
the elderly articulated via the document The Proposed Temporary 
Closure of Walkergate Hospital (NAHA, 1981a). The 'Walkergate 
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Project' accomplished two things as far as the planners were 
concerned; it satisfied the bureaucratic demand for a plan, and it 
also served the purpose of breathing some life into what was otherwise 
a moribund approach to planning for the elderly. The 'broker-
mediator' role is another phrase used to describe the activity whereby 
"in some decision-making environments, the planner must take a leading 
role" (Faludi, 1973, p. 236) 
Advocate - a planner who cannot help being elitist in the sense that 
he/she purports to speak for a particular group of people or section 
of society. One of the earliest and most influential proponents of 
advocacy in planning was Davidoff (1965) who argued that the planner 
as advocate was one who helps a particular community or group to 
identify its particular needs, informs them of the choices or options 
available to them, lobbies decision-makers on their behalf and assists 
the group or community in preparing and articulating its own case or 
plan. When a planner adopts this particular role he/she "is no longer 
isolated from political activity; the planner makes political choices 
in a pluralist arena" (Parston, 1980, p. 56) 
Proponents of the advocacy role proffer three grounds in support of 
such an approach. Firstly, it provides a means of informing the 
public of the choices open to them; secondly, it forces the 
particular agency (such as a health authority) or goverment to 
actively seek and compete for political support; and thirdly, it 
forces those who are openly critical of the establishment (health 
agency) to support or buttress their criticism by preparing 
alternative plans. 
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Hard line supporters of advocacy, such as Goodman (1972), put forward 
a forceful argument that planning in this context means that the 
planner assumes the role of society's policeman; that is, to oversee 
the process whereby the will of society is paramount. Put another 
way, the advocate role is to manage the development of society in a 
way that produces 'just outputs'. 
It would be reasonable to say that those involved in planning in 
Newcastle did not see themselves as playing the role of the advocate 
as defined above. However, it does appear from the actions of certain 
members of the planning teams, certainly those comprising the common 
core membership, that they were not averse to becoming politically 
involved in an issue when they judged that progress was either not 
being made or that the debate was beginning to become tangential to 
the main theme. One member of the planning team for the elderly, a 
psychologist, stated that planners must act as advocates for the group 
they are planning for even though such a stance may well be difficult 
for some because of potential conflicts with their professional duty. 
Fixer/Activist - this category has similarities to the foregoing in 
that the planner uses his/her position to secure certain objectives 
which, more often than not, have been defined and developed according 
to his/her own values. The label 'radical' could also be applied to 
this type of planner because "the activist view builds on the notion 
of a direct political role for the planner, but the activists reject 
the advocates' assumption of an egalitarian ethic" (Parston, 1980, p. 
63) 
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There is a tendency in some of the planning literature to equate 
radical planning with Marxist ideology (Castells, 1973; Harvey, 1973; 
Milliband, 1977). Parston certainly gives the impression of having 
some sympathy with the Marxist view when he notes that "regardless of 
how the benefits of planning are distributed, it is to the profit of 
the capital-owning class to encourage town planning because planning 
helps to maintain existing production relationships." (1980, p. 69). 
Thus does he justify a more overt role for the planner to one who 
seeks "changes in the structural basis of society" (1980, p. 63). 
Having said this Parston recognises that in trying to accomplish this 
the planner is placed in a dilemma because, and especially in the 
health sector, the planner is beholden to the means of production - in 
short he is an employee - and as such may be reluctant to publicly 
push his/her views simply because his/her livelihood depends upon it. 
In other words, the planner as an employee is in an extremely weak 
position with which to foment social revolution. Fainstein and 
Fainstein sum up the problem very neatly when they state that "radical 
advocacy, from a marxist perspective, suffers from its co-optative 
tendencies, its negation of the planning function and transformation 
of planners into political agitators • and its inability to move 
beyond triumphs of veto and negation to orchestrate positive, system-
wide movement. Guerillas in the bureaucracy are seen as weak and 
easily eliminated" (1982, p. 167-8). 
There is a school of thought which, while not adhering to the radical 
advocacy of planning, argues that the planner can play a considerably 
overt role through his/her ability to maximise to the full the various 
resources available to ensure that a particular plan is not only 
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accepted but implemented. This was a view held by one of the planner-
administrators who has argued on many occasions that resources, 
especially financial resources, are required to lubricate the planning 
process and that the hallmark of a good planner is his/her ability to 
secure or husband such resources and use them judiciously to promote 
or further a particular project, idea or proposal. As Petfield has 
acknowledged, "plans . . • without funds to give them effect are 
sterile" (1983, p. 113). 
The Planning Process 
Those involved in planning in Newcastle would hardly call themselves 
'revolutionaries', indeed many would abhor the term and yet there were 
some who could rightly and properly be labelled as 'radicals' in that 
they were prepared to challenge the vested interests and to fight for 
the common good as they saw it. It would be misleading to suggest 
that the planners in Newcastle could be so easily pigeon-holed in the 
sense that any one of the foregoing descriptions could be said to be 
an accurate reflection of how they discharged their role. The reality 
is that the roles so described are manifest in several forms in that 
the planner seems to slip from one role to the other depending upon 
circumstances and the problem or issue to hand. 
The difficulty with developing more sophisticated and specialised 
approaches to planning is that "policies are settled by bargaining 
between groups, with their own interest and frames of references, 
rather than by analysis" (Brown, 1975, p. 233). This is clear from 
the assessment of the JPTE and its membership, even though it appeared 
on the available evidence to be largely ineffectual in developing 
- 182 -
policies and plans. However, the planner-administrators at NHA 
were equally constrained by the ability of certain groups within 
Newcastle to thwart the development of policies with which they did 
not agree. Eckstein (1956) has referred to this as 'bounded planning' 
because the planning process, and indeed those operating within it, do 
so within very tight boundaries, reflective of their own perceived 
values or concerns. In other words, the boundaries within which one 
plans are generally dictated by one's understanding or perception of 
the problem, the values which one holds, and one's susceptibility to 
the opinions and values of others. Consequently planners have very 
little control over the planning environment, as this is largely 
determined by the interaction of others. 
Values play a very important role in planning in that they largely 
determine which issues are placed on the planning agenda, when, and in 
what form. Unfortunately there is little empirical evidence available 
on the impact of interest and values in NHS planning and policy-
making, yet it is acknowledged as a key feature of the process 
(Alford, 1975; Parston, 1980; Haywood and Alaszewski, 1980; Lee and 
Mills, 1982}. Haywood and Aleszewski while pleading for the 
implications of power and the concept of interest to be accorded 
greater prominence in any analysis of health care agencies offer 
little insight into what they readily acknowledge as this "uncharted 
territory." They do contend, however, that concepts extracted from 
the field of administrative policies may be useful in 'explaining' the 
different behaviour of those involved in planning and policy-making in 
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the NHS. This was a technique employed by Hunter (1980) in his study 
of decision-making in two Scottish Health Boards. The validity of 
applying theories of administrative politics as explanations for 
planning and policy-making as observed in Newcastle was discussed in 
Chapter Three and therefore the arguments need not be reiterated. 
The issues discussed by both the JPTE and the JPTMH reflect, to a 
certain extent, the values held by the main protagonists, and it is 
reasonable to assume that the creation of a parallel planning group 
for the elderly was in part a response to differing values and 
perceptions. Commentators have argued that, unless the debate on 
policy is broadened to include notions of interest and values, it is 
most unlikely that policies truly reflective of patients' 'needs' will 
emerge (Haywood and Alaszewski, 1980; Mooney, et al, 1980). The 
evidence from the machinations of the JPTE and to a lesser extent the 
JPTMH does suggest that disguised or unarticulated values and 
interests did inhibit or pre-empt the search for common policies. 
It is useful to compare the approach to planning displayed by each 
joint planning team as it sharply demonstrates the lack of continuity 
in planning in the NHS in general and at Newcastle in particular. It 
will be recalled that the JPTE produced very little in the way of 
proposals or plans for services for the elderly, despite a clear 
mandate to do so. It was left to the planner-administrators to 
produce such a plan, which they did primarily via a comparison of the 
existing range of inpatient facilities with that indicated by DHSS and 
RHA planning norms. The resulting plans were, in effect, a compromise 
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between the identified number of beds required to meet the shortfall 
and what could be reasonably funded, given the health authority's 
projected revenue allocations for the three-year planning period. 
This can be described as the application of a rather crude analytical 
tool to a complex issue. 
Progress for the JPTMH, or the Partnership which replaced it, was 
seemingly much easier, as there was no base with which to draw 
comparisons. As often happens in discussions, issues will arise, more 
by accident than by design, which by general consensus are considered 
to be 'worth pursuing'. It is unclear where or with whom the 
Partnership concept emerged, but once articulated it was rapidly 
endorsed as offering considerable scope for progress and there was a 
general will to carry it through. Thus it could be argued that 
planning in the NHS ranges from a near slavish adherence to central 
planning norms (Korman and Kogan, 1978) as a surrogate for a more 
analytical approach, to opportunism - the ability not only to 
recognise opportunities but also to exploit their potential. 
Such diversity of interpretation and approach to issues has given rise 
to what some commentators have referred to as a conflict theory of 
planning. Basically what the theory suggests is that all the actors 
involved in the process do so within a state of conflict or tension, 
each with a particular position to safeguard and a certain philosophy 
to pursue. The inherent conflict or tension in planning and policy-
making can be visualised as follows (figure 8.3), however as suggested 
earlier (this Chapter and Chapter Seven) most of the conflict would 
seem to occur between the three elites described above with the fourth 
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constituent (the public) a benign onlooker. This is not to say that 
the public is without influence in the policy-making arena; a topic 
'"'hich will be d1.scussed in Chapter Nine. 
Figure 8.3 
Planning/Policy-Making as Tension 
POLITICIANS 
PLANNERS 
PUBLIC 
Wildavsky suggests that tension between actors in the policy process 
gives rise to policy problems and that the policies which are produced 
as a consequence of actor interaction are merely a "temporary and 
partial reduction of tension" because such "solutions are temporary 
in that the conditions producing the initial dislocation change in 
time, creating different tensions" (Wildavsky, 1979, p. 390). This 
view would appear to regard tension as an unreconcilable variable in 
policy-making and planning, a position shared by Barrett and Hill who 
noted that "there is a tension between the normative assumptions of 
government - what ought to be done and how it should happen - and the 
struggle and conflict between interest - the need to bargain and 
compromise - that represent the reality of the process by which 
power/influence is gained and held" (quoted in Ham and Hill, 1984, p. 
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112). This latter opinion would seem to encapsulate a rather 
optimistic note in that there is at least a proforma for reaching an 
agreement or consensus amongst the actors on any policy issues. In 
contrast the position adopted by Wildavsky is a more pessimistic one 
which sees conflict or tension as a precursor for planning and policy-
making. 
It could be said that the art of planning is conflict reconciliation 
rather than conflict resolution since the tensions which exist between 
the four constituencies may be suppressed where each component 
perceives that they will obtain a share or stake in the outcome. Thus 
"conflict may, therefore, remain latent if each has a share of the 
'spoils'" (Lee and Mills, 1982, p. 75). While Lee and Mills 
acknowledge that the reconciliation of conflicting goals, values and 
interests is a major problem they do not really provide an insight 
into how this might be achieved, arguing instead that more research 
into this complex area is necessary. 
There is no doubt that policy-making is an inexact science; if indeed 
it is a science at all, and although more knowledge and understanding 
is to be welcomed there is some evidence available to suggest that 
this area of research has not been neglected with some thought and 
proposals being proffered as to how the planner can undertake a more 
proactive role in the planning process (Parston, 1980; Dear and 
Taylor, 1982; Mohan, 1984). 
The crux of the arguments propounded by Parston (1980), Dear (1984) 
and Mohan (1984) is that planning and policy-making is a state 
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activity and as such is directed towards the fulfillment of the 
state's administrative and legitimate aims. Parston (1980) sees both 
the planner and the provider as agents of the state; the former as a 
pawn whose job is to put the state's wishes into practice through the 
production and publication of plans and programmes which embody and 
justify the wishes of the state. The latter (providers, especially 
the physicians) plays the role of legitimiser by distinguishing 
between physical disability - regarded as a legitimate ailment, ln the 
sense that the reason for lost production is a visible one - and 
psychological illness - the worker is not often regarded as being 
truly sick but one who is work shy and consequently "a parasite on the 
capitalist back". 
Dear demonstrates considerable dis-enchantment with what he calls the 
"well-worn ruts" of health services planning, with "each bearing 
relatively little reference to the other or to the wider context of 
illness and health" (1984, p. 8). He bases his stance on empirical 
evidence arising out of a study of psychiatric services in Toronto 
(Dear and Taylor, 1980). He argues that there is a need for "a proper 
theory of health care systems (which) must accommodate the reflexive 
nature of the concepts of illness and health" (Dear, 1984, p. 9). Such 
a theory, according to Dear, should have three primary foci: the 
historical development of the health care institution because its 
origins rest within the evolution of capitalism; the construction and 
application of health care which sees health primarily as a commodity 
regulated by the state; and, the political context of health care 
where the relationship between the state and the health care 
professions is in a continuing state of flux. 
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The role of the state in the planning process is a theme which is 
echoed by Mohan (1984). He concludes from a description and analysis 
of hospital planning and new town development in the north-east of 
England that there are three issues in which the role of the state is 
important. The first concerns the degree of flexibility (or rather 
the lack of it) indentured in the state which is usually constrained 
by financial circumstances and shifting professional attitudes to 
policy. The second factor is the discord between various state 
agencies whose ability to intervene in issues is governed by 
legislation thus placing some agencies in a subservient role to 
others, leading to a divergence between problem definition and policy 
formulation. The third factor affects the approach to policy 
formulation by the state and its agencies. In essence Mohan argues 
that policies are developed not in a "systematic or co-ordinated 
pursuit of state objectives" but " as a series of ad hoc responses to 
changing socio-political and economic circumstances" (1984, p. 159}. 
There is little dispute about the attractiveness of the message being 
purveyed by advocates such as Parston and Dear, for the planner to 
play a more interventionist role and that planning issues should be 
placed within a wider context. The ideological commonsense of such an 
approach has much to recommend itself, but what is generally lacking 
is a mechanism or formula for putting into practice that which is 
preached. This is a failing which can be unequivocally laid at the 
feet of Parston (1980}, Dear (1984), and others who offer a concept 
without constructs. One is left, therefore, to fall back on the 
methods and mechanisms which these authors deride in order to give 
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some explanation of why and how policy-making and planning functions 
as it does. 
It is generally accepted that the measure of success in planning and 
policy-making is whether or not the desired measures are implemented 
and in the form originally agreed (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Lee 
and Mills, 1982), because this is the stage whereby policy is 
translated into action. If this is the case then successful 
implementation depends upon two crucial elements: organisational 
knowledge; and, determinate power. Or, as Lee and Mills have put it, 
"successful implementation depends first on knowledge of behaviour and 
circumstances both within and outside the organisation and of the 
resources available, and second on the power to carry through 
decisions" (1982, p. 166-7). Understanding these elements is 
therefore crucial for the planner and policy-maker otherwise to ignore 
them would "doom to irrelevance" any outcome of the process. 
Organisational knowledge is important because if one is not familiar 
with the intricacies of the health care system it is most likely that 
the various power bases or factions would remain relatively 
unidentified with the consequential outcome being more or less 
predictable; general intransigence to change. Also relevant is an 
understanding of the relationships which exist between the various 
power blocks {elites) thus enabling the planner to undertake a 
brokerage role by ensuring that the support of those essential for a 
positive outcome (implementation) is actively pursued. Closely allied 
to this bedrock of organisational knowledge is the ability to not only 
identify but also to procure resources; in particular financial 
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resources. This may be difficult in a climate of economic 
retrenchment, but not necessarily impossible. As one 
planner/administrator in Newcastle put it, planning is about the use 
of money in order to invest in change. 
Determinate power is about knowing who can help and who can hinder the 
planning process. It is, of course, more than just a question of 
seeking and building alliances or networks within the organisation, it 
is also about negotiation and bargaining. This is a theme which 
Barnard et al espouse when they noted that "health planning is 
necessarily the subject of adaptation, compromise, bargaining and 
reconciliation of conflicting interests" (1980, p. 263). This implies 
that planners must develop a better than average understanding of the 
political processes which govern planning and policy-making if they 
are to have any chance in ensuring that the outcome of planning is 
effective action. 
At the root of planning and policy-making is the individual and it is 
the role of these individuals and how they interpret the 
organisation's rules and goals which, according to Lipsky (1980) 
determine the policies which are carried out. Lipsy terms the manner 
in which such persons discharge their responsibilities as "street-
level bureaucracy". His description of street-level bureaucrats is of 
workers who "believe themselves to be doing the best they can under 
adverse circumstances and they develop techniques to salvage service 
and decision-making values within the limits imposed upon them by the 
structure of the work. They develop conceptions of their work and of 
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their clients that narrow the gap between their personal and work 
limitations and the service ideal" (Lipsky, 1980, p.xiii). 
Lipsky's concept of street-level bureaucrats is a useful analogy with 
which to explore the approach to planning and policy-making as 
exemplified by NHA. One of the main distinguishing features 
differentiating between street-level bureaucrats and managers is that 
they operate to different job priorities. The clinicians right to 
provide the best available care for his/her patient contrasts with 
management's desire and concern to see that such care is furnished in 
an efficient and effective manner so that many benefit. There is also 
the added factor that street-level bureaucrats are in the front-line 
when it comes to dealings with the public whereas managers usually are 
not. This creates additional problems because the former has to bear 
the brunt of public criticism while the latter is one step removed and 
perhaps may be less appreciative of the pressure placed on the street-
level bureaucrat. This may in part account for the fact that when the 
street-level bureaucrats (professionals/technical elite) are co-opted 
onto a planning team they become very reluctant to rock the proverbial 
boat preferring instead, as the JPTE demonstrated, to create the 
appearance of doing something but, in reality, doing little. Thus 
discussing the potential local implications of national policies is a 
good exercise in "blame diffusion" because any unpleasantness arising 
out of said policies can be firmly laid at the door of central 
government. 
Another and related feature is the desire of street-level bureaucrats 
to expand their autonomy. The growth of professionalism and the 
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fragmentation of larger professional bodies into sub-divisions or 
specialties within, such as medicine and to a lesser extent nursing 
are cases in point. In the main the argillnent here between managers 
and street-level bureaucrats is over discretion. "Managers try to 
restrict workers' discretion in order to secure certain results, but 
street-level bureaucrats often regard such efforts as illegitimate and 
to some degree resist them successfully" (Lipsky, 1980, p. 19). One 
medical member of both the JPTE and JPTMH commented that although 
there should be negotiation between clinicians and planners on how 
things could/should change or develop, ultimately doctors have the 
final say on what changes will be implemented. Needless to say, one 
of the planners/administrators saw things differently by noting that 
management was expected to do their job but in doing so was not to 
challenge the professional's right to provide care even though the two 
perspectives may, and often do, conflict. 
What Lipsky has provided in his study of street-level bureaucracy is 
an insight into the environment within which bureaucrats operate 
"where relationships between policy deliveries and managers are 
conflictual and reciprocal" (1980, p. 25). Understanding and 
accepting this as fact is an essential and necessary ingredient for 
planning and policy-making - the counter balancing informal element 
inherent in any formal planning procedure. 
The informal approach to planning and policy-making operates on a 
different plateau from the formal method but they both nevertheless 
share the same objectives. The emphasis here rests not so much on the 
procedural but instead on the personal - a matter of good 
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relationships being established between all participants. Planning is 
essentially the art of negotiation and while some negotiations can be 
conducted by committees (planning teams) there is generally little 
pressure on individuals to accept, unequivocally, the decisions 
reached by committees. The informal mode of planning and policy-
making puts the onus on both the provider of care (technical elite), 
the planner (administrative elite) and the policy-maker (political 
elite) to identify and share what each sees as important on any issue 
under consideration. The distinct advantages of this approach are 
considered to be a more constructive involvement in planning and 
policy-making instead of the more usual reactionary responses obtained 
hitherto. It is of benefit to both planners and providers to 
understand the values, interests and assumptions which underpin their 
respective positions. 
Whatever mechanism is applied or preferred the participation of both 
providers and planners is important and essential if any changes in 
the pattern of services is to be achieved. Thus it is important that 
the providers of health care understand and appreciate how the NHS 
planning system operates so that it can be employed to the best 
advantage. Health planners and policy-makers are not omnipotent -
they are often not aware of what the problems really are; indeed, 
they are only as good as their information about, and understanding 
of, the relevant issues, how they see these issues being dealt with, 
and their perception of the political framework within which they 
plan. The providers of services also contribute to the overall 
picture of health care but they too tend to see issues or problems in 
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a particular way, a course often coloured by their specific 
professional roles and responsibilities. 
If policy-making in the NHS can be likened to assembling a large 
jigsaw puzzle for which the guiding picture has been lost, then the 
provider and planner are natural allies, because of their specific 
talents, to be given the task of solving the puzzle. There is, 
however, an additional player who, although often excluded from the 
game, does have a legitimate claim as a player - the public. The role 
and contribution of the public in planning and policy-making is the 
major theme of the next Chapter (Nine) which considers the important 
issues of consultation and collaboration and policy formulation. 
CHAPTER NINE 
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNING PROCESS 
Throughout the foregoing discussions on the various roles and 
responsibilities assumed by both planners and policy-makers and others 
it has been implied that there is a degree of dependency between the 
various groups or actors involved, even though such dependency has 
only been referred to through the use of terms such as 'consultation', 
'collaboration' and 'participation'. Equally implied, but not stated, 
was the assumption that those involved in planning and policy-making 
do so on a fairly equal basis with each having a reasonable 
opportunity to influence the outcome of the process. As has been seen 
earlier (Chapters Seven and Eight) there are certain groups who are 
competing, both overtly and covertly, for a greater voice in the 
planning process while others, as a consequence of this agitation, are 
often regarded as mere pawns (Alford, 1975). 
This chapter explores the consultative and collaborative relationship 
between the various actors in the planning process especially as it 
applies to joint planning and in particular the role of the public in 
the planning process. This will be discussed within the context of 
public participation in general and its specific application to the 
health service. It should be borne in mind that although the terms 
'collaboration', 'consultation' and 'participation' are in effect used 
to denote 'involvement' in the policy-making process it does not 
follow that each has the same connotation, nonetheless, it is both 
important and necessary that each of these concepts are clearly 
understood. 
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Consultation and Collaboration 
One of the key features of the NHS reorganisation in 1974 was the 
desire to facilitate joint discussions between the health authorities 
and the corresponding local authorities. Indeed, the legislation 
which constituted the then AHAs enshrined such co-operation through 
the establishment of Joint Consultative Committees (JCC), composed of 
health authority members and local authority councillors. 
Additionally, and equally, important was 'coterrninosity' whereby the 
AHAs and their local authority counterparts shared the same 
geographical boundaries. Collaboration was seen as providing a 
cornerstone in relations between the NHS and local authorities, under 
the terms of the 1974 reorganisation of the health service. The 
vehicle through which this new relationship was to be cemented was the 
JCC. This new body was one of the recommendations contained in the 
report of the Working Party on Collaboration between the NHS and Local 
Government (DHSS, 1973). The rationale underpinning the Working 
Party's recommendations was stated in the following manner; "that the 
real objective is not to achieve the joint consideration of plans 
which have been prepared separately by the two sides and brought 
together at a late stage to see how well they match up. It is, 
rather, to secure genuinely collaborative methods of working 
throughout the process of planning, and close and continuing co-
operation between the officers of the two sides" (DHSS, 1973, para 
4. 9). 
The emphasis was on collaboration, a concept defined by Chambers' 
dictionary as "to work in association with". Lee and Mills offer a 
more detailed definition of collaboration which to them "implies that 
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the organisation or groups in question have equal rights to be 
involved in the formulation of each other's goals and in their 
achievements where there are matters of mutual responsibility, concern 
and interest" ( 1982, p. 129). This concept was one which was shared 
by the DHSS and was articulated to both health and local authorities 
in a circular on joint care planning (HC(77)17/LAC(77)10}. The 
government's views were stated as follows: 
"The Secretary of State's aim is to encourage joint planning 
by health and local authorities in which each authority 
contributes to all stages of the other's planning, from the first 
steps in developing common policies and strategies to the 
production of operational plans to carry them out. Only by full 
collaborative planning in partnership can health and local 
authorities devise and implement effective complementary patterns 
of services." ( DHSS, 1977b, para 1 • 1 ) 
It will be recalled (Chapter Five) that the JCC was the umbrella body 
under which the JCPT, composed of officers from both health and local 
Authorities was created to oversee the planning functions in which 
both had an interest and involvement. The JCC, however, did not have 
executive powers, it was only an advisory body, despite its legal 
constitution. Its creation was designed to ensure a close working 
(that is, collaborative) relationship between health and local 
authorities, in the hope that by doing so a clear lead by the members 
of both Authorities would emerge which would guide and sustain a 
commitment to joint policy-making. What evidence is available would 
suggest that the JCC was largely incapable of fulfilling its original 
function (Lee and Mills, 1982; Glennester, et al, 1983). 
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Consultation, according to Chambers' Dictionary is "deliberation, or a 
meeting for deliberation" which although useful does not help to shed 
much light on the process. Ham has defined consultation as an 
activity which occurs when "a group's views are actively sought and 
may or may not be taken into account" (1980b, p. 223). Lee and Mills 
extend this definition to "the seeking of advice, information or 
opinion, without a commitment to follow views received, and with the 
consulting body responsible for the final decision" (1982, p. 129). 
Thus, negatively, it could be argued that consultation is essentially 
a one-way process in that the consulter is seeking to have his/her 
opinion confirmed and therefore is not really seriously interested in 
the opinion of the consultee, should that opinion be perceived or 
interpreted to be somewhat critical. Positively, it can be argued that 
consultation creates opportunities for corrective processes, for 
example, by eliminating errors, raising previously unacknowledged 
aspects or issues, and so on. 
'Consultation' as seen by most health authority's planners consisted 
of distributing copies of the draft plans to all those bodies who may 
have had an interest in the plans, with an invitation to comment upon 
the contents therein. (In other words, consultation was restricted to 
information sharing and did not extend to participation in decision-
making). The comments received through this procedure tended to fall, 
in the eyes of the planners and policy-makers, into two categories: 
frivolous - raising questions of detail rather than of substance; or 
non-response - little in the plans were seen to be of direct interest 
or not enough time was given to prepare a proper response because of a 
short consultation period. As a consequence, the value of 
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consultation has become rather discredited in the NHS, because it does 
not provide the response which the planners seek which is an 
endorsement of their perception of how and in what manner the health 
service should progress. Thus, to a certain extent consultation is 
the bete noire of NHS planners and policy-makers because it is 
something which they are obliged to do but to which they carry little 
commitment. 
This bureaucratic approach to consultation could partially explain why 
very few health services plans are implemented. The answer may rest 
with the limited involvement in the production of the plans of those 
responsible for providing the service. As Lee and Mills (1982) 
observe, the professions, particularly clinicians, expected their 
views to be unequivocally accepted by planners and policy-makers and 
therefore there was little enthusiasm on the part of doctors to 
participate in the advisory machinery which they regarded as a tedious 
chore. This ambivalent attitude to being involved in the planning 
process was reflected by comments received from two clinical 
representatives of the common core of members to both the JPTE and 
JPTMH. Both were specifically asked for their respective views or 
opinions on the value of consultation. Interestingly, neither of the 
clinicians interviewed regarded consultation and their participation 
in the mechanics of it as being particularly useful. One attributed 
his position to the fact that the planner and the doctor spoke 
different languages. This was ascribed to different perspectives - the 
clinician saw planning as a hobby and therefore divorced from ordinary 
clinical work, whereas it was the raison d'etre for the planner. 
Ergo, it could be argued that doctors have better things to do. The 
- 200 -
other doctor had no opinion whatsoever to offer on the value of 
consultation other than to imply that the existing advisory committee 
structure played a useful supporting role to the established planning 
system. 
An additional factor is that it is uncommon for either the CHC or the 
public to be represented on the planning team thus making it difficult 
for the criteria to be satisfied of plans appropriate to the 'needs' 
of the population. Both the JPTE and the JPTMH followed the 
traditional NHS approach to consultation - comments were invited after 
plans had been formulated (that is, after the event rather than 
during). Furthermore, the membership of the planning teams was 
composed of health and local authority professionals, with the 
majority from the health side; no lay persons or CHC representatives 
were involved in the area under scrutiny. This situation did not hold 
for the Partnership which replaced the JPTMH (Chapter Five), a subject 
which will be returned to later in the chapter. 
It is debatable whether the inclusion of a CHC representative on the 
planning teams would have improved the end result of the process. As 
Lee and Mills have commented from their observation of planning in the 
NHS, "there was little evidence that the consultation process • . • 
had led to any significant change in the balance of power" (1982, p. 
143) towards the CHC. Even the much lauded efforts in the United 
States to bring citizens into the health planning realm has received 
mixed reviews which has led Checkoway to observe that "the future of 
health planning and consumer participation is uncertain" (1981, p. 
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10), because instead of opening up the policy-making process it has 
paradoxically concentrated "power among selected providers committed 
to traditional medical practice" (p. 9). This view is supported by 
Riddick, et al (1984) who in a study of consumer involvement on the 
board of a Health Systems Agency, noted that despite having a majority 
of members, consumers were not able to exert a controlling influence 
over the decision-making process. 
Having said this, and even though the medical profession appeared to 
have little use for consultation, it was seen as an important issue 
both by the planner/administrator member of the common core, and 
perhaps less surprisingly by the secretary of the local CHC in 
Newcastle. The secretary disclosed that the CHC had been offered 
observer status on the JCPT but the CHC declined the offer because it 
did not alter the existing situation by allowing them an early 
involvement in the discussion stage of planning. Thus the goal of the 
CHC remained - to be an equal member of the health authority•s 
planning and policy-making process. 
Participation 
It is appropriate at this stage to consider the question of 
participation since many commentators regard it as crucial to the 
whole debate over policy (Simmie, 1974, Fagence, 1977; Broady, 1979; 
Glass, 1979; Boaden, et al, 1982). The problem with participation is 
that it is much more difficult to settle on an acceptable definition 
than it was for •consultation• and •collaboration•. Much, but not 
all, of the debate about participation is couched in terms of 
democratic theory which essentially sees participation as an integral 
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component of any democracy (see Pateman [1970] for an excellent 
discussion on this topic). Inherent in the concept of participation, 
especially that grounded in democratic theory, is the notion of 
collaboration and consultation- a classification to which Ham (1980) 
also includes articulation and public relations. Interestingly, Ham 
in offering such a typology argues that there is little or no 
correlation between these notions of involvement and the degree of 
power exercised by decision-makers. Thus Ham's classification of 
forms of public participation, though of interest, is not particularly 
helpful. 
A much more informative tabulation of various forms of participation 
has been posed by Arnstein (1969) in what she called a 'ladder of 
citizen participation'. In her concept of the way these types inter-
link, she parts company with Ham since she bases her different notions 
of participation according to the degree of citizens power which 
appertain. Arnstein's terminology is as follows: 
Citizen Control 
Delegated Power 
Partnership 
Placation 
Consultation 
Informing 
Therapy 
Manipulation 
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It will be obvious from this taxonomy that Arnstein's perception of 
participation implies a hierarchical order or range comprising eight 
elements sub-divided into three stages or rungs, representing in 
ascending order of importance, non-participation, tokenism, and 
citizen power. 
The first rung of the ladder (non-participation) requires some 
explanation in order to differentiate between 'manipulation' and 
'therapy'. The former occurs when the public are given places on 
advisory bodies which function primarily as a 'rubber stamp' agency. 
This was what was offered to the CHC in Newcastle - membership in the 
form of observer status on the JCPT - when they persistently pressed 
for a say in the planning and policy-making process. The latter 
refers to attempts to 'educate' the public that the policy-makers 
always have the 'best interests' of the public upper most in their 
minds when formulating policy. 
The second level (degrees of tokenism) describes different degrees of 
involvement and is probably most indicative of the current state of 
participation in the NHS. 'Informing' is a marginal improvement on 
'therapy' in Arnstein's model although there appears to be little to 
distinguish between them. If there is anything between the terms, it 
is suggested that informing does, at least, allow for the possibility 
for the feedback of views whereas 'therapy' clearly does not. The 
relationship between the JPTE and health authority planners could be 
said to be of the 'informing' category since the planners prepared and 
produced plans for the elderly separately from the planning team who 
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were not consulted and therefore played no part in the process. They 
were merely informed of the outcome of the planners efforts. 
'Consultation' is considered to be one of the key planks of the NHS 
planning system whereby there exists a specific procedure for ensuring 
that interested and concerned parties are consulted about the plans 
and policies produced. Thus there is an impression of 'real' 
involvement in the planning process and yet it is a false promise 
because, although the planning system provides a mechanism for 
consultation, it offers no assurance that any views profferred will be 
given any credence and taken account of. This is standard practice in 
the NHS as Lee and Mills (1982), Glennerster, et al (1983) and others 
have observed. Perhaps the attitude to consultation in the NHS can 
best be summarised through the observations of one of the principal 
planners of NHA who, while acknowledging that consultation is 
important, argued that in the end it was the views of the 
administrator/planner which took precedence simply because they were 
paid to manage the services whereas the others were not. 
The final element, 'placation', on the tokenism rung refers to the 
practice of nominating members of the public to sit on executive 
boards such as local health authorities or where citizen committees 
are created, such as community health councils, and given an advisory~ 
role without any real power to influence the policy-making process. A 
discussion of the impact and influence of lay members on executive 
bodies such as health authorities is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
and has been touched on earlier (Chapter Seven) however, there is 
sufficient if limited evidence available to suggest that the public 
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member of such bodies play only a very minor part in policy-making 
(Hunter, 1980; Ham i98i; Haywood and Alaszewski, 1980). The reality 
of planning and policy-making is that it is the professionals 
(technical) and the administrative elites who dominate decision-making 
in the NHS. 
The final or upper tier (degrees of citizen power) represents in many 
ways the ideal or utopian dream, and like all utopias, attainment is 
questionable. There is no evidence in the health service that the 
top two stages, 'citizen control' and 'delegated power' have been, or 
are even likely to be achieved. There is a situation whereby a CHC 
may be in a position analogous to that of 'delegated power' - decision-
making authority and veto - which can occur when a health authority 
wishes to close permanently a hospital or part thereof. When this is 
the case, the view of the relevant CHC must be sought and it is here 
that the CHC has power of veto over the closure proposal insofar as 
it, at the same time, puts forward an alternative plan. If a 
satisfactory solution or compromise cannot be reached, the matter is 
forwarded to the Secretary of State for Health and Social Services for 
a final decision. This decision process is a power which seldom 
results in the CHC proposals prevailing (Hallas, 1977). Subsequent 
modifications by the DHSS have altered the circumstances and 
procedures by which CHCs can exercise their veto over hospital 
closures (De Peyer, 1979). 
The one remaining element in Arnstein's typology is 'partnership' 
which she sees as a form of power through negotiation. Negotiation in 
this context refers to a situation whereby the outcome of the policy-
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making process is contingent upon the agreement of all parties 
concerned. It is clear from the available evidence that the 
Partnership conformed to the 'partnership' component in Arnstein's 
package, even though the earliest attempts to constitute the 
Partnership did not envisage equal sharing of power between health 
authority, local authority and lay representatives, since the lay 
proportion was very much in the minority (Petfield, 1983). Subsequent 
outcries by the lay members succeeded in the granting of equal status 
to all parties, which meant that any plans or policies produced by the 
Partnership emerged as a consequence of negotiation rather than 
consultation. 
Arnstein's 'ladder of citizen participation' is a useful but imperfect 
way in which to examine various attempts and degrees of participation 
in the NHS. However, like many typologies the categories or types 
which she distinguishes and describes are not necessarily self-
evident; that is to say, it is not that easy to be absolutely certain 
that an activity cast as 'informing' is not merely 'manipulation' in 
another guise. Thus it could be argued that Arstein employs too many 
examples which gives rise to classification problems, some of which 
arise from a different interpretation of meanings between US and UK 
cultures and, therefore, a simpler paradigm would be more useful. 
Such a model is one discussed by Pateman (1970) who identified and 
described three forms of participation; pseudo, partial, and full. 
The first type - pseudo - is defined as a process in which no 
participation in decision-making actually takes place, instead under 
the semblance of participation, management consults with its employees 
and others in order to persuade them to accept decisions which have 
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already been made. Much of the so-called participation in the NHS 
planning system by non-NHS bodies was of this type. Indeed, there is 
some evidence to suggest that those within the NHS who were not privy 
to the planning and policy-making process were treated in as equally a 
cavalier fashion as their non-NHS contemporaries (Haywood and 
Alaszewski, 1980; Ham, 1981; Lee and Mills, 1982). This approach is 
consultation in its more literal interpretation where the planners and 
policy-makers seek views in support of their own preconceived position 
as outlined in the plan or policy document. 
The second element - partial participation - describes a situation in 
which those who are party to a decision have some influence over the 
final outcome. Such influence is partial because usually only one 
party has the final say on what will happen. In the case of the NHS 
the deciding party is generally management. A good example of this 
form of participation has been the discussions and consultation 
surrounding the publication by the Oxford Regional Health Authority 
(ORHA) of a paper spelling out the implications for the Region of 
recent changes in Government policy (ORHA, 1982). The paper called 
for very radical changes in the manner in which health services were 
currently being provided in Oxford and was sent out to a variety of 
agencies and groups for their comments. The consultation procedure 
and its general consequences have been well documented by Hallas 
(1985) and therefore will not be elaborated on here. What is of 
interest though is the outcome of the consultation process which led 
to a 'revisionist stance' on the part of the ORHA. In a subsequent 
statement by the authority (ORHA, 1984) it publically acknowledged the 
contribution made by doctors, nurses and administrators to the revised 
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plan. However, "in terms of formal consultation with representatives 
of the general public, to those nearest to this aspect (the CHC) the 
consultation was derisory" (Hallas, 1985, p. 94). Thus partial 
consultation within the context of the NHS indicates that the ability 
to influence plans and policies rests with doctors, nurses, and 
administrators, whereas the public in the guise of the CHC is 
attributed no power or influence at all - shades of pseudo-
participation. 
The third and final component in Pateman's trifurcation is full 
participation; "a process where each individual member of a decision 
making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions" 
(1970, p. 71). This is something of a rarity in NHS circles, 
especially that relating to planning and policy-making of which the 
Partnership is very much the exception with influence and decision-
making power invested in a troika of NHS, local authority, and lay 
representatives. The Partnership with its tripartite structure (see 
Chapter Four) provides a good example of the way in which the mix of 
professionals and lay people can produce results. 
There is some limited evidence available to support the contention 
that the inclusion of CHC members and/or lay people in planning does 
improve the quality of the product (Jones, 1977; Ham 1980; Hallas, 
1985). This has, undoubtedly, been the case with the Partnership, as 
the following event illustrates. One of the earliest issues that the 
Partnership faced was whether to supplement the existing nucleus of a 
Community Mental Handicap Team (CMHT) inherited upon their 
incorporation, or to search for and establish a Family Resource Centre 
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(FRC) as a base from which the Partnership would be administered, 
parents and the mental handicap could turn to for advice, and the 
professionals would operate. Both issues were seen as important as 
defined in the Blueprint for a Local Service' (NAHA, 1981b) which 
outlined the rationale for the Partnership and the policy issues which 
were to be pursued. 
There was considerable debate amongst the Partnership members over 
which of these issues should take precedence and also over what should 
comprise the CMHT and the FRC. The professional element on the 
Partnership, while recognising the need for the FRC, argued for an 
increase in the CMHT on the grounds that this would meet an immediate 
service need. The lay constituents were not entirely convinced by 
this argument, suggesting in turn that the FRC should proceed first, 
since there had been only a very minimal service in Newcastle for the 
mentally handicapped with which parents and supporters had had to 
contend. The lay members believed that they could wait a little longer 
for professional support whereas what they really needed was a place 
where they could go for comfort, relief, short-term support, a forum 
to discuss problems and so on. What, in short, the lay members were 
saying was that they required early on in its development a concrete 
sign that the Partnership was about change, new approaches, and that 
the parents were considered to be an integral part of this new 
initiative. 
The outcome of this testing of the managerial waters was in many 
senses the classical compromise in that the FRC was considered to be 
top priority but at the same time steps were to be taken to bolster 
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the staff resources for the CMHT in order that it could fulfil the 
tasks defined in the 'Blueprint'. Thus the desirability of the lay 
persons on the Partnership for a central focus for mental handicap in 
Newcastle triumphed but the professionals had not necessarily lost 
their case since coupled to their support for the FRC was a request 
for more nursing resources for the CMHT. A request which the Area 
Nursing Officer supported, and offically asked that this petition for 
additional nursing staff be borne by NHA and not from the Partnership 
funds, although there was some reluctance initially to pursue this 
option. 
The difficulties facing the Partnership in attempting to reconcile 
various competing demands on its resources and still retain faith with 
its inaugural policy document (the Blueprint) were aptly described in 
a memorandum from the Health Authority's planning officer to his 
superior: 
"The partnership cannot be expected to maintain its course in 
pursuing the priorities identified in the Blueprint • • • in the 
face of very strong pressure from professional staff for 'more and 
more'. There is no doubt that psychology and nursing resources 
seem incredibly low and in need of strengthening but they needed 
this before the Partnership came on the scene. I think what we 
are witnessing is an admitted frustration from the professionals 
in being unable to obtain additional resources from existing 
budgets. They naturally are attracted therefore to what they see 
as 'free' money. The Partnership is simply not able at this point 
in time to assess their needs" 
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In the end, a proposal was put to the NHA that three additional 
community nurses for the mentally handicapped should be appointed and 
supported by Health Authority funds and not from Partnership monies. 
Problems in Participation 
As the preceding discussion has clearly shown there is no sustained 
drive either within the NHS or theo~~Local Health Authority to augment 
the intrepid st~ps taken .,by the Partnership down the 'unadapted' road 
of public participation. It does appear in the NHS that it is the 
"administrative perspective" rather than the "public perspective" 
(Glass, 1979) which rules the day. The 'administrative' perspective 
is an approach to participation which is, in essence, illusionary. 
That is, participation is viewed as a tool or device through which an 
organisation informs the public that it has its (the public's) best 
interests at heart and that the policies and plans published by the 
organisation reflect this (Hallas, 1979). A sort of benign 
benevolence in that the goals of the organisation, and to a certain 
extent those employed within it, are dressed up to give the appearance 
of emanating from public concern. The 'public' perspective occurs 
when an organisation actively involves the public in the determination 
of policy. 
The choice of either the 'administrative' or the 'public' approach to 
participation is not a straightforward one. The dilemma is that both 
the organisation and the public have particular requirements to be 
considered and these requirements are usually dissimilar in their 
objectives. Thus to follow the 'administrative' approach may satisfy 
the requirements of the organisation but alienate the public; whereas 
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the 'public' approach is often confounded by the knowledge that there 
is no iron-clad procedure for determining what purports to be the 
public's view (Fagence, 1977). There is also a further complication 
to consider; namely that the public and those responsible for the 
planning of health services may not share the same goals and values 
for subsequently improving services. For instance, providers of 
health services may regard better working conditions, improvements in 
medical technology, concentration of services on one site and the 
professional development associated with this concentration as 
providing positive benefits for patients and would, therefore, value 
highly such improvements. Whereas the public may regard improvement 
in health care of value if it increases accessibility to health 
services, provides a reasonable range of services locally and does not 
threaten the existence of their local hospital. Such differences, 
while not irreconcilable, do require considerable negotiation if 
controversy is to be avoided, as the debate in the Partnership between 
a resource centre or extra nursing staff aptly demonstrates. 
Another aspect which often inhibits the acceptance of participation 
from the point of view of the planner, is the so-called 'fickle' 
nature of the public. The public, for example, generally desires the 
best health care available, but at the same time it is often unwilling 
or unable to contribute towards better health care by accepting some 
degree of responsibilitiy for its own state of health. For instance, 
there is a growing body of evidence which suggests that there is a 
causal relationship between smoking and the increase in the incidence 
and prevalence of cancer and respiratory diseases (Vessey and Gray, 
1985; Alderson, et al, 1985), and yet substantial numbers of the 
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population continue to smoke inspite of the obligatory 'health 
warning' on all cigarette packets. 
It is often claimed that it is in the best interests of the planner 
and policy-maker to foster and encourage the involvement of the 
public in the planning process (Simmie, 1974; Bailey, 1975; Fagence, 
1977; Broady, 1979; Checkoway, 1981). The rationle for pursuing this 
task is generally simple: it is easier to effect change if all those 
affected are involved in the debate about the direction and manner 
such change should take. It is assumed that by reaching 
an accord or accommodation on the main issues there would be a 
consensus amongst those concerned to put the plans into operation. 
This has generally been the case with regard to professional and 
administrative roles in decision-making but, as has been shown, rarely 
applied to lay or consumer interests. And yet, the limited evidence 
presented does suggest that there are a number of compelling reasons 
for broadening out the policy-making process to include the public. 
Firstly, people in social classes I, II, III are often more articulate 
and better-informed about health care today than ever before and, 
consequently, are very interested in and concerned with policy issues, 
especially those they perceive to have direct relevance to them. 
Providers of health care, for instance, often see issues in terms of 
resources (usually a lack thereof), whereas the public's concern is 
usually of a different order, less to do with the availability of 
resources, rather more anxiety about access to services; quality of 
care available; responsiveness of health personnel; and, the impact 
upon the family of particular health problems (Ellenburg, 1981). 
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Secondly, there are those in any community who are very well-informed 
about the community and its 'needs', and it is important to try to 
'tap' this pool of knowledge. The creation of the CHC in the health 
service was, in part, designed for this purpose (DHSS, 1975) and as 
both Hallas (1979) and Ham (1980) have observed, CHCs have had some 
success in influencing planning and policy-making in the NHS. Indeed, 
the experience of the CHC in Newcastle also demonstrates that the CHC 
is not without influence, but their ability to effect change would 
appear to be limited to circumstances or issues where there is little 
or no professional connections or power base such as with the mental 
handicap. 
Thirdly, there is a school of thought which argues that it is better 
to involve the public (or at least their 'representative') in planning 
and policy-making rather than exclude them, on the grounds that by 
bringing such groups closer to the planning process it is they and not 
the planners who often become the more amenable. This is not to say 
that it is a one-way procession only: exposure to different 
perceptions held by the public undoubtedly leads to a modification of 
professional views and opinions. Again this change in positions was 
evident from the machinations which occurred within the Partnership 
and the policies which it adopted, whereby a difference of opinion 
between professionals and lay people over priorities was resolved 
amicably (Petfield, 1983). In short it could be argued that 
commitment to the ideals of the Partnership overcame the desires of 
certain groups within it. This approach to decision-making accords 
very closely with the Japanese style of management outlined by Ikegami 
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as "the mutual effort made by both management and workers to gain 
commitment to the organisation" (1985, p. 41). 
The fourth and final factor is based on the concept or philosophy 
currently in vogue in management circles and stems from Peters and 
Waterman's (1982) influential book, In Search of Excellence in which 
they outlined their reasons as to why the top companies in the United 
States were so successful. One of the major factors cited was that 
these successful organisations had specific policies which could be 
collectively referred to as "getting close to the customer". The 
Peters and Waterman formula is very similar but not identical to that 
advocated by Ikegami through his concept of Gemeinschaft whereby 
"people associate together • because they think the relationship 
valuable as an end in, and of, itself" (1985, p. 27). In the context 
of health care this implies that local committees must become actively 
involved in planning and policy-making. Clearly there are both 
advantages and disadvantages associated with such an approach as has 
been shown above, but as Ikegami argues the penalty for not doing so 
"would appear to be letting the conflict of interests intensify in the 
quest for increasingly elusive resources" (1985, p. 42). 
There is then a case to be made for giving the customer a greater say 
in planning and policy-making in the health sector. It would be 
unduly rash to suggest that the involvement of the public would 
transform, overnight, the long established and entrenched procedures 
for planning in the NHS, and yet, there is evidence available which 
suggests that customer involvement can produce benefits (Ham, 1980; 
Falk and Lee, 1978). The initial experience of the Partnership would 
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seem to substantiate the arguments of those who call for a greater 
role for the public, in whatever guise, in planning and policy-making 
in the NHS. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind, that greater 
public participation is not without its impediments; it does take 
much longer for a consensus to emerge at a cost in resources, time, 
and personal sacrifice (Fagence, 1977). There is here then the 
makings of an organisational dilemma: whether the purpose of 
participation is merely to serve and ratify the interest of the 
organisation; or to enable the public to prepare with the relevant 
professionals plans and policies which would more closely reflect 
existing 'needs' and 'demands' for health care. The Newcastle 
experience suggests that the health authority, either intentionally or 
un-intentionally (it is not clear), tried to have it both ways, which 
culminated in fairly predictable results. And yet, one is left with a 
glimmer of hope that the tentative steps taken by the Partnership down 
the road to public participation may yet be repeated not only within 
the health authority but also elsewhere in the NHS. 
CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
The ultimate objective of introducing a formalised planning process 
into the NHS was to ensure that the outcome of planning, in terms of 
services provided, would be commensurate with the 'needs' of the 
population. The health care planning team was considered to be the 
appropriate mechanism for achieving this objective. These planning 
teams were conceived as multidisciplinary groups, with members 
selected according to their professional skills and knowledge of 
health services. Furthermore, the role of the planning team was seen 
as advisory rather than executive - as a forum for discussion and 
formulation of plans and policies which were then forwarded to 
management for consideration and decision. 
The research sought to accomplish two objectives: firstly, to 
determine to what extent the philosophy and rationale of health 
planning has become a guiding force leading to better policies; and 
secondly, to understand the factors which influence the planning 
process and the resulting policy decisions. 
It is clear from the study and the available literature that the 
majority of planning teams have failed to live up to expectations. 
Although a number of factors have been advanced as contributing to 
loss of credibility in NHS planning, four issues appear to pre-
dominate. First, policy decision-making, rooted very much in 
incrementalist philosophy, has not given those who plan the services 
clear and succinct organisational objectives within which 
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to plan: planners generally do not know where they are going nor how 
they are going to get there. Second, since the philosophy of planning 
and its virtues have been given a low profile, planning has become a 
means unto itself, rather than, as was intended, the pursuit of well-
chosen policy objectives. Third, the prescriptive nature of the 
planning system, with its emphasis on an annual timescale precludes 
any detailed or long-term analysis of problems to such an extent that 
most plans tend to adopt DHSS guidelines as de facto appropriate 
levels of service. Finally, in many cases satisfaction for most 
planners lies with the completed plan. Little or no attempt is made 
to evaluate the decisions arising out of the planning system in order 
to ascertain whether or not the original aims and objectives have been 
achieved. 
This is the environment in which planning and policy-making has 
taken place in the NHS. From the evidence of the local case study, it 
has been suggested that, for the JPTE at least, these conditions 
prevailed. This was not true for the Partnership, and to some extent 
the JPTMH, although in the very early years it displayed some 
similarity with the JPTE. The distinguishing features which enabled 
the Partnership to progress were a committed leadership, lack of 
constraining services or facilities, relatively little conflict 
between planners and the caring professions on the type of service 
required, a sense of urgency that something must be done, and 
willingness to devolve responsibility for management to a body which 
accorded an equal say to patients and/or their representatives. 
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The study has demonstrated that the introduction of a formal 
planning system into an organisation, however well-intended, is of 
itself not enough without additional and continuing support. 
Designating someone a planner does not automatically mean that 
planning will result. In the local case study, mechanisms and 
procedures for planning were established and were religiously adhered 
to, and yet very little in the way of acceptable and implementable 
plans were produced. Any system, however well-designed, is only as 
good as the people working within it. This was clealy shown by the 
JPTE where the main protagonists, particularly those in the chair, 
acted more as gatekeepers rather than facilitators. As has been 
indicated, the gatekeeping role was manifest through the restriction 
or filtering of discussion items away from potentially sensitive local 
issues to a consideration of national policy matters where there was 
an identified common adversary - the DHSS. The lesson here is quite 
clear: if people are to undertake a planning role they need to know 
firstly what is expected of them and, secondly, that as agents of 
change they require organisational and managerial support if they are 
to do the job properly. 
Leadership has emerged from the study as being a crucial ingredient in 
any recipe for planning and policy-making. Clearly there are leaders 
and there are leaders. Making one head of a planning team does not 
guarantee success as the example of the JPTE has regrettably 
demonstrated. Being titular head of something does not automatically 
ensure leadership~ it may help but other qualities are necessary. 
The qualities required for effective leadership are difficult to 
identify precisely from the study but certain attributes can be 
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discerned and these are: a strong will and belief in the cause; a 
charismatic personality; an understanding of the complexities of the 
task and the different perceptions and perspectives of the various 
actors involved; and, a personal commitment that change is not only 
necessary but desirable. These people bring to the planning and 
policy-making process an enthusiasm for a new idea or change, a 
commitment to keep that issue on the agenda, almost at any cost, and 
they are prepared to actively promote its acceptancP- and introduction 
even if it means, as with the Partnership, placing one's 
organisational credibility on the line. 
Power is another dominant issue which the study has documented and it 
is a factor which has been applied, almost but not exclusively, in a 
negative way. By far the biggest exploiters of negative power have 
been the medical profession who have used their position, status and 
prestige in the health sector to block changes with which they did not 
approve. This does not imply that their use of power is as a veto 
only, for there is evidence to indicate that they could be formidable 
allies to a cause provided that they are assured or convinced that the 
benefits of change outweigh the risks to be taken. However, as 
Stocking notes "altruism may be mixed with a judgement that promoting 
innovation will increase their status locally or perhaps in 
their professional peer group" (1985, p. 43). Whatever the reason, 
change cannot occur without someone undertaking the role and 
responsibilities of a 'prime mover', 'product champion', or 'policy 
broker'; a first and necessary step to successful planning and 
policy-making. Equally, of course, such a person or persons must have 
a credible power base within the organisation which they are prepared 
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to exploit in order to affect the change they believe is necessary. 
Thus do both leadership and power contribute to successful planning 
and policy-making - a sort of politics of conviction - where 
particular persons or groups are prepared to take a calculated risk 
to generate change within the NHS. But however important leadership 
and power may be, they are only effective if they can succeed in 
carrying a large supporting cast. Support for change or innovation 
must be carried throughout the organisation and beyond as the success 
of the Partnership attests. There is then a third ingredient 
necessary for effective planning and policy-making; involvement, not 
only of others in the organisation but also of the public. 
Public involvement in planning and decision-making does not guarantee 
success; indeed many critics within the NHS have argued that for the 
Health Service to open up the decision-making process to greater 
public contribution would stifle rather than encourage better 
policies. The success of the Partnership clearly has disproved the 
theory that public involvement equals policy paralysis. What the 
Partnership has shown is that by giving the public a say in planning 
and policy-making greater commitment can be generated and that this in 
turn releases a collective energy across the board towards making the 
policy work. 
In Chapter Four a conceptual model of planning was outlined which 
suggested that there was a set procedure or sequence to be followed 
and that this procedure, albeit in modified form, was that which 
underpinned NHS planning. The study has demonstrated that the 
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conceptual model was only partially adhered to, and even then it was 
difficult to point categorically to any example and say that thia 
equated with one step or stage or another. From this it could be 
argued, with some justification, that conceptual models while useful 
in helping one to understand the system, do very little in explaining 
how the process should function. This is because planning and policy-
making occur in a political environment which can, and often does, 
push those given the responsibility for planning in a variety of 
different and often conflicting directions. Thus the political 
dimension of planning and policy-making could be likened to a maze 
whereby one may enter several cul-de-sacs before emerging at the other 
end with an agreed plan or policy. 
The observed failure of NHS planning to rise to the expectations of 
its advocates can be attributed to the fact that it was originally 
perceived of and applied as an activity divorced from management. 
Certainly, many of those with managerial responsibilities also were 
involved in planning and policy-making but they tended to see 
management and planning as separate functions which has inevitably led 
to the apparent denigration of both (DHSS, 1980a; DHSS, 1983). The 
separation of planning and management, where planning was a highly 
prescriptive function, and where management tended to behave more as 
administrators in that they followed a rather unadventurous code of 
practice (Keeling, 1972 ), has resulted in disenchantment all around 
and a search for a more co-ordinated form of policy-making. 
Evidence from the study has demonstrated the need for a more 
integrated style of planning, policy-making and management. The 
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Partnership, which had planning as well as management 
responsibilities, clearly has illustrated that a deliberate 
association between these activities can produce positive benefits. 
What is needed by the NHS is a procedure which accentuates and 
reinforces the linkages between planning and management, instead of 
highlighting, as the study has shown, their distinctiveness. Such a 
process would have to demonstrate that the discipline inherent in 
planning, especially that of long-range or strategic planning, would 
not be sacrificed in the interest of expedient or incremental 
decision-making. Strategic management would seem to offer just such a 
potential to make the linkage between planning and management because 
it uniquely combines the discipline inherent in a system with the 
flexibility necessary for the development and implementation of 
policies. 
Strategic Management - an agent for change 
Why strategic management? The concept embodies two separate but not 
mutually exclusive components: strategic vision and effective 
implementation, both of which have often been lacking in NHS planning. 
The first, strategic vision, refers to the climate necessary for 
strategic management; that is, the synthesis of the merits of NHS 
planning with the all-important local strategic outlook. It is this 
latter component, sometimes referred to as the 'vision of the firm', 
wh~ch has often been missing from planning and policy-making as the 
research has illustrated. Strategic vision is commonly regarded to be 
the corporate philosophy or statement of basic principles which 
governs the manner or direction in which an organisation seeks to 
develop. The purpose of a corporate philosophy is threefold: 
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i) to communicate to both employees and customers the central 
purpose which underpins, guides and motivate the organisation; 
ii) to provide a framework which governs the relationship between the 
organisation, those who work in it, and the wider environment 
within which it operates; and 
iii) to state in broad terms the objectives to which the firm 
aspires with regard to future development and performance (Hax 
and Majluf, 1984). 
The second, effective implementation, implies in practical terms an 
analysis and evaluation of problems and options, and taking positive 
planning and managerial initiatives. As the study has shown, 
particularly from the experience of the JPTE, this is not something at 
which the NHS is especially good. The Partnership was much more 
effective as a planning and policy-making body but then it possessed 
some key ingredients, which the JPTE did not nor, on the evidence 
presented, was ever likely to achieve as it was constituted. The 
Partnership was able to proceed where the JPTE failed because of 
political support, committed leadership, and the ability to effect its 
own policy. This latter feature is very crucial indeed, and 
exemplifies the important and necessary bond between planning and 
management. 
The thrust of strategic managment is implicit in the term - the 
emphasis is on change. And, although the stress is very much on what 
should occur in the future, it should be remarked that it is the steps 
taken today which dictate whether or not the future becomes a reality. 
The strategic management process therefore must be firmly grounded in 
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the realities of today but equally must have a clear vision of the 
future. Thus it has the capability to enhance in a more positive way 
than hitherto both managerial understanding and planning and policy-
making in the NHS. 
The specific objective of strategic management is "the development of 
corporate values, managerial capabilities, organisational 
responsibilities, and administrative systems which link strategic and 
operational decision-making at all heirarchical levels and across all 
.•• functional lines of authority" (Hax and Majluf, 1984, p. 72). 
This description by Hax and Majluf is a useful starting point as it 
clearly identifies what strategic management seeks to do. What is not 
conveyed, however, is any sense of how it should and could be 
accomplished. To be fair, Hax and Majluf do offer a portfolio for 
strategic planning but one that is based entirely on commercial 
principles. Thus the techniques they discuss are those which operate 
well in a business or commercial environment but do not readily 
translate to a multifarious public sector organisation such as the 
NHS. 
The concept of strategic management does commend itself but a 
different model to that of Hax and Majluf must be devised if the 
concept is to be of value to the health service. Such a model is 
described below; one which marries the key attributes of strategic 
change with the necessary understanding of the diverse nature and 
function of the NHS. 
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Strategic management as an activity contains three connected steps: 
strategic review; strategic planning; and, strategic change. 
Although the operation has three stages, in reality strategic 
management is a fluid process as figure 10.1 indicates. This means 
that although different levels can be distinguished, there is 
continual movement from one rung to another, backwards and forwards, 
as conditions and information change in light of the activities 
undertaken. However, for the sake of convenience each layer is 
considered seperately. 
Strategic Review A three-part operation which begins with the 
identification of strategic problems, which, for instance, may centre 
around the longer term availability and utilisation of resources; the 
efficiency and effectiveness of existing services in the light of 
known or projected changes in demand; and, the manner in which 
resources and services are currently organised and the modifications 
which may be required in a continually changing environment. Once the 
strategic problems have been defined some consideration must be given 
to an evaluation of the environmental factors associated with the 
problems. These may be, for example, the likely influence on the 
health status of the community; the impact of social, political and 
technological change on resources, services, and/or the organisation; 
and the implications for inter-organisational relationships, arising 
from specific strategic problems. Describing strategic problems and 
evaluating the environmental factors implicit in them is insufficient 
without some assessment of the potential responsiveness of present 
policies and services. The sorts of questions which seem relevant 
are: 
Figure 10.1. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT- A FLUID PROCESS 
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a) whether or not current trends in service provision will be 
sufficient or adequate in response to the likely demand for and 
use of resources; 
b) what is the life expectancy of existing capital assets, are they 
relevant to the changes proposed and of the appropriate quality; 
and, 
c) will the projected revenue allocations satisfy the changes 
envisaged and if not what would be the likely consequences? 
Strategic Planning It begins with an affirmation of the objectives to 
be pursued. An objective in this case is a statement of purpose or 
intent of a desired condition to be reached at some point in the 
future. This implies that choice must be made between the range of 
demands to be satisfied, and that the objectives so chosen should be 
clearly and concisely stated but not so precise as to be restrictive. 
The aim is for objectives that are easily understood and acceptable to 
the organisation and those who work and/or come in contact with it, 
and this can only be accomplished through the application of an agreed 
mechanism for determining priorities. It is also necessary and 
important to bear in mind the likely effects of choosing certain 
objectives over others as regards relationships within the 
organisation and linkages with outside bodies and agencies. The 
logistics and programming required to achieve this should be clearly 
articulated so that no misunderstandings arise to jeopardise the 
procedure. 
The next step, once the objectives have been identified and 
delineated, is the generation of feasible, acceptable, alternative 
- 229 -
means and the medium by which the policy or objective is put into 
practice. The feasibility of the alternative means must be judged and 
evaluated according to political, social, economic, and technical 
criteria which can only be determined in the light of local 
circumstances. Failure to undertake this assessment of the various 
means could well threaten the viability of the changes under 
consideration, and ultimately endanger the validity of the strategic 
planning process. 
Deciding between objectives and generating feasible alternative means 
are of little value unless these activities are actively supported 
through the decision-making machinery. Such system support has many 
facets but there are some which are of particular importance. These 
can be stated as: the role of the planning manager; planning the 
planning; and analytical support. The role of the planning manager 
is crucial and because planning tasks and responsibilities are 
generally spread amongst several individuals it is important that 
each knows who does what, why and, if appropriate, how. Equally, the 
plan must be planned which means that there should be a document or 
procedure prepared which outlines the targets to be achieved in 
quantitative, qualitiative, and temporal terms. Analytical support 
refers to factual or base data necessary to sustain decision-making. 
This necessitates an established management information system and 
might include any additional material considered necessary which may 
be derived as appropriate from epidemiological studies, economic 
analaysis, operational research and so on. 
- 230 -
Strategic Change The level at which the necessary climate for change 
is created and nurtured. There are three ingredients essential to 
facilitating strategic change. The first component is settling and 
instituting the strategy. In the preceding stages considerable 
stress was placed on ensuring that the overall aims, objectives and 
policies of the organisation were fully and widely understood - a 
crucial factor in the implementation of any strategy. Thus generating 
commitments is a sine qua non for strategic change. The conditions 
required for producing and sustaining commitment, according to Martin 
and Nicholls are: 
"a sense of belonging to the organisation, a sense of excitement 
in the job, and confidence in management leadership" (1985, p. 
56). 
Creating a shared understanding must also be coupled with more mundane 
activities such as a timetable indicating what requires doing and 
when, and identifying initial tasks. 
The second constituent is gearing up the organisation in terms of 
allocating tasks and functions in accordance with the organisational 
structure. The structure also has an additional contribution in that 
individuals who assume responsibility for certain tasks and functions 
should be held accountable for any failure to carry out their 
activities as required. All this should be undertaken within a 
defined framework or modus operandi which clearly sets out the 
latitude and limitations associated with the allocated duties. The 
third and most crucial part of all is the continuing process of 
managing change. This requires good decisive management leadership 
at all levels of the organisation capable of motivating staff and 
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colleagues alike, a system of incentives which rewards success but 
does not punish failure caused by factors beyond the individual's or 
group's ability to master, and a set of control mechanisms which are 
fair, but firm. Freeman has termed this activity 'stakeholder 
management' because it 
" refers to the necessity for an organisation to manage the 
relationship with its specific stakeholder groups in an action-
oriented way" 
where stakeholders are defined as 
"any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of an organisation's purpose" (1985, p. 53) 
Thus strategic change could be summarised as commitment and 
involvement. 
Strategic management offers considerable potential as a change agent 
for the NHS. Unlike some other mechanisms, such as the formal 
planning system, it does not attempt to provide a prescription for 
tackling the strategic problems facing health authorities. The key 
ingredient of strategic management is the emphasis on integration, the 
marriage of the formal planning system with local strategic vision to 
produce policies, plans and programmes that are acceptable across the 
board. There is also a recognition that no matter how good are one's 
policies and plans, they are of little value if they cannot be 
implemented and therefore strategic management is also concerned with 
bargaining, negotiation and consultation and the need to develop 
positive managerial initiatives to affect policy change. In other 
words, an acknowledgement that consensus especially in the multi-
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professional NHS is a crucial element in transforming policies from 
statements of intent into plans of action. 
The management of today's health service is a difficult enough task 
without the additional consideration of how health care should and 
could be provided in the future. Managing change is never easy; the 
management of future change is especially problematical, not least in 
the difficulty of anticipating all future events. And yet the manager 
is continually having to cope with ever changing organisational, 
political, social, and economic environments. The endorsement and 
application of the concept of strategic management in the NHS should 
assist in the creation of health policies and plans capable of 
producing the desired future change. 
There are many factors which impinge on the planning and policy-making 
process, some are understood but some are not; what is clear, 
however, is that the creation and implementation of a formal planning 
system and the introduction of planning teams to operate the system 
does not guarantee success as the research has shown. Structural 
changes are, at best, enabling mechanisms. It is only through a 
subtle blend of leadership, commitment, sacrifice, and common 
understanding on the part of planners, policy-makers and the public 
that planning will effect change in the NHS. 
The essence of strategic management is sensitivity to what the 
organisation stands for, the individuals and groups working within it, 
and to the people it serves. Understanding the complexities of this 
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relationship is a pre-requisite for generating change. Strategic 
management provides a framework for constituting such understanding 
and builds upon this base to develop health care policies, plans, 
and programmes which ensure the commitment of both provider and 
receptor. 
APPENDIX ONE 
AN AIDE MEMOIRE FOR DISCUSSION 
Interview Topics 
1. As a member of a planning team how would you describe your 
contribution, within the team, to the formulation of policy and 
the development of those plans necessary to carry out that 
policy? 
2. Consultation is considered to be an important attribute in 
planning, yet it has become rather discredited simply because it 
was not seen as providing the response which those in planning 
sought. What is your position regarding consultation? Who 
should be involved, and why, and at what stage in the planning 
cycle should they become involved? 
3. Despite the best of intentions, planning teams do not often 
produce policies wholly acceptable to the health authority and 
consequently, the policies which are endorsed are generally 
prepared by the authority's planning staff. This observation 
appears to be supported in respect of the planning team for the 
elderly and less so for the mentally handicapped. What is your 
perception and if shared, what reasons can you suggest for this 
lack of congruence between plans and decision-making? 
4. How would you describe your relationship with local 
authority/health authority members of the planning team? 
5. The health authority and local authority, whilst sharing similar 
responsibilities for certain groups of people (e.g. the elderly, 
handicapped), often have very different views on the type of care 
required. Do you consider this to be an insurmountable obstacle 
to the development of joint programmes? 
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6. Some commentators suggest that there is reluctance by some 
members of the planning team to become actively involved in local 
issues, preferring instead to focus their attention to national 
policies and then the possible local impact of these policies. 
What is your opinion of this assessment? 
7. It has been suggested that the existence of an established 
service or range of facilities for a specific client group is a 
distinct barrier to the development of innovative policies. Would 
you care to comment on the validity of this statement? 
8. There are many factors, external and internal to the health 
sector, which influence the formulation of health policies. The 
various circulars and guidance from the DHSS and others suggest 
that multi-disciplinary planning teams are the most appropriate 
forJID for coping with complex policy issues. What is your view 
on this? 
9. Some commentators suggest that of the many groups involved in 
planning only two predominate - the medical profession and the 
adminstrator/planner. If this is so, why? 
10. The role of the chairperson of the planning team is often seen as 
being crucial to the working of that team. This is because of 
influence over agenda items, understanding of the political 
environment, and the commitment brought to the position. How 
valid, in your view, is this assessment? 
11. What should be the role, responsibility, and accountability of 
the Authority's planning staff? 
12. Would you expect them to be passive supporters of the views of 
those providing care, or as advocates for a more wider debate, 
amongst all parties affected by the health services, on the 
problems facing the Authority? 
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